

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Political Science Department -- Theses,
Dissertations, and Student Scholarship

Political Science, Department of

Summer 7-2021

Navigating Non-Physical Borders: An Examination of the Boundaries of Exclusion and Ideas About Inclusion of Immigrants in American Communities

Alison O'Toole

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses>



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#)

O'Toole, Alison, "Navigating Non-Physical Borders: An Examination of the Boundaries of Exclusion and Ideas About Inclusion of Immigrants in American Communities" (2021). *Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship*. 55.

<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/55>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

NAVIGATING NON-PHYSICAL BORDERS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
BOUNDARIES OF EXCLUSION AND IDEAS ABOUT INCLUSION OF
IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

by

Alison K. O'Toole

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Political Science

Under the Supervision of Professor Elizabeth Theiss-Morse

Lincoln, Nebraska

August, 2021

NAVIGATING NON-PHYSICAL BORDERS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
BOUNDARIES OF EXCLUSION AND IDEAS ABOUT INCLUSION OF
IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

Alison K. O'Toole, Ph.D.

University of Nebraska, 2021

Advisor: Elizabeth Theiss-Morse

Are exclusionary boundaries drawn by those who aren't accepting of immigrants malleable? Do beliefs about inclusion on the part of those who tend to be more accepting toward immigrants have limits? To address these questions, I look at the major factors that I believe influence reactions to immigrants: national identity and trust, and values. This dissertation contributes to two important goals. The first is to help ensure that long-term residents in communities accept people from diverse cultures and backgrounds. The second is softening the divisive power of the immigration issue to make it less of a staple in the arsenal of partisan and ideological warfare that currently plagues the American political landscape. Though attitudes about immigration are widely studied, often the boundaries of exclusion and ideas about inclusion are taken for granted. I argue that both exclusive and inclusive tendencies toward immigrants are complex and defy stereotypical categorization. Various aspects of this argument are tested using two survey experiments. In Chapter 2, I find that although trust and attitudes toward immigrants appear to be preset and difficult to manipulate in the minds of people who identify strongly with the American national identity, not all strong national identifiers are alike. It is only when strong national identity is coupled with low institutional trust that attitudes toward immigrants are significantly negatively affected. In Chapter 3, I find that "liking" fully

mediates the relationship between values and behavioral intentions toward immigrants.

The relevant values are self-transcendence and conservation. In everyday situations where different cultures come into contact with one another, inclusivity as pure, positive acceptance is a reaction experienced by very few. For the majority of people who are generally pro-diversity, norms violations and different sets of values create real conflicts. Overall, my dissertation shows that attitudes and reactions toward immigrants defy stereotypical images of the “racist conservative” or the morally superior liberal on issues of diversity

To Sofia and Linda, love you both dearly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am so grateful for my journey through UNL's Political Science Department. The professors and staff are kind, generous, and provide a supportive and stimulating environment that both encourages and pushes graduate students to be their best. I first met Beth Theiss-Morse as an undergraduate student trying to make my way through a graduate level course she was teaching. Her early encouragement and belief in my abilities went a long way in helping me have the courage to go for my dreams and apply for the graduate program. Little did I know then that she would eventually become my dissertation chair and an even larger part of my academic journey. Thank you, Beth, for your kindness, sincerity, encouragement, and support through the entire process, from pre-beginning to end. Although a well-known and successful scholar and administrator, Beth was never condescending, was always easy to talk to, and managed to make time to meet with me throughout my dissertation process whenever I needed it, despite her own challenging schedule full of administrative duties and deadlines. Her unique mix of constructive critique, kindness, and patience make her a rare leader indeed. I'll always be grateful for her example and friendship.

I am also sincerely grateful to a handful of other mentors in the department. In the beginning stages of my research for this project, Sergio Wals was incredibly generous with his time. He took care to show me that work to understand immigration started generations ago. His kindness, skill, and conversations provided much needed guidance and support. Patrice McMahon's professionalism and special way of looking at the world of human rights and interstate relations made her classes memorable and thought

provoking. Her strength of character inspired me from early on and I am thankful for her continued support and inspiration. Sarah Michaels' courses were some of the most challenging and rewarding experiences I had as a graduate student. She has a way of inspiring hard work and diligence by setting high standards in her courses that students must rise to meet. I greatly appreciate her unique way of giving practical, useful advice and for seeing the connections between research and the real world in clear and meaningful ways. I'm also grateful for the input of the UNL Public Policy Center Director, Mario Scalora, who made time to commit to being a part of my committee and provided invaluable insight and ideas in the early stages of the research process.

My mother, Linda, and my daughter, Sofia, have been my ultimate center for support and inspiration. I am so grateful to my mother for always being there to tell me what I need to hear and for being my greatest friend. Sofia ensured that I never got too lost in the sea of endless deadlines and projects, I will always cherish the time I took to enjoy life at her side and watch her grow and prosper alongside me. I'd like to thank Dave for bringing interesting conversations about community and political events to family discussions and for continuing to believe in and support me. I'd like to thank my father, Pat, for making sure I remember there are many different political viewpoints and for being there for both Sofia and I whenever we need him. And a special thanks to my brother, Kane, for being a source of security and for helping to make sure Sof and I have fun whenever possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	vii
List of Figures	x
List of Appendices Tables	xi
List of Appendices Figures	xiv
1. Introduction	1
1.1 The Argument	2
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation	6
2. Love Thy Country, Hate Thy Neighbor: National Identity, Institutional Trust, and Attitudes Toward Immigrant Diversity.....	9
2.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses	11
2.2 Study Design	19
2.3 Results	29
2.4 Assessment	39
2.5 Conclusion	53
3. Normative Deviance and Unwilling Hosts: Pushing the Limits of Inclusivity	55
3.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses	58
3.2 Study Design	76
3.3 Results	98
3.4 Discussion	101
3.5 Conclusion	112
4. Conclusion	115

4.1 Findings and Implications	115
4.2 Limitations and Future Research	122
4.3 Conclusion	123

Appendices

Chapter 2 Appendices	125
Chapter 3 Appendices	143
References	174

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Strength of National identity Index	21
2.2	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Attitude Toward Immigrant Index	23
2.3	Descriptive Statistics	28
2.4	Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Government Institutions	31
2.5	Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Public Institutions	32
2.6	Linear Regressions of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables	39
2.7	Table of Unrotated Factor Loadings for Five Indices	42
2.8	Correlation Coefficients, Alphas for All Items, and Overall Index Alpha	42
2.9	Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government	44
2.10	Bivariate Relationships for Immigrant Attitudes and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government	44
2.11	Bivariate Relationships for Political Ideology and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government	44
2.12	Bivariate Relationships: Political Ideology and Attitudes Toward Immigrants, NI Attachment and Attitudes Toward Immigrants, and NI Attachment and Political Ideology	45

2.13	Coefficients from Linear Regression of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables and Trust Index Interactions	47
2.14	Model 2 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength	48
2.15	Model 4 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength	49
2.16	Model 6 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength	50
3.1	Definitions of 19 Basic Values	61
3.2	Value Orientations and Associated Behavioral Outcomes	76
3.3	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Openness to Change	81
3.4	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Self-Transcendence	81
3.5	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Self-Enhancement	82
3.6	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Conservation	82
3.7	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Like Index	83
3.8	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Full 14-Item Behavioral Index	86
3.9	Behavioral Intention Motivations	87
3.10	Factor Loadings and Alphas for Anxiety, Aversion, and Enthusiasm Indices ..	88
3.11	Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 (Ali – Prolific Sample)	91
3.12	ANOVAs With Vignettes, Values Similarity, and Feelings	95
3.13	Bivariate Relationships for Political Ideology and Value Orientation	97
3.14	ANOVAs With Values and Political Ideology	97

3.15	Linear Regression Models Examining Mediation of Liking Between Values and Behavior	100
3.16	Predicted Simple Main Effects of Vignettes by Different levels of Self-Transcendence Across Liking	103
3.17	Predicted Simple Main Effects of Vignettes by Different levels of Conservation Across Liking	106
3.18	Predicted Effect of Liking on Behavioral Intention	112
3.19	Values Orientation and Vignette Group Behavioral Intention Scoring	112

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Conceptual Model	29
2.2 National Identity Attachment by 6-Item Trust Index Interaction	48
2.3 National Identity Attachment by 5-Item Trust Index Interaction	49
2.4 National Identity Attachment by Institutional Trust Interaction	50
3.1 Theoretical Model	58
3.2 19 Basic Values	60
3.3 Path Model With Coefficients	101
3.4 Graph of Self-Transcendence by Vignette Group Interaction Regressed Across Liking	103
3.5 Graph of Conservation by Vignette Group Interaction Regressed Across Liking	106
3.6 Graph of Liking Across Behavioral Intention Score Predictions	111

LIST OF APPENDICES TABLES

Appendix 2.1, Table 2.1 Vignettes	125
Appendix 2.2, Table 2.2 Full Model With All Control Variables for Both Adult (Models 1 and 2) and Student (Models 3 and 4) Samples	127
Appendix 2.2a, Table 2.0 Student Sample Demographics	128
Appendix 2.2a, Table 2.1 Coefficients from Linear Regression of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables and Trust Index Interactions in Student Sample ..	130
A.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part 1, Sample from Dynata Survey Platform	145
A.3.2 Original Vignettes for Study 1, Part 1	147
A.3.3 Crosstabs for Aamira Vignettes and Dichotomous Anxiety (Dynata Sample)..	149
A.3.4 Crosstabs for Ali Vignettes and Dichotomous Anxiety (Dynata Sample)	149
A.3.5 Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Dynata Sample)	150
A.3.6 ANOVA With Vignettes Across Liking (Ali – Dynata Sample)	150
A.3.7 Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Aamira – Dynata Sample)	150
A.3.8 ANOVA With Vignettes Across Liking (Aamira – Dynata Sample)	150
A.3.9 Linear Regression Models for Aamira Condition to Test Vignette Group Impact Across Liking, Invite to Home, and Friendship Variables (Dynata Sample)	151
A.3.10 Linear Regression Models for Ali Condition to Test Vignette Group Impact Across Liking, Invite to Home, and Friendship Variables (Dynata Sample)	152

B.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test (Aamira – Prolific Sample)	153
B.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test (Ali – Prolific Sample)	155
B.3.3 Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test – Revised Vignette Structure (Aamira)	157
B.3.4 Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test – Revised Vignette Structure (Ali) ..	158
B.3.5 ANOVA Summary of Vignette data on Anxiety (Ali – Prolific Sample) ..	160
B.3.6 ANOVA for Ali Condition, Vignettes Across Anxiety (Prolific Sample)..	160
B.3.7 ANOVA Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Ali – Prolific Sample) ...	160
B.3.8 ANOVA for Ali Condition, Vignettes Across Liking (Prolific Sample) ...	160
B.3.9 Summary of Vignette data on Anxiety (Aamira – Prolific Sample)	161
B.3.10 ANOVA for Aamira Condition, Vignettes Across Anxiety (Prolific Sample)	161
B.3.11 Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Aamira – Prolific Sample)	161
B.3.12 ANOVA for Aamira Condition, Vignettes Across Liking (Prolific Sample)	161
B.3.13 Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Liking (Prolific Sample)	162
B.3.14 Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Anxiety (Prolific Sample)	163
B.3.15 Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Neighbor (Prolific Sample)	164

C.3.1 Study 2 Revised Vignette Structure (Ali – Only)	165
C.3.2 Study 2 Final Vignette Structure (Ali – Only)	166
D.3.1 Value Items and Codes	167
E.3.1 Like Measure Items	169
E.3.2 Behavioral Index Questions	170
F.3.1 Linear Regression Models Examining Mediation of Liking Between Values and Behavior	173

LIST OF APPENDICES FIGURES

A.2.1 Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the 6-Item Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 2 in Table 2.13)	131
A.2.2 Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the 5-Item Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 4 in Table 2.13)	132
A.2.3 Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the Institution-Only Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 6 in Table 2.13)	133
F.3.1 Political Ideology Interaction With Vignettes on Liking	171
F.3.2 Political Ideology Interaction With Vignettes on Behavior	172

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Imagine standing in front of a store and realizing your shirt is on fire. Instinctively you look around in panic, scanning your environment for answers and see a stranger holding a lighter in their hand, sneering. Now imagine it is a hot summer day and you decide to go swimming at a public pool. While swimming, you notice a group of people staring at you and animatedly talking. Shortly after, the pool manager comes over and asks you to leave the pool because you are not properly dressed. A few minutes later, the police arrive to escort you off the premises. Now you are at a park, having a picnic. You are approached by two people glaring at you menacingly. They look you in the eye and tell you to go back where you came from; you don't belong here. These poignant anecdotes are an agglomeration of everyday incidents of behaviors that Muslim women in traditional dress have reported experiencing in the United States (Elmir 2016; Baldeck 2018; Abdelaziz 2020). They are examples of boundaries drawn around who belongs in the community and actions taken to enforce those boundaries.

This project is positioned along the intersection where cultures collide in the United States. This is a large topic. I approach it from two points of focus that include both sides of the immigration debate: boundaries of exclusion on the part of those who aren't accepting of immigrants, and beliefs about inclusion on the part of those who tend to be more accepting toward immigrants. Once immigrants cross over the physical border into the country, they are met in their new communities with citizens' ideas about who belongs and who doesn't. Citizens draw boundaries around who they feel deserves membership in their social group and these boundaries serve as the second set of borders that must be navigated by newcomers. Understanding the nature of these nonphysical

borders contributes to two important goals. The first is to help ensure that long term residents in communities accept the right of people from diverse cultures and backgrounds to live among them. The second is softening some of the divisive power of the immigration issue so that it is less of a staple in the arsenal of partisan and ideological warfare that currently plagues the American political landscape.

1.1 THE ARGUMENT

Contemporary scholarship increasingly supports the argument that the main cleavage in the United States is the widening divide between partisan orientations (Iyengar & Westwood 2015; Brandt et al. 2014; Crawford & Pilanski 2014; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1982) and political ideologies (Mason 2018). Viewing Republicans and Democrats and liberals and conservatives as standing on opposite sides of contentious political issues is not only counterproductive but also dangerous, as the capitol riots that occurred while Congress was confirming President Joe Biden's electoral college victory in January of 2021 demonstrate (Tan, et al. 2021). Lilliana Mason (2018) argues for a distinction between issue-based and identity-based elements of political ideology and finds that polarization and social distancing between liberals and conservatives occurs regardless of whether there is real disagreement about the issues because for many people, political ideology is a social rather than issue-based association. I argue that despite this, providing a deeper understanding about motivations for issue stances on both sides of the immigration divide can improve understanding between the polarized political identities because often the issue stances are used as kindling to the flames that widen the divide.

The first part of this dissertation tests how strong boundaries of exclusion are in order to provide guidance for reducing negativity toward immigrants. Exclusion and boundary drawing are understood through the lens of national identity and the impact of institutional trust. National identity is at the forefront when it comes to thinking about the acceptance of immigrants because it remains a primary distinguishing characteristic between people who come from different geographical areas of the world. American national identity has developed over a historical path that has favored the ingroup characteristics of Anglo-Saxon Protestants (Citrin & Sears 2014). Ideals of the true American prototype have therefore centered on this identity. People who strongly identify with the American national identity hold this ideal most closely and use it to determine where boundaries ought to be drawn around group membership (Theiss-Morse 2009). I look at whether the power of institutional trust can be leveraged to get strong national identifiers to be more inclusive. Exclusion is related to inclusion because social groups are composed of both members (inclusion) and boundaries (exclusion) (Brewer 2003). After the focus on national identity as a group identity to understand and try to manipulate boundaries of community membership, values become the focus at the individual level and serve as the starting point from which to critically understand and try to manipulate the limits of inclusion.

Focusing on the limits of inclusion helps to construct a potential bridge between partisan and ideological divides because I argue that people on different sides of the immigration question have common mechanisms driving them to be either inclusive or exclusive and these common mechanisms can be used to promote understanding of opposing viewpoints. Democrats and liberals tend to be pro-diversity (Citrin et al. 2009;

Kunovich 2009; Fussel 2014) and Republicans and conservatives tend to be more exclusionary toward immigrants (Pettigrew, Thomas, Ulrich Wagner, & Christ 2007; Citrin et al. 2009).¹ When taken as a starting point rather than a conclusion, these findings raise immediate questions. For example, what drives the Republican and conservative tendency toward exclusion? Is it racial and ethnic prejudice as heated exchanges on Twitter often insinuate or is something else going on?

A growing body of work suggests that both sides of the ideological spectrum exhibit intolerance in the face of conflicting ideals about what is right and what is wrong (Brandt et al. 2014; Morgan et al. 2010). My dissertation contributes to this literature by testing the argument in everyday interactions with immigrants. The findings suggest that the tendency to exclude immigrants is often driven by a real need to protect tradition and social norms. When norms are violated in public spaces in dress or behavior, they are interpreted as direct threats to social stability and in these situations, anxiety greatly affects individuals' interpretation of events and estimations of those at the heart of them. This finding does not excuse ill treatment of immigrants and, to be sure, there are those who are simply prejudiced, but it does allow a nuanced explanation that uncovers new pathways from which to diminish right-left misunderstanding and outright contention between the two sides of the issue. It is easy for more inclusive people to close their minds toward those perceived to be prejudiced and backward, dismissing them as callous

¹ The data in Chapter 3 show that liberalism is correlated with orienting toward self-transcendence values and conservatism is correlated with orienting toward conservation values. Additionally, the mean score for liberals on the self-transcendence index was significantly higher than the mean self-transcendence index score for conservatives. In contrast, the mean score for conservatives on the conservation index was significantly higher than the mean conservation score for liberals on the conservation values index. I therefore discuss conservation orienters as conservative and self-transcendence orienters as being liberal when it comes to political ideology.

and ignorant. It is less easy to engage in this dismissal if it is widely understood that a good number of people who struggle with accepting difference are reacting with exclusionary attitudes and behaviors because their sense of security is under fire.

At the other side of the equation, are Democrats and liberals really so open or are there limits to inclusion? In not taking openness as a blanket idea that somehow gets people moral points for being more progressive and accepting than their “close minded” counterparts, we can open the door for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at play that lead to both inclusive and exclusive forces in the social arena. Gaining a deeper knowledge of where the boundaries of inclusion lie can help us to understand how opposing viewpoints may arise from more similar processes than we often assume. For example, in Chapter 3, only the top 10% of more open individuals did not experience some cognitive difficulty in overcoming negativity toward an immigrant when a public display of a normative violation was described and values dissonance was made salient. This finding helps to paint a more delicate picture of what inclusivity really means. In everyday situations where different cultures come into contact with one another, inclusivity as pure, positive acceptance is a reaction experienced by very few. For the majority of people who are generally pro-diversity, norms violations and different sets of values create real conflicts. This means that inclusivity, like exclusivity, is often accompanied with a level of internal struggle. The overarching purpose of this work is to untangle reactions on both sides, so that a greater understanding can be reached about the roots of feelings on different sides of this important issue and how those roots translate into behaviors toward new and different people in American communities.

1.2 DISSERTATION OUTLINE

The broad overarching questions in this dissertation ask whether the boundaries of exclusion are malleable and whether inclusivity has limits. To address these questions, I broke the topic down into the major factors that I believe influence reactions to immigrants: national identity and trust, and values. There are other factors that help explain people's attitudes about immigrants and narrowing the field when thinking about how to address the most important problems communities face today in managing immigrant integration is a challenging task. For example, attitudes toward immigrants may be attached to economic threat (Olzak, 1992; Citrin et al., 1997; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010), feelings of alienation (Espenshade & Hempstead 1996), trait predispositions (Freitag & Rapp 2015), or generalized social trust (Herrerros & Criado 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). These are important topics, but I have chosen to focus on key psychological influences on people's behavior because I believe these are the most relevant in terms of thinking about how to smooth social tensions in everyday lived experiences. I argue that national identity and trust best address exclusion and that values best address individual ideas about inclusion.

Chapter 2 uses a survey experiment to test whether negative attitudes toward immigrants can be moved to be more positive in the minds of those who are inclined to exclude immigrants from their social group. Those inclined or predisposed in this way tend to be ideologically conservative strong national identifiers. The conceptual framework of this study builds on theories about national identity and boundary drawing (Theiss-Morse 2009) and work done on the effects of institutional trust on social tolerance (Halapuu et al. 2013; Mannemar-Sønderskov et al. 2016). The survey measures

the strength of people's national identity attachment and manipulates institutional trust with vignettes that prime trust in religious institutions, law enforcement agencies, and public school systems. Political ideology is found to be the primary force driving attitudes toward immigrants. Priming institutional trust did not shift people's attitudes toward immigrants, which suggests that immigrant attitudes and levels of trust are preset in people's minds and change may not be possible when these attitudes are driven by ideology and are closely interrelated to deeply held beliefs and viewpoints. I also find that trust is an important component of immigrant attitudes; it helped to distinguish between different shades of attitude among strong national identifiers. It is only when institutional trust is low that attitudes toward immigrants are predicted to become more negative as strength of national identity increases.

Chapter 3 shifts focus to the other side of the ideological divide where the inclination is to be more open and welcoming to immigrants. This study is designed to uncover some of the underlying cognitive mechanisms that drive how long-term residents process and navigate interactions with immigrants in everyday life. The theoretical framework of the project interweaves literatures on values, the anxiety-inducing effects of normative violations, attitudes of liking and disliking, and social tolerance. The focus of this study is to examine how anxiety from values dissonance and normative violations relate to people's attitudes (liking) toward immigrants and then how liking affects behavioral intentions toward immigrants in everyday social situations. I find that liking fully mediates the impact of values on behavioral intentions. The two values that matter for immigrant attitudes and behavioral intentions are self-transcendence and conservation. For more open and pro-diversity oriented individuals, it was only at the

highest levels of self-transcendence (a score of one on a zero to one index) that values dissonance and normative violations did not produce any sort of cognitive struggle when evaluating a described immigrant and deciding behavioral intentions toward them. As mentioned above, only about 10% of the sample population scored this high on the self-transcendence value orientation index. For more exclusionary oriented individuals, the introduction of anxiety by making values dissonance and normative violations salient lowered estimations of the immigrant and caused cognitive struggle across the board.

The concluding chapter highlights the major findings from Chapters 2 and 3, discusses how to use the findings to help communities navigate social contentions between immigrants and long-term residents, and discusses project limitations and future research. Based on the findings from the dissertation, I recommend a triple element approach to immigrant-related contentions in communities. First, official policy must be aware of and specifically address issues that arise from the clash of cultures in a way that acknowledges and validates all parties involved while addressing fairness, the guaranteed rights of all individuals, and general limitations with which all people living under a social contract are expected to comply. Second, public education must be conscious of avoiding ethnocentric and limited views of what it means to be American and who represents the American national identity. Third, municipalities should consciously and actively promote understanding between long-term residents and immigrants through festivals, concerts, and interfaith dinners that celebrate diversity through sharing and building familiarity.

CHAPTER 2: LOVE THY COUNTRY, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: NATIONAL IDENTITY, INSTITUTIONAL TRUST, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANT DIVERSITY

How do we understand the boundaries of social exclusion when it comes to immigrants? In the current project, I argue that this question hinges on the social dynamics of national identity and institutional trust. Some people welcome immigrants and the diversity they introduce into the community, while others find it more difficult to be inclusive. The primary expectation of this chapter is that institutional trust can be leveraged in a way that leads to more accepting attitudes toward immigrants for those who find it more difficult to be inclusive. In line with previous findings, I expect that people who identify strongly with the American national identity will tend to be more exclusive toward immigrants (Theiss-Morse 2009). A survey experiment is utilized to examine whether strong national identifiers are also more likely to more fully trust in their country's governmental institutions. Building on this expectation, I then test whether reminding strong national identifiers of the capabilities of their government and community institutions to successfully integrate newcomers can lead them to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants.

Empirical evidence showing that reminding strong national identifiers that they can trust their governmental institutions to successfully integrate immigrants into their communities can improve attitudes toward immigrants can provide a model for strategic public information campaigns that positively associate institutional capability with successful immigrant integration. This information could be disseminated via infomercials on local television stations, pamphlets, and/or political discussions by policymakers. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is that it tests one relatively

low-cost strategy that community leaders could potentially use to mitigate negative attitudes toward immigrants.

It is important to study the intersection of cultures in established communities because if immigrant diversity is not well received, a host of negative effects that reduce the quality of social life can arise. The overall cohesion of human society rests minimally on a basic distribution of equal rights and treatment and the absence of major intergroup cleavages (Easterly, Ritzan, & Woolcock 2006). Broadly, negative attitudes toward immigrants can lower social cohesion in terms of alienating immigrant groups. This alienation tends to have detrimental effects on the mental health of immigrants (Yakushko 2009) and can increase and reify ethnocentrism (Perez 2014). Yet the effects also cut more deeply into the heart of our social structures. Negativity toward immigrant individuals or groups stokes divisiveness and resentment and if left unchecked can lead to marginalization and cleavages between different social groups (Portes & Vickstrom 2011).

The theoretical framework employed for this project weaves together literature on attitudes toward immigrants, national identity in terms of boundary drawing around group membership, and institutional trust. The outcome of interest is attitudes toward immigration. Attitudes are defined as beliefs about an object, person, or group. They incorporate positive or negative evaluations (Eagly & Chaiken 1993), which lead to behavioral orientations toward the target object (Sullivan et al. 1982). In the immigration context, individual attitudes represent a person's beliefs, evaluations, and behavior orientations toward immigrants in their community. Attitudes toward immigrants may be attached to feelings of cultural threat (Hopkins et al. 2014), beliefs about the economy or

feelings of alienation (Espenshade & Hempstead 1996), identity orientations (Jeong 2013; Creighton 2016), or trait predispositions (Freitag & Rapp 2015), but they are also motivated by a mixture of sometimes competing underlying values (Sagiv & Schwartz 1995) and can be adapted due to inflows of information and experiences (Sniderman et al. 2004). I highlight individual levels of national identity attachment as an important driver of attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity and look at how specific inflows of information might adapt these attitudes.

2.1 Literature Review & Hypotheses

Independent Variable: National Identity Attachment

National identity is defined in this project in terms of a social identity that is founded on people's sense of belonging toward one another and toward their national community. The identity manifests itself in both formal and informal ways in society. Formally, certain rights and rules structure the legal system. Informally, citizens have beliefs and expectations about what it means to be a member of their national group in terms of what members believe, how they act, and typical personal characteristics (Schildkraut 2011). Individuals often have extremely strong affective and normative attachments to their national group and whether the identity is more ethnic, civic, or some combination of the two it encompasses those formal and informal cultural practices (Citrin & Sears 2014). For the purposes of this paper, two major components of national identity stand out: individuals' level of identification with their national group and the ways that boundaries of group membership are drawn (Theiss-Morse 2009).

The national context matters for how the effects of national identity translate into perceived social membership rights (Miller & Ali 2014). Canada's national identity, for

example, is built on multicultural and more inclusive norms and ideals (Citrin, Johnston, & Wright 2012). National identity in the Netherlands has historically been based on more homogenous characteristics (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007). Therefore, while priming national identity in the Netherlands in one study decreased tolerance for immigrants (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007), priming national identity in Canada did not have the same effect (Breton 2015). One explanation for the content of national identity in the United States is that it has developed amidst nativistic responses to non-British immigration in the nineteenth century, the history of black slavery and inequality, and the usurpation of land from Native Americans. This historical path has favored the ingroup characteristics of Anglo-Saxon Protestants (see Citrin & Sears 2014, p. 2).

In effect, individuals in the United States who identify strongly with the national group tend to be more exclusive with membership by drawing hard boundaries around who “fits the bill” for ideal members. The bill has tended to center around Anglo-Saxon prototypical identities. In contrast, Americans who only weakly identify with the U.S. national identity tend to be more open, inclusive, and less apt to emulate or require the Anglo-Saxon prototypical characteristics for membership (Theiss-Morse 2009). In line with previous findings, I first expect that in the context of the United States:

H1: Strong national identifiers are more likely to harbor negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity than weak national identifiers.

The Moderating Effect of Institutional Trust

Trust is a multifaceted phenomenon in the organizational structure of social life. Cleary and Stokes (2006, chapter 1) discuss both weak and strong forms of trust. Strong, individual trust is based on the belief that a person will follow through with their stated

intentions. Trustworthiness is a form of strong trust that relies on the inherent qualities of the actor earned through repeated instances of following through with one's stated intentions. Weak trust is defined as trust in actors that is possible only through the belief that a third party will punish those who would otherwise be untrustworthy. Because institutions offer nonpersonal standard sets of rules, norms, and behaviors for which noncompliance is punished, interpersonal, or strong trust is not necessary for society to operate cohesively.

I extend this framework of institutional trust to the relationship between citizens (long-term residents)² and immigrants. If citizens are part of a society with strong institutions and they believe in them enough to delegate the responsibility of managing social issues to them, this trust in institutions should relieve those citizens of anxieties associated with nonconformity or difference. In contrast, if citizens do not have trust in the institutions of their society, they will bear the brunt of their social anxieties themselves instead of trusting that the government institutions can handle it for them. Therefore, in theory at least, individuals who personally distrust diverse others, but that do trust in government institutions, should have some assurance that institutions will represent their interests by upholding the social norms they value amidst influxes of people who may be very different from them in both look and behavior.

Previous empirical work supports this thesis. Political trust in general has been linked with support for both political elites and institutions and less risk aversion in

² Long term residents are loosely defined as people who have lived a minimum of 8 years in their community (or 8 years across similar communities within the United States). Ideal participants should have lived in their communities long enough to have internalized the social norms and behaviors of the community (the benchmark of 8 years is based on the Lawful Permanent Resident Laws used by the U.S. tax system). See Tax-Expatriation: < <https://tax-expatriation.com/2014/08/19/who-is-a-long-term-lawful-permanent-resident-lpr-and-why-does-it-matter/> > (accessed July 20th, 2019).

individuals in the United States (Hetherington 1998). Political trust has been shown to be so strong that it survives across borders (Wals 2011). In a study of 28 countries outside of the U.S., Kirchner et al. (2011) found that if institutions are inclusive (measured by the disproportion of votes and allocation of seats for parties in national elections), universal (measured with health care expenditures as percent of GDP), and fair (transparency international corruption index rating), they reduce the perception of threat from outsiders and increase social tolerance. Examining the institutions of parliament, the legal system, the police, and political parties, Halapuu et al. (2013) found a significant and positive relationship between institutional trust and attitudes toward immigrants for both majority and minority populations. A longitudinal study looking at the impact of institutional trust on social trust in Denmark found that institutional trust (in the institutions of parliament, the judiciary, and the police) was the most important contributor to explaining social trust (Mannemar-Sonderskov et al. 2016). Together, these studies provide an increasing amount of support for the importance of institutional trust as an explanatory variable for social tolerance, social trust, and the outcome of interest for the current project: attitudes toward immigrants.

Most of the analyses above focus on the European context and on overarching political institutions such as parliament and the judiciary. I move institutional trust into the role of moderator and focus on the American context. Given the wide variety of more localized American institutions that are involved with immigration in some way (Schneeweis 2011; Foner & Alba 2008; Cade & Ecklund 2007), it is also worthwhile to examine whether different types of more localized institutions differentially impact this relationship. I therefore look at whether priming trust in public schools, religious

organizations, and law enforcement agencies can improve strong national identifiers' attitudes toward immigrants.

To my knowledge, there is a paucity of literature connecting long-term resident trust in these specific types of institutions to attitudes toward immigrants, especially in the context of the United States (but see Halapuu et al. 2013, 2017 for European context; see both Halapuu et al. 2013, 2017 and Mannemar-Sonderskov et al. 2016 for trust in police outside of U.S.). However, the Pew Research Center has collected some data on the levels of trust Americans have in leaders of specific types of U.S. institutions that is informative for establishing expectations for localized institutional trust. A Pew survey conducted in 2018 of U.S. adults used five measures to gauge Americans' level of trust in eight different types of institutions. Of interest here are the results for public school principals, police officers, and religious leaders. The five measures included whether the specified leaders care about average people, are effective at their job, communicate fairly and accurately with the public, handle resources responsibly, and take responsibility for their mistakes.

Public schools play an important role in the acculturation of immigrant children and families to American ways of life (Potochnick 2014). If long-term residents tend to trust in their school systems, this trust may be leverageable to help improve negative attitudes toward immigrants. Long-term residents' trust in the public schools can at least be indirectly assessed through the questions Pew asked about principals of k-12 public schools. Principals fared better than religious leaders and police officers in all measures across demographic groups and partisan lines. A majority of those surveyed believe that principals effectively and honestly communicate with the public (79%), are effective at

their job (72%), take responsibility for their mistakes (65%), and handle resources responsibly (81%). There are slight differences in partisan perceptions. More Democrats tend to believe that principals handle resources responsibly (87% versus 76% respectively) and are effective at their jobs (76% versus 68%).

Like public schools, religious institutions have long been considered entrance points into the American way of life for newcomers (Foner & Alba 2008). They sometimes provide services such as English language classes and study resources for obtaining citizenship, provide foundations for civic identities, and facilitate adaptation to American life (Cadge & Ecklund 2007). Pew's question about trust in religious leaders serves here as a proxy for gauging long-term residents' feelings of trust toward religious institutions. Feelings toward religious leaders in the United States tend to fall across a few different lines: whether respondent "believes" or not, religious affiliation of respondent, and partisanship. Unsurprisingly, people who hold religious beliefs also hold more positive sentiment toward religious leaders across all of the measures. This is especially true when comparing Protestants and Evangelicals to unaffiliated respondents across the measures of whether religious leaders care about average people (82% to 86% versus 56%, respectively), do their jobs effectively (85% to 90% versus 65%), handle resources responsibly (80% to 82% versus 53%), communicate effectively and honestly with the public (79% to 83% versus 46%), and admit responsibility for mistakes (65% to 68% versus 30%). Republicans also consistently agreed at higher levels across all measures: religious leaders care about average people (77% versus 65%), do their jobs effectively (81% versus 72%), handle resources responsibly (76% versus 62%),

communicates effectively and honestly with the public (75% versus 54%), and admits responsibility for mistakes (59% versus 42%).

Given the current political climate, it is perhaps not surprising that trust for police officers in the United States falls along racial lines. Across all of the measures used to gauge trust in police officers in the study, Hispanics and Blacks reported lower levels of trust than Whites. An added measure asking whether police officers treat racial and ethnic groups equally emphasized the divide most strongly with Whites agreeing some or all of the time (72%) compared to Hispanics (49%) and Blacks (33%). Across partisan lines, Republicans consistently agreed at higher levels across the measures than Democrats: police officers care about average people (88% versus 73% respectively), are good at their job (89% versus 79%), communicate earnestly with the public (86% versus 66%), and take responsibility for their mistakes (73% versus 42%). Finally, another Pew study in 2018 found that older people are also more likely to trust principals of k-12 public schools (age 50 and older 81% versus ages 18-29 75%), religious leaders (age 50 and older 71% versus ages 30-49 56% versus ages 18-29 50%), and police officers (85% versus 75% versus 67%).

Overall, the above numbers identify people who are Republican, older, white, and Protestant as the most trusting of the institutional leaders of public schools, religious institutions, and law enforcement agencies. These characteristics align closely with the characteristics of strong national identifiers: being older, white, Christian, less educated, less politically knowledgeable, and trusting of others within the group (Theiss-Morse 2009; Citrin & Sears 2014). In addition, strong national identifiers tend to favorably view their group and their country (Theiss-Morse 2009). Weighing this with the Pew data just

discussed, I expect that strong national identifiers' favorable views of their country extend to local American institutions:

H2: Strong national identifiers are likely to be more trusting of American institutions than weak national identifiers.

Building on hypothesis H2 I more specifically expect that:

H2a: Strong national identifiers are likely to be more trusting of public schools, religious organizations, and law enforcement agencies than weak national identifiers.

Taken together, strong national identifiers will tend to have higher levels of trust in institutions and institutional trust should lead to more inclusive and positive attitudes toward immigrants. If this is the case, then why do people who identify strongly with their national identity and tend to trust institutions more than others also harbor more negative attitudes toward immigrants? I argue below that this logical conundrum is the key to improving strong national identifiers' attitudes toward immigrants.

Experimental Analysis of Priming Effects on Attitudes Toward Diversity

Zaller and Feldman's (1992) model of survey response argues that individuals "carry around in their heads a mix of only partially consistent ideas and considerations" (p. 579). As we have seen, strong national identifiers seem to carry the disconnected beliefs that immigrants are threatening but also that U.S. institutions are capable and trustworthy. This is where priming can help. Priming works by focusing attention. Attention to a particular thought, issue, or subject "influences the weight assigned it" in the process of evaluation (Hetherington & Rudolph 2015, p. 52). Making institutional trust salient should influence strong identifiers to give weight to institutional trust when forming or recalling attitudes toward immigrants. Institutional trust should act as a moderating variable that weakens the impact of strong national identity attachment on

negative attitudes toward diversity. Testing this proposition is the primary focus of this study:

H3: Priming institutional trust should weaken the relationship between strong national identity attachment and negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity.

2.2 Study Design

This expectation is tested with a between-subjects survey experiment where participants are randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In each condition, participants begin by reading information about increasing immigrant influxes into their community. For those assigned to the control condition, the vignette reading stops there and they go directly to the survey questions. For those assigned to one of the three treatment conditions, a second paragraph is included that primes institutional trust by describing how efficient and seamless the specific institution (public school, religious organization, or law enforcement agency) is at integrating and socializing people who are new to the country before respondents answer the survey questions (see Table 1 in Appendix A).

Data

A fellowship from the Political Science Department at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln was awarded for purchase of a survey sample for this study. Qualtrics was used to create the online survey experiment. Data was collected from Dynata, which is an online survey firm that maintains a diverse panel of web-based survey participants. Potential participants who were not American citizens were excluded from the study because this is a study of American attitudes toward immigrants in their communities. Participants took the survey on their own computers when it was convenient for them.

Dynata sends periodic invitations to their panel of potential participants that provide information about the length of the survey and payment amount if they choose to participate.

The sample consists of 441 observations. It is about 53% male and 47% female. About 52% of the participants are Republican, 48% Democrat; 49% are conservative, 32% liberal, and about 17% self-categorize into the middle of the ideological road (see Table A for full enumeration of sample characteristics). The sample is unevenly distributed across age categories. Only about 17% of the sample are between ages 20 to 60, 24% are between 61 to 67, 41% are between 68 to 74, and 17% are 75 or older. This means that the findings may not be widely generalizable to the important age range between 20 and 60. Because of this, results were cross validated with a previously collected pilot sample of college students (see *Appendices 2.2 and 2.2a* for student sample demographics and results). The age generalization limitations should be kept in mind but supportive of the findings, the primary result patterns held for both the student and adult samples.

Measures of Level of National identity Attachment and Attitudes Toward immigration

Recall that the explanatory variable of interest is the respondent's level of national identity attachment. The mediating variable is institutional trust. The outcome variable is attitudes toward immigrants. The explanatory variable, *level of national identity attachment*, is defined as the strength of identity attachment to the American national identity. It is measured with a four-item additive index, previously used by Theiss-Morse (2009). The questions in the four-item index include (1) "Do you identify with the

American people? Response options range from 1 = not part of the group to 5 = very strongly part of the group. (2) “I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people.” Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. (3) “Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person.” Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. (4) “Overall, I think Americans are a great group of people” Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. For each of the national identity strength questions, the categories of “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” had too few cases compared to the other categories so they were combined into “disagree” categories. Resulting response options range from 1 = disagree to 4 = strongly agree (1 = not part of the group to 4 = very strongly part of the group for question item 1 above). This translates to strong national identity attachment corresponding to higher scores on the items. Factor analysis was used to create a national identity strength index, all four items loaded onto one factor ($\alpha = .80$, also see Table 2.1). The index ranged from 4 to 16. It was recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Table 2.1: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Strength of National identity Index

Variable	Factor	Corr With Total	Alpha
Identify With American People	.6278	.7599	.7830
Strong Ties to American People	.7703	.8407	.7185
Being American Important to Identity	.7019	.7930	.7535
Americans Great Group of People	.6702	.7827	.7641

A Pearson correlation was performed to assess construct validity of the national identity index with the single measure question: “The idea of an America where most people are not white makes me feel anxious.” Response options ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 4 = strongly disagree. This question was selected because there were no items outside of those used to create the index that directly measured national identity attachment. To support index validity, the single item measure should be negatively correlated with the index. This would be in line with previous findings (Thiess-Morse 2009) that strong identifiers tend to draw more exclusive boundaries around who is American. They are likely to therefore feel more uncomfortable with the idea of a nonwhite America. The correlation between the national identity index and comfort with a nonwhite America was negative and statistically significant, $r(441) = -.112, p < .02$. The negative and significant correlation provides some support for the validity of the index.

The dependent variable, *attitudes toward immigrants*, is defined as individual attitudes that represent a person’s beliefs, evaluations, and behavior orientations toward immigrants in their community. Factor analysis was performed with eight question items in order to create an attitude toward immigrant index: (1) “The idea of an America where most people are not white makes me feel anxious.” (2) “If immigrants only tried harder to fit in, then more Americans would accept their cultural differences.” (3) “Immigrants today take advantage of jobs and opportunities here without doing enough to give back to the community.” (4) “Immigrants who are Western European seem less American to me.” (5) “Immigrants who are Middle Eastern seem less American to me.” (6) “Immigrants who are Eastern European seem less American to me.” (7) “Immigrants who are Asian

seem less American to me.” (8) “Immigrants who are African seem less American to me.” Response options for each of the eight questions items ranged from 1= strongly agree to 4 = strongly disagree. This translates to more negative attitudes toward immigrants being indicated by lower scores on the items. Factor analysis was used to create an immigrant attitude index, all eight items loaded onto one factor ($\alpha = .91$; also see Table 2.2). The index ranged from 8 to 32. It was recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Table 2.2: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Attitude Toward Immigrant Index

Variable	Factor	Corr With Total	Alpha
Non-White America	.6208	.7112	.9046
If Only Immigrants Tried Harder	.5166	.6246	.9126
Immigrants Take Advantage	.6864	.7635	.8991
West Europe Immigrants Seem less American	.7801	.7867	.8946
Middle East Immigrants Seem less American	.8219	.8446	.8880
East Europe Immigrants Seem less American	.8304	.8184	.8913
Asian Immigrants Seem less American	.8628	.8491	.8877
African Immigrants Seem less American	.8709	.8731	.8845

A Pearson correlation was performed to assess construct validity of the immigrant attitude index with the single measure question: “Should the number of immigrants permitted to come to U.S be increased, or decreased, or should the number be the same as it is now?” Response options ranged from 1 = Decrease, 2 = Stay the Same, or 3 = Increase. To support index validity, the single item measure should be positively correlated with the index. This would indicate that as attitudes toward immigrants become more positive, people tend to be more willing to support larger numbers of immigrants allowed entry into the U.S. The correlation between the immigrant attitude index and preference for the number of immigrants that should be allowed into the U.S. was statistically significant, $r(441) = .496, p < .0001$. The positive and significant correlation provides some support for the validity of the index.

Institutional Trust Prime

Institutional trust is primed in this study with three institution specific vignettes that highlight how well law enforcement agencies, public schools, and local religious organizations manage immigrant influxes (see *Appendix A*). The survey experiment is a between-subjects design where participants are randomly assigned to either a control condition that does not prime institutional trust or one of three experimental conditions that include vignettes designed to prime institutional trust.

The terms “immigrants” and “refugees” are used interchangeably in the vignettes. In order to disentangle whether people make meaningful distinctions between the two labels, a survey question instructed respondents to “Please select the statement that comes closest to your views: 1) I think the United States should allow more immigrants, but should allow fewer refugees to come in to the country each year, 2) I think the United

States should allow more refugees, but should allow fewer immigrants to come in to the country each year, or 3) I do not make a distinction between immigrants and refugees.”

About 75% (n=332) of respondents indicated that they do not make a distinction between the labels. About 15% (n=66) preferred to let more immigrants and fewer refugees into the country and about 10% (n=43) preferred to let more refugees than immigrants into the country. Because three-fourths of the sample did not make a distinction between the labels, it was judged that using the labels interchangeably in the vignettes would likely have little to no impact on participant response.

Control Variables

Control variables include several factors likely to influence attitudes toward immigrants. People oriented toward different political ideologies have been shown to view immigration according to generalized patterns. Conservatives and Republicans tend to have more negative attitudes toward immigration (Pettigrew, Thomas, Ulrich Wagner, & Christ 2007; Citrin et al. 2009). Liberals and Democrats tend to have more positive attitudes toward immigration (Citrin et al. 2009; Kunovich 2009; Fussel 2014). Ideology was therefore accounted for, respondents were asked where they placed themselves on a liberal to conservative 7-point scale, 1 = Extremely conservative to 7 = Extremely liberal. Partisanship was measured with the question: “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?” Response options ranged from 1 = Republican, 2 = Democrat, 3 = Independent, and 4 = other. No one selected “other.” A follow-up question asked Republican respondents “Generally speaking are you: 1 = A strong Republican or 2 = Not a very strong republican.” Respondents who answered as Democrats were given the same follow-up question

worded for Democrats. Respondents who answered as independents were asked the follow-up question, “Do you lean more toward the Democratic or Republican party?” Response options were either 1 = Democratic or 2 = Republican. Due to the low number of cases in both of these categories, independents who lean toward Republicans were recoded into the “Not very strong Republican” category and independents who lean toward the Democratic party were recoded as “Not very strong Democrats. Initial and follow-up partisanship items were combined into one partisanship variable with response options ranging from: 1 = Strong Republican, 2 = Not very strong Republican, 3 = Not very strong Democrat, and 4 = Strong Democrat. A correlation matrix showed that political ideology and partisanship were highly correlated ($p = .80$). In order to avoid issues associated with multicollinearity between the two variables, partisanship will be dropped from the analysis.

Perceptions of economic threat have also been shown to correlate with negative attitudes toward immigration (Olzak, 1992; Citrin et al., 1997; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether they believe the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the last year. This variable was recoded so that a higher score indicated more positive feelings toward the economy (1 = gotten worse, 2 = stayed the same, 3 = gotten better). Interpretation of this variable will need to take the Covid-19 pandemic into consideration. The pandemic will likely cause many more people than usual report negative perceptions of the economy. Social trust has also been shown to impact whether immigrant-generated diversity is well received (Herreros & Criado 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether most people can be trusted (1) or whether you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (0).

Respondents were also asked about whether they trusted “the government in Washington to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in the United States?” Response options ranged from 1= Never, to 5 = Just about always. Contact with different groups has been found under certain conditions to reduce prejudices (Jackman and Crane 1986; McLaren, 2003; Oliver and Wong). In order to examine whether people in more densely populated areas attitudes toward immigration differed from those in less populated areas respondents were asked “about how many people live in your city or town?” Response options ranged across eight population specific categories: 1) $\leq 50,000$, 2) Between 51,000 and 100,000; 3) Between 101,000 and 150,000; 4) Between 150,000 and 300,000; 5) Between 301,000 and 600,000; 6) Between 601,000 and 800,000; 7) Between 801,000 and 1 million; and 8. Over 1 Million.

The analysis also included several relevant sociodemographic variables: *gender* (1 = female, 0 = male); *race* (1 = white, 0 = other) *religious affiliation* (1 = Christian, 2 = other, 3 = none), *income* (1. $< \$25,000$ 2. $\$26,000-\$40,000$, 3. $\$41,000-\$59,000$, 4. $\$60,000-\$79,000$, 5. $\$80,000-\$99,000$, 6. $\$100,000-\$149,000$, 7. $\$150,000-\$199,000$, 8. $\geq \$250,000$), *volunteer work* (0 = no, 1 = yes), and *age* (open ended text box). For all of the control variables that were not already dummy coded as 0-1 dichotomies, variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1 (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Percent	Mean	Metric	SD
DV: Attitudes Toward Immigrants	441		.577	Index created from 8 variables measuring attitudes toward immigrants (See Appendix)	.224
IV: Strength of National Identity Attachment	441		.835	Index created from 4 variables measuring strength of individual attachment to U.S. national identity	.179
Age	441		.650	What is your age?	.154
20-60	76	17.23			
61-67	108	24.49			
68-74	182	41.27			
> 75	175	17.01			
Gender	441			Do you identify as male or female?	.499
Male (0)	235	53.29			
Female (1)	206	46.71			
Income	441		.405	What was your total household income in 2019?	.261
Social Trust	441			Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	.500
Distrust (0)	207	46.94		0=You can't be too careful	
Trust (1)	234	53.06		1=Most people can be trusted	
Trust in WA Government	441		.446	To what extent do you think you can trust the government in Washington to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in the United States?	.263
Never	49	11.11			
Not very much	136	30.84			
Only sometimes	136	30.84			
Most times	101	22.9			
Just about always	19	4.31			
Political Ideology	441		.567	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	.321
Extremely Conservative	66	7.48			
Conservative	112	16.33			
Slightly Conservative	40	9.30			
Middle	77	17.46			
Slightly Liberal	41	9.07			
Liberal	72	25.40			
Extremely Liberal	33	14.97			
City Size	441		.255	About how many people live in your city or town?	.312
<= 50k	173	39.23			
51k-100k	102	23.13			
101k-150k	35	7.94			
150k-300k	49	11.11			
301k-600k	28	6.35			

601k 800k	5	1.13			
801k-1 Million	12	2.72			
Over 1 Million	37	8.39			
Religion	441			What, if any, is your religious preference?	.255
Christian	295	66.89			
Other	72	16.33			
None	74	16.78			
Economy	441		.153	Would you say that in the past year the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?	.248
Worse	305				
Same	69				
Better	67				
Volunteer	441			Do you currently do any volunteer work?	.400
No (0)	353	80.05			
Yes (1)	88	19.95			
Race	441			What race do you consider yourself to be?	
Other (0)	35	7.94			
White (1)	406	92.06			
Neighborhood Ethnicity	441			In general, would you say that your neighborhood is...	.419
Multiethnic (0)	100	22.68			
Mostly White (1)	341	77.32			

2.3 Results




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model

H1: Strong national identifiers are more likely to harbor negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity than weak national identifiers.

A Pearson correlation was performed to assess the potential of whether attitudes toward immigrants could be predicted from strength of national identity attachment.

Examination of histograms indicated that that the distribution shapes were close to

normal for both variables. Strength of national identity attachment showed a ceiling effect, with scores compressed at the upper end of strength of NI attachment, and was slightly skewed left. The irregularities were not judged to be severe enough to require data transformation. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and attitudes toward immigrants was weak but statistically significant and in the expected direction, $r(441) = -.15$, $p = .002$. As strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants become more negative.

H2: Strong national identifiers are likely to be more trusting of American institutions than weak national identifiers.

A Pearson correlation was performed to assess the potential of whether trust in different levels of government institutions could be predicted from strength of national identity attachment. Examination of histograms indicated that the distribution shapes were close to normal with slight left skewing on the trust in state and local government institutions. The irregularities were not judged to require data transformation. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in the government in Washington was positive and statistically significant, $r(441) = .196$, $p < .0001$. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in the state government was positive, but weak and not significant, $r(441) = .064$, $p = .182$. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in the local city government was positive, but weak and not significant, $r(441) = .075$, $p = .116$. The correlations indicate that as strength of national identity increases, trust in the government in Washington also significantly increases while trust in state and local institutions also slightly increased, but to a weaker and nonsignificant degree. Therefore,

in this sample, trust in the federal level of government has a stronger relationship with strength of national identity attachment than trust in state and city levels of government.

Table 2.4: Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Government Institutions

Variables	N	Corr	P
Trust in Washington Government	441	0.196	<.0001
Trust in State Government	441	0.064	.182
Trust in Local Government	441	0.075	.116

Building on hypothesis H2 I more specifically expect that:

H2a: Strong national identifiers are likely to be more trusting of public schools, religious organizations, and law enforcement agencies than weak national identifiers.

A Pearson correlation was performed to assess the potential of whether trust in different types of local institutions could be predicted from strength of national identity attachment. Examination of histograms of the institutional trust variables indicated that the distribution shapes were left-skewed for each of the variables, more people than not rated higher levels of trust in these institutions. The irregularities were not judged to require data transformation. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in public schools was positive and statistically significant, $r(441) = .230$, $p < .0001$. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in law enforcement was positive and statistically significant, $r(441) = .40$, $p < .0001$. The correlation between strength of national identity attachment and trust in religious institutions was positive and statistically significant, $r(441) = .323$, $p < .0001$. The correlations indicate that as strength of national identity increases in the sample, trust in public schools, religious organizations, and law enforcement also increases.

Table 2.5: Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Public Institutions

Variables	N	Corr	P
Trust in Public Schools	441	0.230	<.0001
Trust in Law Enforcement	441	0.400	<.0001
Trust in Religious Institutions	441	0.323	<.0001

H3: Priming institutional trust should weaken the relationship between strong national identity attachment and negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity.

Two-way ANOVA: Strength of National Identity Attachment and Vignette Group Across Attitudes Toward immigrants

To begin to examine whether there is support for hypothesis three, a two-way ANOVA was run on a sample of 441 participants to examine the mean differences between strong and weak national identity attachment and whether there were mean differences between the control and experiment groups across attitudes toward immigrants. Strength of national identity attachment was made into a binary variable that split strong (0 = NI index score 14-16) and weak (1 = NI index score 4-13) identifiers into separate groups. Vignette is a 4-category nominal variable with 1 = control, 2 = law enforcement, 3 = public school, and 4 = religious institution. No significant differences were found across the vignette groups (Control group $M=22.04$; Law enforcement $M=21.26$; public schools $M=22.02$; religious institutions $M=22.04$), $F(3, 433) = 0.33$, $p = .8$. There was a significant difference at the .10 level between strong and weak national identifiers on attitudes toward immigrants, $F(1, 433) = 3.11$, $p = .08$. The interaction between strength of national identity attachment and vignette group was not significant, $F(3, 433) = 0.22$, $p = .89$, indicating that whether or not the participant saw the institutional trust prime did not impact mean attitude scores.

Assessment of Mean Differences Between Strong and Weak National Identifiers in the Control and Experimental Groups

Two t tests were performed in order to further examine whether or not the institutional trust prime had a significant effect on the mean attitudes toward immigrants between strong and weak national identifiers in the control group and between strong and weak national identifiers in the experiment group. If there *is* a significant difference in attitudes toward immigrants between strong and weak national identifiers who did not see the institutional trust prime (the control group), and if there is *no* significant difference between strong and weak national identifiers who did see the experimental trust prime (indicating the prime brought the two groups' attitudes closer together by improving the more negative attitudes), then hypothesis three will be supported.

The first t test assessed whether mean attitudes toward immigrants differed significantly for strong national identifiers (same variable as used above) in the control group, which contained 49 participants, and weak national identifiers in the control group, which contained 30 participants. The mean attitudes toward immigrants across strong and weak national identifiers did not significantly differ in the control group $t(55.5) = -0.77, p = 0.44$, two tailed. Because the mean attitude scores did not differ across strong and weak national identifiers in the control group, hypothesis three cannot be assessed in this way. However, I will still look at whether there were differences in mean attitudes toward immigrants across strong and weak national identifiers in the experiment group below.

A second t test was performed with the strong and weak national identifiers from the experiment groups. A variable was created that split those in the experimental

vignette groups into strong national identifiers (0 = those who scored 14-16 on index) and weak national identifiers (1 = those who scored 4-13 on index). The strong national identifier experiment group contained 213 participants and the weak national identifier experiment group contained 149 participants. The mean attitudes toward immigrants between strong and weak national identifiers in the experiment group did not significantly differ, $t(320) = -1.61$, $p = 0.11$, two tailed. This indicates that the institutional trust prime may have had an impact by shifting strong national identifiers attitudes toward immigrants to be closer to those of weak national identifiers because there is no significant difference between the two groups. However, since there was no significant difference between the strong and weak national identifiers in the control group either, the difference cannot be attributed to the institutional trust prime.

Assessment of Mean Differences Between High Institutional Trusters and Low Institutional Trusters in Control and Experimental Groups

The survey asked participants about their levels of trust in law enforcement, public schools, and religious institutions to successfully integrate people from foreign countries into the United States before they were randomly assigned to a vignette. This section compares the mean differences of attitudes toward immigrants for people who had low initial trust in these institutions to people who initially had high trust in these institutions. Similar to the above section, if there is a significant mean difference in attitudes toward immigrants between the low and high institution trusting participants in the control group but there is no mean difference in attitudes toward immigrants between the low and high trusting participants in the experiment group who were primed with institutional trust, there would be support that the experimental trust prime flattened out

the differences in attitudes toward immigrants. In other words, it would support the hypothesis that priming institutional trust improves immigrant attitudes, indicated in this case by shifting negative attitudes to be more similar to those who tend to have supportive views toward immigrants.

A two way ANOVA was performed to assess whether there were significant differences across the vignette groups on mean attitude toward immigrant scores for low and high initial institution trusters, $F(3, 433) = 0.40$, $p = .40$. A binary variable was created with the individuals who were randomly assigned into the control group that split the control group into those that initially had low trust for public institutions (0 = answered either never, not very much of the time, or some of the time on the institutional trust questions) and people who initially had high trust for public institutions (1 = answered either most of the time or just about always on the institutional trust questions). An independent samples t test was then performed to assess whether mean attitudes toward immigrants differed significantly for the low trust control group, which contained 15 participants, and the high trust control group, which contained 64 participants. The mean attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly differ in the control group $t(19.5) = -0.44$, $p = 0.66$, two tailed.

A second t test was performed with the vignette variable low and high trust levels split differently in the control group. This time, the binary variable split the control group into lower trust (answered either never, not very much of the time, some of the time, or most of the time) versus high trust (Just about always). The low trust control group contained 46 participants and the high trust control group contained 33 participants. The

mean attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly differ $t(71.8) = -0.26$, $p = 0.8$, two tailed.

A third t test was performed with the participant data from the experiment groups. A variable was created that split those in the experimental vignette groups in low (0 = answered either never, not very much of the time, or some of the time on the institutional trust questions) and high (1 = answered either most of the time or just about always on the institutional trust questions) institutional trust groups. The low trust experimental group contained 64 participants and the high trust control group contained 298 participants. The mean attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly differ $t(90) = -0.82$, $p = 0.42$, two tailed.

A fourth t test was performed with the participant data from the experiment groups. A variable was created that split those in the experimental vignette groups in low (0 = answered either never, not very much of the time, some of the time, or most of the time on the institutional trust questions) and high (1 = answered just about always on the institutional trust questions) institutional trust groups. The low trust experimental group contained 205 participants and the high trust control group contained 157 participants. The mean attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly differ $t(332) = -0.53$, $p = 0.59$, two tailed. The results of the procession of t tests indicate that there are no significant differences in mean attitudes toward immigrants between those who initially trust the public institutions of law enforcement, public schools, and religious organizations and those who did not initially trust these institutions. Because the control groups low-high trust means on attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly differ, no support for hypothesis three, priming institutional trust should weaken the relationship

between strong national identity attachment and negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity, is found in this section.

3-Way ANOVA Adding Political Ideology

A three-way ANOVA was run on a sample of 441 participants to examine the effect of strength of national identity attachment, whether the participant was primed with institutional trust or not, and political ideology on immigrant attitudes. The primary independent variable, strength of national identity attachment, is described above. The second independent variable, vignette group, was a 4-category nominal variable (1 = control, 2 = law, 3 = public school, 4 = religious institution). The dependent variable, attitudes toward immigrants, is an index created from a handful of items as described above. The only significant outcome was political ideology, $F(6, 385) = 17.7, p = <.0001$. This indicates that political ideology is likely driving attitudes toward immigrants in this sample.

Elaboration Model With Multiple Linear Regression

A series of sequential linear regressions were performed in STATA 15.1 to assess the focal relationship between strength of national identity attachment, whether the participant was in the control or experimental group, and attitudes toward immigrants. Due to the above analyses showing no significant differences between the different experimental prime groups (law enforcement, religious organization, and public school), the vignette variable used in the below models was made into a dichotomous variable (0 = control, 1 = all 3 experiment groups). The first model included only the hypothesized focal independent variables: strength of national identity attachment and vignette group across attitudes toward immigrants. The second model added political ideology. Trust

was measured by six different questions in the survey. The questions were made into indices using factor analysis (See Trust section and Tables 2.7-2.8 below). A mini-series of sequential regression were performed in order to determine which measures of trust were best suited to the model.³ The third model added the control variables: trust as a 5-item index, trust in the government in Washington, social trust, age, and whether the participant is active in volunteer work.⁴ Model 4 tested the primary hypothesis, that the vignette trust prime could moderate strong national identifiers attitudes toward immigrants by adding an interaction term that multiplied level of national identity attachment with the dichotomous vignette variable.

³ Variables included in these models were: attitudes toward immigrants, national identity attachment, vignette, political ideology, and the different trust indices. Selection of trust measures to include in the final were based on significance and the measures that did not overlap one another. For example, although the index that included state and city trust was significant, it was not included in the final model because the 5-item trust index had a stronger coefficient and also included state and city trust.

⁴ Marginally contributing, nonsignificant control variables of religion, city size, gender, income, economy, and race were dropped from the analysis. See Appendix 2.2 for Models 3 and 4 with full set of control variables included.

Table 2.6: Linear Regressions of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
National Identity Attachment Vignette	-.193** (.059)	.021 (.056)	-.055 (.057)	-.144 (.128)
Experiment	-.013 (.028)	-.023 (.024)	-.032 (.024)	-.122 (.118)
Political Ideology		-.348*** (.031)	-.301*** (.031)	-.302*** (.031)
5-Item Trust Index			.162** (.057)	.160** (.057)
Trust in WA Government			-.107** (.040)	-.106** (.040)
Volunteer			.060** (.023)	.060* (.023)
Social Trust			.052** (.019)	.052** (.019)
Age			.113+ (.061)	.114+ (.061)
NI Attach x Vignette				.107 (.137)
Constant	.749***	.776***	.651***	.727***
Adjusted R ²	.0196	.238	.294	.293
F-statistic	5.4	46.83	23.90	21.30

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For all models $N = 441$.

2.4 Assessment

The above regression analyses demonstrate that political ideology is driving the impact of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants in this sample.

This is first indicated by the changes between Models 1 and 2. In Model 1, level of national identity attachment is significant and the adjusted R^2 is very small (.0196). When political ideology is introduced in Model 2, the significance of national identity attachment drops out and the adjusted R^2 sizably increases (.238). Political ideology has the strongest coefficient and remains significant when the controls and interaction are added in Models 3 and 4.

Model 4 does not support hypothesis three, that priming institutional trust should weaken the relationship between strong national identity attachment and negative attitudes toward immigrant-generated diversity. This is demonstrated by the nonsignificant interaction between the vignettes and strength of national identity attachment, which indicates that there are no meaningful differences in attitudes toward immigrants between the control and experiment conditions. It may be that the prime was not strong enough or that immigrant attitudes are too “stuck” because of political ideology. Recent work has shown, for example, that within the conservative political ideology, there are “securitarians” whose primary concern is to protect the in-group from outsiders. These individuals simply do not want outsiders coming to the United States regardless of whether they feel threatened or not. As put by John Hibbing, securitarians “...want to stop immigration from infiltrating the country even if they do not feel threatened by immigrants and even if they believe immigrants make America a better place to live...” (Hibbing 2020, p. 115).⁵

Yet another possibility may be that people associate immigration with the federal level of government which could explain why priming local institutional trust would have little to no impact on attitudes toward immigrants. The findings above seem to indicate that the latter may be the case and that priming local institutions is not the way to go. However, based on previous findings discussed above (Kirchner et al. 2011; Halapuu et al. 2013, 2017; Mannemar-Sonderskov et al. 2016), it is likely that trust is part of the

⁵ It is likely that there are some securitarians in the sample for this study. Though I do not have a direct measure, about 36% (79 of a total of 218) of the conservatives in the sample are both strong national identifiers and express anxiety about a “nonwhite” America, which are potential proxy measures for this group. The very fixed securitarian view toward immigration may have provided an obstacle to the ability to shift strong national identifiers attitudes to be more positive.

attitude-toward-immigrant-equation, even though it did not work as prime in this study.

In order to further examine how trust matters on its own, the next section explores relationships between strength of national identity attachment, political ideology, different types of trust, and attitudes toward immigrants.

Trust

Six questions about trust were included in the survey. Three asked about trust in the ability of different levels of government to integrate newcomers: “To what extent do you think you can trust the (government in Washington; or, your state government; or, your city government) to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in the United States?” Response options on all three questions ranged from 1 = Just about always, 2 = Most of the time, 3 = Only some of the time, 4 = Not very much of the time, and 5 = Never. Three more questions asked about trust in the ability of local institutions to integrate newcomers: “To what extent do you think you can trust the (local public-school system, or law enforcement agencies, or local religious institutions) in your city to successfully integrate people from foreign countries into the United States?” Response options on all three questions were the same as in the trust in levels of government questions.

A series of indices were created with the trust items using unrotated factor analysis in order to parse out different trust effects between levels of government and levels of government versus specific institutions. First, an index was created with all 6-question items ($\alpha = .77$). Second, an index was created with the federal level of trust in Washington dropped (5-items, $\alpha = .77$). Third, an index was created with just the institution specific trust variables (public school, law enforcement, religious institution, α

= .77). The fourth index contained the three levels of government trust questions (trust in city, state, and Washington $\alpha = .80$). Finally, the fifth index dropped trust in Washington from the government level items (trust in city and trust in state only, $\alpha = .86$). See Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 for factor loadings, coefficients, and alphas for the five indices.

Table 2.7: Table of Unrotated Factor Loadings for Five Indices

Variable	Index 1	Index 2	Index 3	Index 4	Index 5
Trust in Washington	.4962			.5713	
Trust in State	.7210	.6569		.8300	.8127
Trust in City	.7554	.7112		.8151	.8127
Trust in Public School	.6084	.6557	.6365		
Trust in Law Enforcement	.5460	.5820	.7302		
Trust in Religious Institution	.5669	.6089	.7194		
Eigenvalue	2.3264	2.0768	1.4558	1.6797	1.3208

Table 2.8: Correlation Coefficients, Alphas for All Items, and Overall Index Alpha

Variable	Index 1		Index 2		Index 3		Index 4		Index 5	
	Corr w/ total	Alpha	Corr w/ total	Alpha	Corr w/ total	Alpha	Corr w/ total	Alpha	Corr w/ total	Alpha
Trust in Washington	.6004	.7674					.7817	.8593		
Trust in State	.7194	.7261	.6813	.7418			.8846	.6437		
Trust in City	.7593	.7120	.7346	.7174			.8752	.6681		
Trust in Public School	.6960	.7352	.7651	.7018	.8022	.7493				
Trust in Law Enforcement	.6539	.7476	.6920	.7362	.8411	.6607				
Trust in Religious Institution	.5004	.7440	.7254	.7271	.8478	.6741				
Overall Alpha		.7728		.7674		.7744		.8022		.8593

To begin a deeper exploration of how trust impacts the focal relationship between strength of national identity attachment and attitudes toward immigrants, a series of

Pearson correlations were performed to assess the relationships between institutional and governmental trust and immigrant attitudes, institutional and governmental trust and strength of national identity attachment, and political ideology and institutional and governmental trust. Table 2.9 shows that as strength of national identity attachment increases, so does trust in each of the indices except trust in state and city without trust in Washington (Index 5 described above), which is positive but not significant. Table 2.10 shows that attitudes toward immigrants are positively and significantly correlated with the 5-item index (all items but trust in Washington) and the state and city index. As trust in city and state governments increase, so do attitudes toward immigrants. Attitudes toward immigrants are negatively and significantly correlated with trust in the federal government (Washington). As trust in the federal government decreases, attitudes toward immigrants become more positive. This indicates a different pattern for trust at the federal level than at the city or state or local institutional level. The survey was taken during the Trump presidency in 2020, a time when the federal administration was likely to provide more security and ideological similarity for conservatives and Republicans, of whom are more likely to identify strongly with the American national identity and harbor more negative attitudes toward immigrants. The positive correlations in Table 2.11 indicate that in this sample, as political ideology becomes more conservative, trust increases across the board. Supportive of the patterns thus far indicated, trust in the federal government has the strongest and most significant positive correlation to political ideology, indicating that individuals who are more conservative tend to trust in Washington more than those who are less conservative or liberal.

Table 2.9: Bivariate Relationships for Level of National Identity Attachment and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government

Variables	N	Corr	P
Index 1 (All 6)	441	0.314	<.0001
Index 2 (5)	441	0.304	<.0001
Institutions	441	0.382	<.0001
Trust Gov't Levels	441	0.323	<.0001
Trust State & City	441	0.074	.120
Trust in WA	441	0.196	<.0001

*As strength of national identity attachment increases, so does trust as measured in all of the indices except trust in state and city levels of government, which is positive but not significant.

Table 2.10: Bivariate Relationships for Immigrant Attitudes and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government

Variables	N	Corr	P
Index 1 (All 6)	441	0.054	.26
Index 2 (5)	441	0.11	.021
Institutions	441	0.035	.47
Trust Gov't Levels	441	0.053	.269
Trust State & City	441	0.167	.0004
Trust in WA	441	-0.172	.0003

*Attitudes toward immigrants are positively and significantly correlated with the 5-item index (all items but WA) and the state and city index. As trust in city and state governments increase, so do attitudes toward immigrants. Attitudes toward immigrants are negatively and significantly correlated with trust in the federal government (WA). As trust in the federal government decreases, attitudes toward immigrants become more positive. This indicates a different pattern for trust at the federal level than at the city or state or local institutional level.

Table 2.11: Bivariate Relationships for Political Ideology and Trust in Public Institutions and Levels of Government

Variables	N	Corr	P
Index 1 (All 6)	441	0.093	.05
Index 2 (5)	441	0.034	.48
Institutions	441	0.118	.013
Trust Gov't Levels	441	0.034	.47
Trust State & City	441	0.094	.05
Trust in WA	441	0.258	<.0001

*Political ideology ranges from 1= extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative; positive correlation indicates that as ideology becomes more conservative, trust increases. Trust in the federal government has the strongest and most significant positive correlation to political ideology.

Table 2.12: Bivariate Relationships: Political Ideology and Attitudes Toward Immigrants, NI Attachment and Attitudes Toward Immigrants, and NI Attachment & Political Ideology

Variables	N	Corr	P
Attitudes Toward Immigrants & Political Ideology	441	-0.491	<.0001
Attitudes Toward Immigrants & Nat'l Identity Strength	441	-0.1502	.0016
NI Attachment & Political Ideology	441	0.345	<.0001

*Political ideology ranges from 1= extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative; negative correlation indicates that as ideology becomes more conservative, attitudes toward immigrants become more negative. Negative correlation for NI attachment indicates that as strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants become more negative (also shown above in prior correlations). Finally, as political ideology increases (becomes more conservative), strength of national identity attachment also increases.

Trust as Moderator

The overall argument of this study is that people can be moved to be more accepting of immigrants through priming trust in government institutions. Although the vignette prime did not work as anticipated by shifting people's attitudes, trust does appear to matter as an important factor in people's attitudes toward immigrants. Further, the specification of trust also likely matters. A series of sequential linear regressions were performed in STATA 15.1 to assess how different configurations of trust impact the effect of strength of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants. Because the vignette trust prime variable did not near significance in any of the models, it was dropped from the final analysis below. Each model was performed with and without an interaction term in order to parse out the strength of effect of the trust variables on their own and as conditioning variables. In total, 5 different trust item indices were used (described above). Trust in Washington to resettle newcomers was significant as a stand-

alone factor but not as an interaction with national identity attachment so it was included as a control variable in Models 3 through 5 where it was not already a part of the model's trust index. Only models with significant trust interaction terms (the 6-item trust index, the 5-item trust index, and the institution-only trust index) were included in the final analysis shown in Table 2.13.⁶

Model 1 examines the impact of the 6-item trust index and Model 2 examines its interaction with strength of national identity attachment. Model 3 examines the impact of the 5-item trust index and Model 4 examines its interaction with strength of national identity attachment. Model 5 examines the impact of the institution-only (law enforcement, religious organization, and public school) trust index and Model 6 examines its interaction with strength of national identity attachment. The interaction effects were graphed in Figures 2.2-2.4.

⁶ Additional linear regressions were performed to test whether there was a significant interaction between the vignette groups and the 5-item trust index and to examine whether there was a significant interaction between national identity attachment and political ideology, the interactions in both models were not significant.

Table 2.13: Coefficients from Linear Regression of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables and Trust Index Interactions

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
National Identity Attachment	-.045 (.058)	-.434** (.161)	-.052 (.057)	-.499** (.161)	-.041 (.059)	-.427** (.143)
Political Ideology	-.326*** (.030)	-.323*** (.030)	-.301*** (.031)	-.297*** (.031)	-.312*** (.031)	-.316*** (.031)
Trust in WA Government			-.105** (.040)	-.113** (.040)	-.070 ⁺ (.038)	-.060 (.037)
Volunteer	.060* (.023)	.058* (.023)	.061** (.023)	.060** (.023)	.063** (.023)	.059** (.023)
Social Trust	.047* (.019)	.044* (.019)	.050* (.019)	.045* (.019)	.056** (.019)	.052** (.019)
Age	.155** (.060)	.149** (.060)	.113 ⁺ (.061)	.108 ⁺ (.061)	.123* (.062)	.124* (.061)
6-Item Trust Index	.072 (.056)	-.523* (.238)				
5-Item Trust Index			.159** (.057)	-.474* (.220)		
Institution only Index					.072 (.046)	-.457* (.185)
NI Attach x 6-Item Trust Index		.712** (.276)				
NI Attach x 5-item Trust Index				.769** (.259)		
NI Attach x Institution Only Index						.637** (.216)
Constant	.618***	.939***	.624***	.991***	.647***	.958***
Adjusted R ²	.2797	.2889	.2927	.3052	.2839	.2964
F	29.47	26.54	27.01	25.16	25.91	24.17

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. For all models N = 441.

Table 2.14: Model 2 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength

	Weak NI	Strong NI
Low Trust	.939	.505
High Trust	.416	.694




Figure 2.2: National Identity Attachment by 6-Item Trust Index Interaction

Note: Figure 2.2 shows that at low levels national identity attachment, as trust increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of national identity attachment, as levels of trust increase, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. For wider range of significant predictive margins for the moderating effect of the 6-Item trust index on the impact of strength of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants, see *Appendix 2.3, Figure 2.1*.

Table 2.15: Model 4 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength

	Weak NI	Strong NI
Low Trust	.991	.557
High Trust	.517	.787




Figure 2.3: National Identity Attachment by 5-Item Trust Index Interaction

Note: Figure 2.3 shows that at low levels national identity attachment, as trust increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of national identity attachment, as levels of trust increase, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. For wider range of significant predictive margins for the moderating effect of the 5-Item trust index on the impact of strength of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants, see *Appendix 2.3, Figure 2.2*.

Table 2.16: Model 6 Regression Calculations for High-Low Levels of Trust and Strong-Weak National Identity Attachment Strength

	Weak NI	Strong NI
Low Trust	.958	.531
High Trust	.501	.711




Figure 2.4: National Identity Attachment by Institutional Trust Interaction

Note: Figure 2.4 shows that at low levels national identity attachment, as trust in institutions increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of national identity attachment, as levels of trust increase, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. For wider range of significant predictive margins for the moderating effect of the institution-only trust index on the impact of strength of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants, see *Appendix 2.3, Figure 2.3*.

Results

The results across all three interaction models reveal similar patterns. I therefore report in detail only Model 5 with the 5-item trust index. Theoretically this index is superior because it drops trust in the Washington government, which correlated differently with attitudes toward immigrants than the other institutional trust variables

(see Table 2.10). It is also the only index that is significant on its own (demonstrated in Model 4).

The third linear regression (Model 3, Table 2.13) was performed to assess the strength of the contribution of the 5-item trust index (that drops trust in Washington) on its own in terms of predicting attitudes toward immigrants from strength of national identity attachment, political ideology, trust in the government in Washington, volunteer work, social trust, and age. For the overall regression, adjusted $R^2 = .2927$. That is, about 29% of the variance in attitudes toward immigrants could be predicted by this model. The overall regression was statistically significant, $F(7, 433) = 27.01$, $p < .0001$. Strength of national identity attachment is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward immigrants in this model. By far, the strongest predictor of attitudes toward immigrants is political ideology $t(433) = -9.61$, $p < .0001$. The negative slope for political ideology indicates that for every one-unit shift toward conservatism, there is about a .30 decrease in attitudes toward immigrants. The 5-item trust index is significant, $t(433) = 2.79$, $p = .005$. This indicates that attitudes toward immigrants increase by about .16 for every one-unit increase in trust. Trust in Washington is significant, $t(433) = -2.61$, $p = .009$. The negative slope for trust in Washington indicates that for every one-unit decrease in trust in Washington, attitudes toward immigrants increase by about .105. In terms of the control variables, whether participants volunteer, have social trust, and are older are significant predictors of attitudes toward immigrants. Those who do volunteer work and tend to trust others (social trust) have significantly more positive attitudes toward immigrants than those who don't volunteer or tend to trust others. Attitudes toward

immigrants increase by about .113 for every one-year increase in age. The patterns for the controls hold across all of the models in the table.

A fourth regression was performed to assess whether the 5-item trust index interacts with strength of national identity attachment to predict attitudes toward immigrants (Model 4, Table 2.13). Both the 5-item index and strength of national identity attachment ranged from 0 to 1. The overall regression was statistically significant, $R^2 = .3052$, $F(8, 432) = 25.16$, $p < .0001$. There was a significant strength of national identity attachment by 5-item trust index interaction, $b = .769$, $t(432) = 2.97$, $p = .003$. There were also significant effects for strength of national identity attachment, $b = -.499$, $t(432) = -3.10$, $p = .002$, political ideology, $b = -.297$, $t(432) = -9.56$, $p < .0001$, the 5-item trust index, $b = -.47$, $t(432) = -2.15$, $p = .032$, whether a participant volunteered, $b = -.060$, $t(432) = 2.64$, $p = .009$, social trust, $b = .045$, $t(432) = 2.35$, $p = .019$, and age, $b = .108$, $t(432) = 1.77$, $p = .077$.

To visualize the nature of the national identity strength by trust indices interaction, examine the graphs of the regression prediction lines for low and high levels of trust and weak and strong levels of national identity attachment strength in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 above. At low levels of national identity attachment (for weak identifiers) as trust in the government and institutions increase, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of national identity attachment (for strong identifiers) as levels of trust increase, attitudes toward immigrants increase or become more positive.

This indicates that strong national identifiers who have higher levels of trust in the government and community-specific institutions have more positive attitudes toward

immigrants. Strong national identifiers who have lower levels of trust in the government and community-specific institutions have more negative attitudes toward immigrants. Trust in the government and community-specific institutions have the opposite effect on weak national identifiers. For them, as trust in the government and community-specific institutions increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative.

2.5 Conclusion

Strong national identifiers are not all the same when it comes to attitudes toward immigrants. Although the priming experiment did not shift strong national identifiers attitudes toward immigrants to be more positive, the interaction models showed that those of this group who scored higher on levels of trust in the indices tend to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than strong national identifiers who score low on these configurations of trust. So while an attitude shift may not be possible in a one-shot experiment or an on-the-ground-attitude-improvement-campaign, there are likely people out there who have higher levels of trust in American institutions and also identify strongly with American national identity that will have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than their non-trusting strong identifying counterparts. It is not wholly accurate then to think of everyone who identifies strongly with the American national identity as people who also will necessarily have the most negative attitudes toward immigrants. It is strong identifiers who also tend to have low levels of trust in institutions that will have the most negative attitudes toward newcomers.

For weak national identifiers the conditioning impact of the indices had the opposite effect. The more weak identifiers trust in government and local institutions, the more negative their attitudes toward immigrants become. Hypotheses 2 and 2a posited

that strong identifiers were more likely to trust in different levels of government and public schools, religious organizations, and law enforcement agencies, which was supported in the data. Weak identifiers are more likely to question their government and disagree with it than strong national identifiers are (Theiss-Morse 2009). This seems to have played out because weak identifiers who were the least trusting of different levels of government and public schools, religious organizations, and law enforcement agencies were also the most accepting of immigrants. As trust for this group increases, attitudes toward immigrants become more negative.

Whether the focus is on strong or weak national identifiers, this study suggests that trust is preset in people's minds and this is why trying to prime it doesn't work. For weak national identifiers, low trust in government or institutional ability correlates with positive attitudes toward immigrants because weak national identifiers are more critical of their government while also being less exclusive when drawing boundaries around who they believe is American. For strong national identifiers, trust in the government and institutions are correlated with more positive attitudes toward immigrants but these trust-to-immigrant-attitude orientations appear to be preset and to be closely related to fixed political ideologies.

CHAPTER 3: NORMATIVE DEVIANCE AND UNWILLING HOSTS: PUSHING THE LIMITS OF INCLUSIVITY

Introduction

The previous chapter tested whether negative attitudes toward immigrants could be moved to be more positive in the minds of those who are inclined to exclude immigrants from their social group. Those inclined or predisposed in this way tended to be ideologically conservative strong national identifiers. The experiment demonstrated that shifting people's attitudes to be more inclusive may not be possible when these attitudes are driven by political ideology and are closely interrelated to deeply held beliefs and viewpoints. This chapter, in part, shifts focus to the other side of the ideological divide where the inclination is to be open and welcoming to immigrants. It also utilizes a more complex model that goes beyond political ideology to core value orientations. Not only are attitudes measured but associated behavioral intentions are also examined, which offers a panoramic view that begins in individual psychology and ends in everyday interactions in the public sphere. I ask: Which core values drive attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants and what are the underlying connective mechanisms in this process? Can acute everyday culturally dissonant experiences shift people who tend to be more open and welcoming to newcomers to be less so? Are there limits to the 'openness' inclination? And, under what conditions do people who tend to be more exclusionary exhibit exclusionary behaviors?

These are important questions to ask for several reasons. First, understanding the values at play and the mechanisms that underlie attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants gives policymakers more precise intervention points. If we can uncover

cognitive pathways that lead either to positive or negative evaluations of immigrants, then we can develop programs that address points of contention along those paths. For example, if we know that long-term residents⁷ strongly oriented toward self-direction and freedom-based values feel threatened by particular types of cultural behavior such as traditional female Islamic clothing, we can develop programs that inform both long-term residents and immigrants of these tendencies and work to find mutual understanding and compassion through education about the beliefs that drive the behaviors on both sides. If a person wearing a burqa and niqab receives a threatened look from a long-term resident without understanding, they may take it as a display of hate and prejudice. If that newcomer in their traditional dress is aware that long-term residents understand her dress as potentially oppressive to her, she may then be able to react with a desire to help increase understanding between cultures, instead of recoil with an understandable need to defend herself.

Another reason this research is important is that in not taking openness or exclusionary tendencies as blanket ideas that somehow get people moral points for being more progressive and accepting than their “close minded” counterparts or condemnation for not being so, we can open the door for a deeper understanding of both inclusive and exclusive forces in the social arena. Gaining a deeper knowledge of where the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion lie can help us to understand how opposing viewpoints may

⁷ Long term residents are loosely defined as people who have lived a minimum of 8 years in their community (or 8 years across similar communities within the United States). Ideal participants should have lived in their communities long enough to have internalized the social norms and behaviors of the community (the benchmark of 8 years is based on the Lawful Permanent Resident Laws used by the U.S. tax system). See Tax-Expatriation: < <https://tax-expatriation.com/2014/08/19/who-is-a-long-term-lawful-permanent-resident-lpr-and-why-does-it-matter/> > (accessed July 20th, 2019).

arise from more similar processes than we often assume. If both exclusionary and inclusionary people behave in ways that reflect the protection of deeply held values, then we can, from a balanced perspective, work to map the boundaries drawn around the need to secure these values which will allow for more accurate predictions of where, when, and why social tensions are likely to bubble over in everyday interactions between diverse types of people. Mapping boundaries allows us to uncover more precisely where inclusion and exclusion are rooted and looking at behavioral intentions associated with exclusion and inclusion improves our ability to predict social interaction in the public sphere.

This study takes value orientations as the baseline to understand what different types of people may feel the need to protect in terms of the norms of their social order. It utilizes a survey experiment to critically examine openness by describing an immigrant personality and a public violation of general liberal norms to see how both attitudes and behavior intentions toward immigrant are impacted. By looking at both attitudes and behavioral intentions, policymakers can get a deeper picture of the mechanisms underlying behavior in everyday social life. In this way, we can more appropriately inform organizations helping acclimate immigrants into their new communities and we can use the knowledge of protective boundaries to predict where cleavages are most likely to fester and therefore create policies aimed at alleviating these pressure points.

The theoretical framework of the project interweaves literature on values, the anxiety-inducing effects of normative violations, attitudes of liking and disliking, social tolerance, and the attitude-behavior connection. The primary outcome is intended behaviors toward immigrants. Attitudes likely mediate between values and behaviors.

Anxiety is hypothesized to condition the effect of values and attitudes on intended behavior (see the conceptual model below, in Figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1: Theoretical Model

3.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses

Independent Variable: Form and Function of Values

Following Schwartz (1992, 2006), values are defined “as desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz 2006, p. 1). Schwartz’s theory of basic individual values is comprised of 19 values arranged in a circular continuum. The categories provide an efficient means of tracing origins of individual behavior because the 19 values serve as goal orientations. Values are both distinct and interrelated. Schwartz’s value categories have been shown to hold consistently across at least 90 countries. They tend to generalize so well in part because they reflect basic organismic needs that all humans and social groups must contend with. These include the biological needs of individuals, necessities of social interaction within groups, and the need for group survival (Schwartz et al. 2001; Schwartz et al. 2012; Caprara et al. 2009).

The 19 basic value categories (Self-direction–thought, Self-direction–action, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power–dominance, Power–resources, Face,

Security–personal, Security–societal, Tradition, Conformity–rules, Conformity–interpersonal, Humility, Benevolence–dependability, Benevolence–caring, Universalism–concern, Universalism–nature, Universalism–tolerance; see Table 3.1 for definitions of each) are arranged in the circle according to sets of both related and orthogonal groups that reflect the inherent relationships and conflicts between them (see Figure 3.2). The outer most rings of the circle divide it into two orthogonally related groups of values distinguished by the presence or absence of anxiety. The two upper quadrants contain values that thrive in the absence of anxiety. The two lower quadrants contain values that are often motivated by the desire to avoid anxiety and threat. The second inner ring provides division of the broader categories of values that are focused on the self and values that are focused on social interaction and maintenance of social relations. The third inner ring further divides the focus orientations into four quadrants, two of which are geared toward the self (openness to change and self-enhancement) and two of which that have a social focus (self-transcendence and conservation).



Figure 3.2: 19 Basic Values

Note: Taken from Schwartz et al. (2012), p. 669.

Within the four quadrants are the 19 basic value divisions. The self-enhancement quadrant contains Power–dominance, Power–resources, Achievement, Face, and Hedonism. The latter two are closely related and cross the boundary into the conservation and openness to change quadrants respectively. The openness to change quadrant contains Self-direction–thought, Self-direction–action, Stimulation, and Hedonism. The self-transcendence quadrant includes Benevolence–dependability, Benevolence–caring, Universalism–concern, Universalism–nature, and Universalism–tolerance, and Humility, which crosses over into the conservation quadrant. The conservation quadrant contains Face, Security–personal, Security–societal, Tradition, Conformity–rules, Conformity–interpersonal, and Humility.

The circle of values reflects the universe of human action motivations. Across different cultures and individuals, the weighting and importance of the value configuration varies, but the core underlying structure remains the same. The pursuit of specific values often requires trade-offs or de-emphasis of values that are orthogonally related. For instance, placing emphasis on self-direction (which encompasses creativity and freedom) requires a de-emphasis on conformity (which encompasses compliance and following rules). Social interactions are greatly impacted by individual emphases and trade-offs among the values.

Table 3.1: Definitions of 19 Basic Values

Value	Conceptual definitions in terms of motivational goals
Self-direction–thought	Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities
Self-direction–action	Freedom to determine one’s own actions
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and change
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification
Achievement	Success according to social standards
Power–dominance	Power through exercising control over people
Power–resources	Power through control of material and social resources
Face	Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation
Security–personal	Safety in one’s immediate environment
Security–societal	Safety and stability in the wider society
Tradition	Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions
Conformity–rules	Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations
Conformity–interpersonal	Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people
Humility	Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things
Benevolence–dependability	Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the ingroup
Benevolence–caring	Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members
Universalism–concern	Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people
Universalism–nature	Preservation of the natural environment
Universalism–tolerance	Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself

Note: Taken from Schwartz et al. (2012), p. 669.

Values are abstract but they are expressed in the real world through their guidance of action decisions (Schwartz 2006). Schwartz (2004) links values to action decisions through a four-step process: the value must be made salient or turned on; values will lead to certain action choices being selected over others; values serve as criteria and therefore

influence interpretation and evaluation of situations; and finally, values orient and drive individual plans. The process consists of weighing events or perceptions of events against value goals and determining judgment of the events in terms of alignment with the value goals. Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) demonstrated that readiness for contact with the outgroup between Jews and Arabs was dependent on whether contact was perceived to be synergistic with individuals' most highly prioritized values in both groups. Values have also been shown to influence voting behavior and political ideology (Caprara, Vecchione, & Schwartz 2009). Values also compete with normative pressures and they are sensitive to the structure of the social environment (Schwartz & Bardi 2003).

It seems that values tend to be relatively stable, but they have been shown to evolve along with life circumstances and experiences. Whether individuals are capable or incapable of reaching value goals influences their relative prioritization (Schwartz & Bardi 1997) as does the structure of job duties and available career paths (Kohn & Schooner 1983) and whether individual socioeconomic status is secure or insecure (Inglehart 1997; see Schwartz 2015 for review). In longer-term life circumstances at least, changes in value orientations can lead to shifts in goals or ideals that impact action decisions. The current project looks at the potential for everyday interactions to acutely shift value priorities in ways that effect behavioral intentions toward others in the social arena.

Immigrants, Value Conflicts, and Normative Violations

At the broadest level, this study asks how individuals in communities grapple with immigrant-generated diversity. Many of the tensions that arise amidst immigrant generated diversity are related to different sets of dissonant value orientations coming

into close contact in the context of established communities with established norms and value orientations. When values are orthogonally related in the circle of values as discussed above, they directly conflict with one another. Conflicting values are likely to lead to behaviors that undermine the goals of their orthogonally related values. When immigrants adhere to orthogonally related sets of value orientations in comparison to the majority in the established community, some of the action choices they exhibit may be perceived in the public arena by long-term residents as normative violations.

Norms are generally defined as standard social behaviors within cultures. They enable predictable interactions with people in everyday living and they provide security in regards to what behaviors can be expected of others (Feld 2002). Social norms guide behavior outside of the force of law and those who violate them may face sanctions from social networks (Cialdini & Trost 1998) in the form of intolerance, rude or shaming behaviors, or exclusion. If the value orientations of immigrants conflict with those of long-term residents in such a way that the related behaviors violate social norms, they have the potential to create tension, raise anxiety, and attract social sanctioning. Indeed, Marcus, Wood, and Thiess-Morse (1998) defined normative violations as threats and showed that feelings of threat caused by the perception that groups had departed from normal, socially accepted behavior edged people toward intolerance of the norm violators.

The tensions created by conflicting values are not the same as tensions created by racism. Racial prejudice is generally defined as “an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a member of that group” (Dovidio & Gaertner 1999, p. 101). Prejudice is intertwined with stereotypes, which are “abstract knowledge structures linking a social

group to a set of traits or behavioral characteristics” (Hamilton & Sherman 2016, p. 3).

Prejudice combines negative stereotypes and evaluations that together create predispositions to act negatively toward the target group (Sullivan et al. 1982). The type of negative evaluation of groups or individuals of focus in this project arises when an individual sees and interprets behavior in the public sphere as a violation of the established normative system in terms of their value criteria. The perceiver witnesses something that is real and threatening to them (factual) and they must process the event. As Gibson (2011) pointed out, “Perceptions of threat may be based upon prejudice, but they need not be, and one can well imagine that many perceptions of group threat are based on objective and realistic perceptions that have nothing to do with prejudice” (p. 7). Perceived threat from coming into contact with dissonant value orientations has been shown to be so strong, in fact, that it can wash out racial prejudice. Brandt et al. (2014) showed that among white conservative participants, prejudice against blacks completely disappeared when black individuals were portrayed as having similar political values to the white participants.

Partisanship, in fact, is said by some to be a stronger divide than race in today’s social sphere (Iyengar & Westwood 2015). Interestingly, both conservatives and liberals are equally intolerant of those whose value orientations conflict with their own (Brandt et al. 2014; Crawford & Pilanski 2014; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1982). Those who most strongly emphasize and adhere to orthogonally related value sets (i.e. those on the far right and those on the far left in terms of political ideology) tend to have the most bias and animosity toward conflicting value orientations (Mason 2015). What is similar with the studies of political polarization and the potential tensions between immigrants and

long-term residents in communities is that in many cases both types of contentions are fundamentally based on conflicting values. What is at stake are “genuine differences about what is right and wrong” (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007, p. 9).

When people are faced with values that conflict with their own most highly cherished beliefs and these conflicting values are made apparent through normative violations, anxiety increases because normative violations are felt as threats. This is “state” anxiety because it is induced by the environment. It is this sense of threat and subsequent feeling of anxiety that create the conditions for which a shift in value priorities may occur in order to protect the social norms one is accustomed to. It is important to note that this process is not more applicable to any specific type of person over another as the above-mentioned polarization studies demonstrate. What differs between individuals is the starting point of their value orientations. Different starting points will differentially impact which behavioral outcomes will occur in consequence of acute shifts in value priorities. People who are highly oriented toward conservation values tend to exist in a more trait-like state of anxiousness. They are focused on anxiety avoidance and protection. The theoretical relationship is made clear by looking at the circle of the basic values in *Figure 3.2* and paying special attention to the outer most ring as it relates anxiety to the different value quadrants.

Affective intelligence theory further underscores the underlying mechanisms. It describes two preconscious emotional systems in the limbic area of the brain. The dispositional system manages tried and true behaviors that are familiar and match expectations. The surveillance system is activated in high anxiety situations that are perceived as unfamiliar or threatening (Marcus et al. 2000). In the event that a normative

violation is witnessed, the surveillance system will be activated in response to the unfamiliar or otherwise dissonant behavior. When this system is turned on, people tend to think more deeply about their environment and think or act in ways that reflect these inner processes. For example, threat modifies levels of tolerance in predictable ways (Marcus, Wood, Theiss-Morse 1998). In terms of the 19 basic values, tolerance fits into the universalism value unit. Universalism-tolerance is characterized by “Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself” (Schwartz et al. 2012, p. 669). A reduction of tolerance due to an increase of anxiety reflects a shift in emphasis from the universalism unit in the anxiety-free half of the values circle toward the half of the values circle that is motivated by anxiety avoidance. The shift is likely to cause acute emphasis on either the conservation or self-enhancement quadrants from which Power–dominance, Power–resources, Security–personal, Security–societal, Tradition, and Conformity–rules are all contenders.

In sum, dissonance in value orientations between immigrants and long-term residents can create anxiety when they lead to perceived behavioral normative violations within the new cultural context. Anxiety may cause a shifted value orientation in long-term residents aimed at self-protection or protection of the status quo against the perceived threat associated with normative violations. This shifting of value priorities, in turn, may lead to behavioral outcomes that are different than the outcomes normally expected of individuals based on their usual value orientation. For instance, if individuals normally oriented toward openness to change and self-transcendence shift to instead prioritize conservation or self-enhancement, it means people who tend to be open to newcomers and change in their lives become less tolerant and less open. It is a cognitive

paradox indeed if an inclusively oriented person finds themselves threatened or repelled by difference. Further, as the last chapter showed, people who are more exclusionary are not easily moved to be more inclusionary, but, do exclusionary tendencies necessarily translate to exclusionary behaviors in the social arena? This study examines the borders around openness to explain why the above paradox may sometimes occur in everyday life and it examines the reach of exclusive tendencies from attitudes to behavioral intentions.

Theoretical Overview and Dependent Variables

The baseline expectation is that long-term residents will naturally be inclined to evaluate the presence of immigrants based on their value orientations, which will differentially correspond to either liking or disliking the presence of immigrants in their communities. Liking or disliking immigrants should in turn lead to corresponding behavioral intention outcome patterns (Ajzen & Fishbein 2005; Ajzen & Gilbert 2008). Those whose values orient them to like immigrant diversity will naturally display behavioral outcomes that range from amiability to friendship in interactions with immigrants. Those whose values orient them to dislike immigrant diversity will display behavioral outcomes that range from social tolerance to intolerance with immigrants. When anxiety is introduced into scenarios by making normative violations salient, the outcomes will change for individuals across the like-dislike continuum. The anxiety induced changes will reflect the activation of the surveillance system, which is likely to lead all individuals to react more negatively toward the immigrants who are causing the anxiety by violating established normative behaviors or dress. Below, I discuss the specific value orientations expected to lead to the natural conditions of both liking and disliking immigrant generated diversity. I then focus on the behavioral intentions

associated with each natural condition. Finally, I discuss how the behavioral intentions are expected to change under the condition of anxiety.

Liking (amiability, friendship) and Disliking (social tolerance and intolerance)

This project conceptualizes both liking and disliking as a result of a person's value orientations. Liking is generally understood as a positive evaluation of someone (Sternberg 1987; Veksler & Eden 2017; Wojciszke et al. 2009). It is associated with a willingness (at the low end) or a desire (at the high end) to engage positively with the object of liking in the future (Veksler & Eden 2017). If interacting with someone fulfills or is complimentary to the value goals one emphasizes, then individuals are more likely to "like" the person with whom they are interacting. If interacting with someone contradicts the value goals one emphasizes, then individuals are more likely to "dislike" the person with whom they are interacting. Disliking is the result of a negative evaluation of someone based on one's own value orientation.

The evaluations of liking and disliking have different implications for behaviors and are results of different underlying motivations. If a long-term resident has a positive evaluation of an immigrant individual or group, they will approach or react to interactions with them from a positive perspective where the effect is somewhere between amiability and friendliness. Amiability is defined as being agreeable, pleasant, and good natured.⁸ Friendliness is generally defined as mutual affection, favoring or promoting something, or the absence of hostility.⁹ Liking someone, then, means you are inclined to treat them kindly and perhaps even have some level of affection for them. Importantly, kindness

⁸ Dictionary.com. Amiable. < <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/amiability> >

⁹ Miriam-Webster. Friend. < <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/friend> >

toward those who are liked does not require a lot of effort or entail any sort of cognitive struggle.

If, on the other hand, a long-term resident has a negative evaluation of an immigrant individual or group, they will approach interactions with them from a negative perspective. Behaviors resulting from negative evaluations range from social tolerance to intolerance. Intolerance reflects an unwillingness to share social space with those who are disliked or those who are members of minority groups (Kirchner, Freitag, & Rapp 2011; Tir & Singh 2015). It is associated with feelings of threat (Marcus, Wood, Theiss-Morse 1998) and entails social pressure to conform (Gibson 1992). Intolerance may be associated with unkind actions or behaviors or even outright degradation. Social tolerance is symbiotically linked to intolerance as both stem from a foundation of disliking or disapproving (Walsham 2006), but social tolerance reflects an effort to overcome negative impulses toward others. Social tolerance is tolerating others in response to the necessity of coexisting in order to establish harmony in society regardless of differing values and behaviors (Kirchner, Freitag, & Rapp 2011). Social tolerance may lead to displays of kindness, but it is likely a kindness achieved through some level of cognitive struggling and perhaps constraint.¹⁰

Liking. The value orientations that are naturally expected to lead to liking immigrants and immigrant generated diversity in one's community are located in the self-transcendence and openness to change quadrants of the values circle. Self-transcendence

¹⁰ A distinction must be made between the concept of *social tolerance* and the *universalism-tolerance* value in Schwartz's continuum. Social tolerance stems from a foundation of disliking difference whereas the universalism-tolerance value is defined by acceptance and understanding of those who are different. In this project, universalism-tolerance is one of the elements of the measure of individual value orientation while social tolerance is an effect of individual value orientation.

values include humility (which overlaps with the conservation quadrant), universalism, and benevolence. In the values continuum (Schwartz et al. 2012), humility is an understanding of “one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things” (p. 669).

Universalism has three different components: concern, nature, and tolerance.

Universalism-concern is related to the civil liberties of equality and justice for everyone.

Universalism-nature is the desire to preserve and protect nature. Universalism-tolerance is defined by acceptance and understanding of those who are different. Universalism-concern and tolerance are expected to positively correlate with the behaviors associated with liking (amiability and friendliness).

Benevolence has two different components: dependability and caring. The former is focused on being reliable and trustworthy toward the ingroup, the latter on ensuring the welfare of ingroup members. If immigrants are accepted as legitimate members of the community, benevolence is expected to positively correlate with liking behaviors. If immigrants are not accepted as legitimate members of the community, then the relationship between benevolence and liking is expected to be weaker or negative as benevolence motivated behaviors are generally understood to apply to the ingroup. However, if one naturally emphasizes self-transcendence values they are likely to be more accepting of difference because both benevolence and universalism values are located in the self-transcendence quadrant. The boundaries of group membership for this orientation then are likely be more inclusive leading to the extension of benevolent related behaviors to a wider range of people. Therefore, the overarching expectation for this quadrant is that emphasizing self-transcendence values will correlate positively with amiability and friendliness toward immigrants.

Openness to change values include self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism.

Self-direction includes two components: thought and action. Self-direction-thought is an emphasis on the importance of independently forming one's thoughts and abilities. Self-direction-action emphasizes the importance of freedom of action. Those who emphasize self-direction values want to form their own opinions, which means that stereotypes may have less influence on them (Sagiv & Schwartz 1995). They are likely to view diversity as an opportunity to learn. The related value of stimulation enhances the desire for novel experiences and ideas, something that exposure to different cultures and ways of life can provide. Hedonism motivates sensuous gratification and pleasure, goals that are not expected to be relevant in everyday interactions with immigrants (Sagiv & Schwartz 1995). Therefore, overall:

H1: An emphasis on values located in the self-transcendence and openness to change quadrants will tend to correlate positively with liking behaviors of amiability and friendliness toward immigrants.

Disliking. The values located in the conservation quadrant are humility (which overlaps with the self-transcendence quadrant) conformity, tradition, security, and face (which overlaps with the self-enhancement quadrant). As discussed above, humility is about situating one's self understanding in the context of the wider scheme of the world. Conformity, tradition, and security are oriented toward preserving the status quo (Sagiv & Schwartz 1995; Schwartz et al. 2012). The two components of conformity are *interpersonal* and *rules*. Conformity-interpersonal reflects an emphasis on conflict avoidance with or avoidance of harm toward other people. Conformity-rules emphasizes compliance with rules and laws. Tradition reflects an emphasis on "Maintaining and

preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions” (2012, p. 669). Security has two components: societal and personal. Security-societal is related to emphasizing “safety and stability of the wider society,” (2012, p. 669). Security-personal represents an emphasis on individual safety. Face represents an emphasis on goals of security and social power by maintaining a clean and untarnished public image.

Conservation quadrant values are generally expected to correlate positively with either social tolerance or intolerance. Interacting with immigrants who may have different value orientations than one’s own may appear to threaten the harmony and stability associated with established norms leading individuals oriented toward conservation to dislike immigrants. Individuals who emphasize conformity-rules are expected to diligently restrain behaviors that would violate established rules and laws and to expect that behavior from others. They will likely feel threatened by difference that does not conform to usual social standards and tend to dislike immigrant diversity, which may lead to social intolerance. However, with the interplay of conformity-personal, individuals who emphasize conformity also are likely to be motivated to restrain behaviors that would upset harmony with other people in everyday social interactions. This latter effect may lead to a positive correlation with social tolerance instead of intolerance.

Emphasizing tradition values means that a person has wholly accepted prevailing customs, religious traditions, and norms that are common to the status quo. Evaluations of dissonant cultures are likely to be negative and perceived as threatening the more one cherishes and invests in particular belief systems such as religion or patriotism, leading to the expectation of a positive correlation with intolerance, the more negative side of disliking. Humility in terms of the conservation quadrant will likely correlate positively

with social tolerance. If an individual is oriented toward conservation coupled with the understanding of their own insignificance in the wider scheme of things, they are likely to be socially tolerant regardless of discomfort associated with nonconformance of social standards because they can conceive of their discomfort from within larger schemes of social stability. Those oriented toward the face value in terms of the conservation quadrant are tough to form expectations about. When face is more closely related to conservation, the social context is likely to dictate how feelings and behaviors toward immigrants will play out. The desire for personal security and power through the maintenance of one's reputation will likely lead to whatever behaviors garner social admiration. The expectation for this value will therefore remain neutral and exploratory. Taken together:

H2: An emphasis on values located in the conservation quadrant will tend to correlate positively with the disliking behaviors of social tolerance and intolerance toward immigrants.

The values located in the self-enhancement quadrant are face (which overlaps with the conservation quadrant), power, achievement, and hedonism (which overlaps with the openness to change quadrant). Expectations for the face value will again remain neutral and exploratory for the reasons discussed above. Power consists of two components: dominance and resources. The former reflects emphasis on power over people and the latter reflects emphasis on "power through control over material and social resources" (Schwartz et al. 2012, p. 669). If long-term residents feel that they are in a position of power in terms of being higher in the social status hierarchy than immigrants, they are not likely to feel threatened by them and there is no reason to

believe they would naturally dislike immigrant diversity. If immigrants are seen as viable competitors for status, then individuals who emphasize power will likely feel more anxious at their presence and dislike them.

Achievement values are oriented around personal success in the social world. Behaviors associated with self-enhancement values are context dependent because the context of the social environment will determine what behaviors are required to be successful in it. In the U.S. context, many recent immigrants still have a minority status but often there is diversity in work and educational environments. Further, the U.S. is a liberal society where nonacceptance of diversity can hinder one's success or progress in many social and professional settings and would therefore call for masking dislike if one were naturally inclined in that direction but also sought power and achievement. As previously discussed, those who are naturally inclined to dislike immigrant diversity will likely tend to be oriented toward conservation values. Therefore, if individuals are oriented toward power and achievement but also emphasize conservation values, a positive correlation with social tolerance is expected because the dual goals associated with these quadrants will require constraint of the tendency to dislike diversity. If individuals are oriented toward self-enhancement values but do not also emphasize conservation values, there will likely be little to no correlation between self-enhancement and social tolerance. In the latter case, if immigrants do not pose a threat to status and authority, they may even provide opportunities to exercise it, which could translate into a positive correlation between self-enhancement and the liking outcomes of amiability and friendliness (Sagiv & Schwartz 1995). Therefore:

H3: An emphasis on values located in the self-enhancement quadrant coupled with an emphasis on the conservation quadrant will tend to correlate positively with the disliking behaviors of social tolerance and intolerance toward immigrants.

H4: An emphasis on values located in the self-enhancement quadrant that is *not* coupled with an emphasis on the conservation quadrant will tend to correlate positively with the liking behaviors of amiability and friendship.

Value Shifts Under Conditions of Anxiety

As discussed above, when anxiety is introduced into scenarios by making normative violations salient, the behavioral outcomes are expected to change for individuals across the like-dislike continuum. The anxiety induced changes will reflect the activation of the surveillance system. When this system is turned on, people tend to think more deeply about their environment and will act or think in ways that are out of the ordinary from their usual cognitive processes. Conservation values are oriented in order to protect from threat, reduce anxiety, and uphold the status quo. In the face of perceiving normative violations committed by people with conflicting value orientations, conservation values will likely be activated in individuals, even if those individuals are normally oriented toward orthogonal quadrants like openness to change. This means that across the board of natural value orientations, when long-term residents witness normative violations they will become anxious. Under this condition of anxiety, value priorities associated with liking will be reordered while value priorities associated with disliking will become stronger. Therefore:

H4: An emphasis on values located in the self-transcendence and openness to change quadrants will tend to correlate positively with the disliking behaviors of social tolerance and intolerance toward immigrants under conditions of anxiety.

H5: An emphasis on values located in the conservation and self-enhancement quadrants will tend to correlate more strongly with the disliking behaviors of social tolerance and intolerance toward immigrants under conditions of anxiety.

Table 3.2: Value Orientations and Associated Behavioral Outcomes

Value Orientation	Low Anxiety Behavioral Outcome (Natural Orientation)	High Anxiety Behavioral Outcome
<i>Self-Transcendence</i>	<i>Hypotheses 1:</i> Liking (amiability and/or friendliness)	<i>Hypotheses 1a:</i> Disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)
<i>Openness to Change</i>	<i>Hypotheses 2:</i> Liking (amiability and/or friendliness)	<i>Hypotheses 2a:</i> Disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)
<i>Conservation</i>	<i>Hypotheses 3:</i> Disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)	<i>Hypotheses 3a:</i> Stronger association with disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)
<i>Self-Enhancement coupled with Conservation</i>	<i>Hypotheses 4:</i> Disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)	<i>Hypotheses 4a:</i> Stronger association with disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)
<i>Self-Enhancement not coupled with Conservation</i>	<i>Hypotheses 5:</i> Liking (amiability and/or friendliness)	<i>Hypotheses 5a:</i> Disliking (social tolerance or intolerance)

3.2 Study Design

The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationships between the value orientations of long-term residents and their everyday attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants in conditions of both low and high anxiety. Two studies were conducted to test the hypotheses. Both studies were designed as between-subjects survey experiments. The first study served as a pilot and the second study incorporated changes

to the survey vignettes based on findings from the pilot study. Both studies used Schwartz's PVQ5X Value measure to capture the independent variable, the same 18-item like/dislike measure, and the same 14-item behavioral measure.¹¹ Please see *Study 1: Appendix A* for description and most important results of the pilot study. The focus below is on Study 2.

Survey Experiment Procedure for Study 2

The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationships between the value orientations of long-term residents and their attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants in conditions of both low and high anxiety. A between-subjects survey experiment where participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions was utilized to this end. To measure values, participants completed the PVQ5X Value survey. After completing the values measure, participants were randomly assigned to either a control (neutral) or an experiment (normative violation) condition. In each condition, all participants read a description of an immigrant, followed by indices that measured whether they liked or disliked the immigrant and then whether they would partake in different behaviors toward the immigrant. Participants either read the control condition vignette or the experimental condition vignette. The control vignette neutrally described Ali as a person who has a family, enjoys baseball, and likes to travel. The experimental condition vignette described Ali as coming from a Middle Eastern country and conforming to a traditional sect of Islam that requires his wife to wear a burka and niqab

¹¹ The pilot study had two parts, the original pilot, and then a second, shortened, vignette-manipulation-test round of data collection that tested a revised version of the vignettes. In the latter, the sole purpose was to test whether the revised vignette structure performed as expected. Therefore, the PVQ5X, 15 of the 18 like/dislike items, and 13 of the 14 behavioral items were dropped from the survey in this round of data collection. The items were added back in for the second study in which the purpose was again to test the primary hypotheses.

when she leaves the house. The experiment condition went on to describe Ali and his family swimming at a pool in traditional Muslim attire and showed three images that corresponded to the description (see *Appendix C*, Table C.3.2 for vignette structure).¹² Following the vignettes, participants were asked a battery of questions measuring whether they liked or disliked the immigrant. The like-dislike measures were then followed by a list of behaviors that could occur in everyday life such as sitting next to the immigrant on a bench at the local shopping mall. Participants were first asked whether they would partake in the behavior and then they were asked to rate how easy or how difficult the behaviors would be for them to endorse in social interactions with the described immigrant.

Data Collection

Qualtrics was used to create the online survey experiment. Data were collected through Prolific, an online survey firm that maintains a diverse panel of web-based survey participants. Participants were screened to ensure they were American citizens and also resided in the United States at the time the survey was taken. Participants took the survey on their own computers when it was convenient for them. Prolific provides lists of surveys to potential participants that provide information about the length of the survey and the compensation if they choose to participate. The sample for Study 2 consisted of 388 observations. An attention check analysis was completed using two screen

¹² A third vignette was originally included in Study 2 to test whether adding “extremely hot” to the description of the summer day that Ali and his family were swimming would have an impact (See *Appendix C*, Table C.3.1 for all 3 vignettes). There were no statistical differences in found between the normative violation experiment condition and the normative violation experiment condition that added the descriptive words, the two vignettes were ultimately combined for this reason.

questions.¹³ About 46% of the sample were male and 56% were female. The sample was about 52% Democrat, 48% Republican. In terms of political ideology, the sample was about 40% liberal, 16% middle of the road, and 44% conservative.

Measures

The explanatory variable is value orientation. Anxiety is a moderator that is introduced in the experimental manipulation through the norm violation vignette. The outcome variables are behaviors associated with the mediating attitudes of liking (related to amiability and friendliness) and disliking (related to social tolerance and intolerance). Individuals' *value orientation* was measured with Schwartz's Values Survey (PVQ5X). This is a 57-item index that has a version for males and a version for females. Each item describes an attribute of a person (a male for the male oriented version and a female for the female oriented version). The respondent rates on a 6-option scale (very much like me, like me, some-what like me, a little like me, not like me, not like me at all) how closely like them the person described in the item is on that aspect. Some examples from the index include: "Being creative is important to him"; "He thinks it is important to be ambitious"; "Having order and stability in society is important to him"; "He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching"; "Being very successful is important to him"; "He strongly believes that he should care for nature";

¹³ A screen question was asked after each vignette that read "What is the composition of Ali's family?" Response options were: 1 = Ali has a wife and two children (correct answer), 2 = Ali is single and has two children (incorrect), 3 = Ali has a wife and three children, and 4 = Select this answer if you would like to be redirected to read the paragraph about Ali again before answering this question. In all, 71 respondents selected incorrect answers. A screen variable was made where 1 = participants who answered the screen question correctly, 2 = those who got Ali's number of children wrong, and 3 = those who answered Ali's marital status incorrectly. A series of ANOVAs and linear regressions were run with the screen question as the primary predictor and different dependent variables. There were no significant differences found between those who answered the number of children question incorrectly and those who answered the screen correctly across all of the tests. Therefore, following Alvarez et al. 2019, those respondents were not dropped from the analysis.

“She works to promote harmony and peace among diverse groups”; “She takes advantage of every opportunity to have fun”; “She wants everyone to be treated justly, even people she doesn’t know”; “obeying all the laws is important to her”; “It is important to her to work against threats to the world of nature”; “Learning things for herself and improving her abilities is important to her” (see full item list in *Appendix D*).

Factor Analysis of Value Variables

Factor analysis using STATA 15.1 was performed to create four values indices, one for each of the value quadrants (openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement, and conservation; see *Appendix D*, Table D.3.1 for full list of value items and corresponding codes). Oblique rotation was specified because it is likely that at least openness to change and self-transcendence factors correlate. The openness to change index included 12-items (three self-direction-thought items, three self-direction-action items, three stimulation items, and three hedonism items). The Eigenvalue for the index was 4.2120 ($\alpha = .8541$), range = 27 to 72, $M = 55.35$, $std = 8.40$. The self-transcendence index included 15-items (three universalism-tolerance items, three universalism-nature items, three universalism-caring items, three benevolence-caring items, three benevolence-dependability items, and one humility item). The self-transcendence index Eigenvalue was 5.2822 ($\alpha = .8857$), range = 28 to 90, $M = 71.3$, $std = 10.66$. The self-enhancement index included 10-items (one face item, three power-dominance items, three power-resource items, and three achievement items). The self-enhancement index Eigenvalue was 5.0242 ($\alpha = .9055$), range = 10 to 60, $M = 33.59$, $std = 10.56$. Finally, the conservation index included 12-items (three security-personal items, three security-societal items, three tradition items, and three conformity-rules items). The conservation

index Eigenvalue was 4.6661 ($\alpha = .8748$), range = 23 to 72 $M = 51.26$, $std = 10.43$. See

Tables 3.3 through 3.6 for factor loadings, correlations, and alphas. After the indices were created, they were recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Table 3.3: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Openness to Change

Variable	Factor (Promax)	Corr With Total (item-rest)	Alpha
SDT1	.4677	.4315	.8517
SDT2	.5199	.4789	.8462
SD13	.5356	.4898	.8456
SDA1	.5848	.5185	.8445
SDA2	.4311	.3895	.8534
SDA3	.5903	.5297	.8433
ST1	.6498	.6082	.8368
ST2	.6263	.5604	.8408
ST3	.7350	.6807	.8310
HE1	.6616	.5948	.8385
HE2	.6414	.5850	.8394
HE3	.5966	.5319	.8426

Table 3.4: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Self-Transcendence

Variable	Factor (Promax)	Corr With Total	Alpha
UNT1	.4338	.4042	.8782
UNT2	.4904	.4659	.8760
UNT3	.3251	.3071	.8857
UNN1	.5987	.5501	.8730
UNN2	.5283	.4878	.8753
UNN3	.5094	.4713	.8758
UNC1	.7210	.6662	.8668
UNC2	.6548	.6031	.8699
UNC3	.6882	.6343	.8688
BEC1	.6688	.6111	.8695
BEC2	.6408	.5932	.8704
BEC3	.6589	.5953	.8702
BED1	.6635	.6255	.8687
BED2	.6325	.5877	.8707
BED3	.5443	.5030	.8745

Note: Although UNT3 (Universalism-Tolerance understanding) loaded low at .3251, the overall alpha did not change with this variable removed, so it was not dropped.

Table 3.5: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Self-Enhancement

Variable	Factor (Promax)	Corr With Total	Alpha
FAC2	.5695	.5350	.9035
POD1	.7528	.7151	.8927
POD2	.6106	.5906	.9006
POD3	.7565	.7153	.8926
POR1	.7839	.7445	.8907
POR2	.8478	.8022	.8868
POR3	.6453	.5986	.8999
AC1	.8086	.7636	.8897
AC2	.7258	.6716	.8956
AC3	.5077	.4874	.9068

Table 3.6: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Conservation

Variable	Factor (Promax)	Corr With Total	Alpha
SEP1	.4627	.4243	.8732
SEP2	.4411	.4015	.8735
SEP3	.4828	.4353	.8720
SES1	.6971	.6180	.8616
SES2	.7237	.6459	.8599
SES3	.6159	.5824	.8649
TR1	.7716	.7170	.8545
TR2	.6488	.5911	.8642
TR3	.6877	.6296	.8608
COR1	.5518	.5189	.8678
COR2	.6428	.6027	.8627
COR3	.6544	.6137	.8619

Factor Analysis on Like/Dislike Items

Whether participants liked or disliked the described immigrant was measured with an index including modified items from several different sources. Response options spread across a 4-point scale that ranges from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (definitely true). Examples include: “I think that Ali exhibits good judgment”; “I think that future interactions with Ali would be undesirable”; “I would like to get to know Ali and his

family better”; “I think Ali could be a friend of mine”; “It would be difficult to meet and talk with Ali”; “Ali just wouldn’t fit in to my circle of friends” (see *Appendix B Table 3.2: Like/Dislike Index for full index item list*).

In total, there were 18 like/dislike measures in the survey for each immigrant (see *Appendix Table 3.2*). Unrotated, Promax rotated, and Varimax rotated factor analyses in STATA 15.1 were performed on all 18 items. Because the Promax and Varimax rotations showed the same factor loadings, the Varimax (uncorrelated) results are reported below for the sake of a simpler structure (DeVellis 2017, pp. 180-185). The liking index included all 18-like measures, Eigenvalue = 8.2428 ($\alpha = .9346$), range = 18 to 72, $M = 53.1$, $std = 11.45$. After the index was created, it was recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Table 3.7: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Like Index

Variable	Factor	Corr With Total	Alpha
18. Like	.8167	.7834	.9282
17. Should not serve as example	.6780	.6518	.9308
16. Admiration	.6868	.6496	.9308
15. Respect	.7533	.7227	.9292
14. Loyal	.4867	.4632	.9343
13. Probably unfair	.7001	.6765	.9304
12. Not like	.6347	.6126	.9316
11. Cold feelings	.5870	.5627	.9325
9. Could not be friends	.4952	.4768	.9347
10. Know more	.6621	.6239	.9314
8. Would not fit in	.7055	.6854	.9301
7. Difficult to meet	.6358	.6161	.9315
6. Could be Friends	.7669	.7313	.9290
5. Get to know	.7105	.6706	.9303
4. Interaction Undesirable	.7021	.6799	.9303
3. Good judge	.7251	.6887	.9300
2. Dislike	.6941	.6711	.9303
1. Commonality	.6507	.6184	.9315

Behavior Measures

The behavior measures are a mix of both modified and novel items. First, respondents were asked whether they would partake in the behavior described. Examples include: “If Ali sat down next to you on a public bench at the local mall would you be able to sit by him?”; “Would you socialize with Ali at a social function?”; “Would you smile at Ali if he was the salesperson scanning your items at the supermarket?”; “Would you consent to having Ali’s desk next to yours at your job?”; “Could you be friends with Ali?”; “Would you listen to Ali explain his beliefs about life?” Following a “yes” or “no” answer to each question, respondents are asked to rate how difficult the decision to partake or not to partake in the behaviors would be for them by selecting their response from a 6-option scale: 1 = extremely difficult; 2 = moderately difficult; 3 = slightly difficult; 4 = slightly easy; 5 = moderately easy; or 6 = extremely easy (see *Appendix B* for actual response scale).

The 14 behavioral questions measured the underlying motivation *and* the behavioral outcome, both assumed to be driven by individual values and attitudes toward the described immigrants. The motivational drivers (described in detail above) include intolerance, social tolerance, amiability, and friendship. If a person answered “no” to any of the behavioral questions, they were demonstrating some level of intolerance. If they answered “yes” to the behavioral questions, they may have been demonstrating social tolerance, amiability, or friendship. The difficulty ratings of the “yes” or “no” answers were designed to disentangle the motivations underlying the behaviors. For example, behavioral question item number nine (*Appendix E, Table E.3.2*) asks “Would you socialize with Ali at a social function?” If respondents answered yes to this question they

could have been demonstrating either social tolerance, amiability, or friendliness. If they were demonstrating social tolerance, there should have been an underlying cognitive struggle present because they are driven from a more negative evaluation of the described immigrant. It is necessary for the end of social tolerance to overcome negative feelings in order to be polite. If the respondent answered “yes” that that they would socialize with the immigrant at a function and then also rated the difficulty of their decision in the range from response option 1 = extremely difficult, up to 3 = slightly difficult, this was taken as indicative of that underlying struggle. In contrast, if the participant was demonstrating friendliness, this decision should be easy and its corresponding difficulty rating would be 6 = extremely easy. If the respondent was demonstrating amiability without the desire or interest to get to know the person more (the latter of which indicate friendliness), the difficulty rating of the decision should be 4 = slightly easy to 5 = moderately easy. This latter rating range indicates a relative ease of the decision to be agreeable and pleasant but also is slightly indicative of some cognitive boundaries that could potentially prevent the open pursuit of friendship, or in the least, indicate of a lack of interest in the pursuit of friendship.

Factor Analysis on Behavioral Items

The behavior items were recoded to combine the yes and no answers. This produced 14-items, each of which ranged from 1 = No – Extremely easy to 12 = Yes – Extremely easy. The full index Eigenvalue was 6.1316 ($\alpha = .9178$), range = 14 to 168, $M = 140.04$, $std = 28.82$. Table 3.8 shows the factor loadings and alphas for the items. Recall that the difficulty rating (1 = No, Extremely easy to 12 = Yes, Extremely easy) was included in order to be able to disentangle the underlying motivations (intolerance,

social tolerance, amiability, and friendliness) behind stated behavioral intentions. A coding scheme was devised for this purpose that split the behavioral intention index into four sections according to difficulty ratings, each corresponding to one of the underlying motivators (see Table 3.9 below).¹⁴ Finally, the behavioral intention index was recoded to range from 0 to 1, the range adjustments are located in the third column of Table 3.9.

Table 3.8: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Full 14-Item Behavioral Index

Variable	Factor Promax	Corr With Total	Alpha
1. Polite at supermarket	.5009	.4489	.9097
2. Allow in line	.4429	.4032	.9110
3. Give directions to store	.4848	.4317	.9102
4. Sit by on public bench	.6086	.5781	.9052
5. Smile at in supermarket	.5210	.4793	.9085
6. Partner with on project	.7685	.7379	.8990
7. Desk neighbor at job	.6951	.6581	.9031
8. Comfortable as next-door neighbor	.7537	.7201	.8996
9. Socialize with at function	.7658	.7401	.8989
10. Listen to explanation of beliefs about life	.6331	.6082	.9041
11. Invite to home	.7569	.7234	.8996
12. Could be friends	.7530	.7226	.8994
13. Invite to BBQ	.7294	.7020	.9005
14. Go for coffee	.7118	.6848	.9015

¹⁴ Theoretically, intolerance was defined by answering “no” to the behavior items. The Likert response items that corresponded with “no” were 1 through 6. Fourteen total items multiplied by 6 equals 84. Social tolerance was defined as answering yes, but with difficulty, corresponding to Likert response items 7 through 9. Nine multiplied by 14-items equals 126. Amiability corresponded with “yes” answers that came relatively easily, which corresponded with Likert options 10 and 11. Eleven multiplied by 14-items equals 154. Friendliness corresponded with answering “yes” with ease. This was Likert response item number 12. Twelve multiplied by 14-items equals 168. Because participants were able to rate each behavior item at different levels of difficulty there were numbers in between the pure ranges. For example, if a respondent answered yes to all of the items and rated the difficulty level at 10 *Slightly easy* every time, they would score 140. However, if they sometimes answered 9 *Slightly difficult*, this would put their overall score somewhere between 126 and 140. Therefore, the ranges in between that indicated people answered at different difficulty ratings for different items were added to the lower range (i.e. intolerance ranged from 14 to 97, rather than 14 to 84) except in the amiability section where some variability was afforded to friendliness, which was set to range from 161 to 168.

Table 3.9: Behavioral Intention Motivations

Motivation	Behavioral Index Score Range	Recoded from 0 to 1
Intolerance	14 to 97	0 to .5325
Social Tolerance	98 to 139	.5326 to .8117
Amiability	140 to 160	.8118 to .9481
Friendliness	161 to 168	.9482 to 1

Feeling Variables

In order to capture the emotions roused by the vignettes, a set of nine feeling questions were included in the survey after participants read the vignette. The question format was: “How anxious would you say Ali makes you feel?” This format was the same for all nine questions, one for each of the feelings: anxious, uncomfortable, uneasy, resentful, angry, disgusted, hopeful, enthusiastic, and proud. The responses ranged from 1 = Not [insert feeling] at all to 4 = Extremely [insert feeling]. The feeling list is intended to capture not just anxiety (anxious, uncomfortable, and uneasy), but also resentment (resentful, angry, and disgusted), and enthusiasm (hopeful, enthusiastic, and proud). This emotional distinction is made by Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000), who disentangle anxiousness from resentment and enthusiasm by defining the former as situational and related to new and unexpected circumstances while the latter two are related to the execution of preformed action plans based on past attitude formation toward the object. Specifically, the authors state that “enthusiasm is associated with a plan of action or achievement and aversion is associated with a plan of avoidance or conflict” (p. 165).

Measuring participants feelings in this way serves a couple of purposes. First, the feeling measures provide another way to check the effectiveness of the vignettes. If the experiment is successful, participants who read the normative violation vignette should

feel significantly more negative toward Ali than those in the neutral condition. Second, they can provide a deeper understanding of the relationship and interaction between values, attitudes, and behaviors toward immigrants because they are one of the underlying mechanisms between values and attitudes that likely impact behavioral intentions. Three feeling indices were created. Anxiety included anxiousness, discomfort, and uneasiness, Eigenvalue = 2.2329 ($\alpha = .9098$), range = 3 to 12, M = 4.40, std = 2.28. Aversion included disgust, anger, and resentment, Eigenvalue = 1.9617 ($\alpha = .8685$), range = 3 to 12, M = 3.87, std = 1.81. Enthusiasm included hope, enthusiasm, and pride, Eigenvalue = 1.9556 ($\alpha = .8709$), range = 3 to 12, M = 9.36, std = 2.50. See Table 3.10 for factor loading and item alphas.

Table 3.10: Factor Loadings and Alphas for Anxiety, Aversion, and Enthusiasm Indices

Variable	Factor Promax	Corr With Total	Alpha
Anxiety			
Uneasy	.8974	.8551	.8399
Discomfort	.8789	.8341	.8594
Anxiousness	.8094	.7754	.9071
Aversion			
Disgust	.8510	.7916	.7747
Anger	.8107	.7509	.8177
Resentment	.7618	.7128	.8496
Enthusiasm			
Hope	.8154	.7609	.8108
Enthusiasm	.8056	.7520	.8205
Pride	.8010	.7481	.8229

Control Variables

Control variables include several factors likely to influence attitudes toward immigrants. People oriented toward different political ideologies have been shown to view immigration according to generalized patterns. Conservatives and Republicans tend to have more negative attitudes toward immigration (Pettigrew, Thomas, Ulrich Wagner,

& Christ 2007; Citrin et al. 2009). Liberals and Democrats tend to have more positive attitudes toward immigration (Citrin et al. 2009; Kunovich 2009; Fussel 2014). Ideology was therefore accounted for, respondents were asked where they placed themselves on a liberal to conservative 7-point scale, 1 = Extremely conservative to 7 = Extremely liberal. Partisanship was measured with the question: “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?” Response options ranged from 1 = Republican, 2 = Democrat, 3 = Independent/Other. A follow-up question asked Republican respondents “How strong of a Republican are you?: 1 = A strong Republican or 2 = Not a very strong republican.” Respondents who answered as Democrats were given the same follow-up question worded for Democrats. Respondents who answered as independents were asked the follow-up question, “Do you lean more toward the Democratic or Republican party?” Response options were either 1 = Democratic or 2 = Republican. Independents who leaned toward Republicans were recoded into the “Not very strong Republican” category and independents who lean toward the Democratic party were recoded as “Not very strong Democrats.” Initial and follow-up partisanship items were combined into one partisanship variable with response options ranging from: 1 = Strong Democrat, 2 = Not very strong Democrat, 3 = Not very strong Republican, and 4 = Strong Republican. A correlation matrix showed that political ideology and partisanship were highly correlated ($p = .8066$), political ideology was included in the below analyses and partisanship was not in order to avoid multicollinearity between them.

Perceptions of economic threat have also been shown to correlate with negative attitudes toward immigration (Olzak, 1992; Citrin et al., 1997; Kesler & Bloemraad

2010). Respondents were asked whether they believe the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the last year. This variable was recoded so that a higher score indicated more positive feelings toward the economy (1 = gotten worse, 2 = stayed the same, 3 = gotten better). Interpretation of this variable will need to take the Covid-19 pandemic into consideration. The pandemic will likely cause many more people than usual report negative perceptions of the economy. Social trust has also been shown to impact whether immigrant-generated diversity is well received (Herreros & Criado 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010). Respondents were asked whether most people can be trusted (1) or whether you can't be too careful in dealing with people (0). In order to examine whether people in more densely populated areas attitudes toward immigration differed from those in less populated areas respondents were asked "about how many people live in your city or town?" Response options ranged across eight population specific categories: < 50,000 (about 27%); between 51,000 and 100,000 (about 19%); between 101,000 and 150,000 (about 9%); between 150,000 and 300,000 (about 10%); between 301,000 and 600,000 (about 9%); between 601,000 and 800,000 (about 7%); between 801,000 to 1 million (about 5%); and > 1 million (about 16%).

The analysis also included several relevant sociodemographic variables: *gender* (1 = female, 0 = male); *race* (1 = white, 2 = black, 3 = Hispanic/Latino, 4 = Asian, 5 = other) *religious affiliation* (1 = Christian, 2 = None, 3 = other), and *income* (1. <\$25,000 2. \$26,000-\$40,000, 3. \$41,000-\$59,000, 4. \$60,000-\$79,000, 5. \$80,000-\$99,000, 6. \$100,000-\$149,000, 7. \$150,000-\$199,000, 8. >= \$250,000). Non-dummy control variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1, except religion and race.

Vignette Manipulation Check Measures

In order to check whether the experiment manipulation was effective, two manipulation check questions were asked after each vignette. The first was, “Based on the description you just read, how different would you say Ali's values are from your values? Response options were 1 = Not different at all, 2 = Somewhat different, 3 = Pretty different, and 4 = Extremely different. The second manipulation check question was “Based on the description you just read, how unusual would you say Ali's values are compared to typical American values?” Response options were 1 = Not unusual at all, 2 = Somewhat unusual, 3 = Pretty unusual, and 4 = Extremely unusual. See Table 3.11 below for full view of descriptive statistics.

Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 (Ali – Prolific Sample)

Variable	N	M/%	Metric	SD	Min	Max
Behavior	388	.818	14-item index	.187	0	1
Self-transcendence	388	.698	15-item index	.17	0	1
Conservation	388	.577	12-item index	.21	0	1
Self-enhancement	388	.472	10-item index	.21	0	1
Openness to change	388	.630	12-item index	.19	0	1
Liking	388		18-item index	.21	0	1
Feeling Indices						
Anxiety	388	4.40	Anxiety: 3-item index (anxiousness, discomfort, uneasiness)	2.28	3	12
Aversion	388	3.87	Aversion: 3-item index (resentment, anger, disgust)	1.81	3	12
Positive	388	9.36	Positive: 3-item index (hope, enthusiasm, pride)	2.50	3	12
Vignette	388			.47	0	1
Neutral	131	33.76				
Normative Viol.	257	66.24				
Gender	388		Do you identify as male or female?	.50	0	1
Male (0)	180	46.39				
Female (1)	208	53.61				
Partisanship	388		Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?	.37	0	1
Strong Democrat	103	26.55				
Not Strong Dem	101	26.03				
Not Strong Rep	96	24.74				
Strong Rep	88	22.68				
Political Ideology	388		We hear a lot of talk these	.31	0	1

Extr Liberal	53	13.66	days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?			
Liberal	100	25.77				
Middle	62	15.98				
Conservative	134	34.54				
Extr Conserv	39	10.05				
Education	388		What level of education have you completed?	.25	0	1
High School	35	9.02				
Some College	96	24.74				
Bachelor's	137	35.31				
Master's	104	26.80				
PhD/Professional	16	4.12				
Income	388		What was your total household income in 2019?	.24	0	1
<\$25,000	48	12.37				
\$26k-\$40k	50	12.89				
\$41k-\$59k	60	15.46				
\$60k-\$79k	61	15.72				
\$80k-\$99k	52	13.40				
\$100k-\$149k	64	16.49				
\$150k-\$199k	37	9.54				
\$200k-\$249k	5	1.29				
\$250k-\$300k	5	1.29				
>\$300k	6	1.55				
Race	388		What race do you consider yourself to be?	.23	1	5
White	302	77.84				
Black	42	10.82				
Hisp/Lat	12	3.09				
Asian	28	7.22				
Other	4	1.03				
Age	388	38	What is your age?	.23	0	1
National Identity	383		I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people.	.28	0	1
Strongly Disagree	20	5.22				
Disagree	41	10.70				
Neither	82	21.41				
Agree	151	39.43				
Strongly Agree	89	23.24				
City size	388		About how many people live in your city or town?	.37	0	1
< 50,000	103	26.55				
btwn 51k-100k	73	18.81				
btwn 101k- 150k	34	8.76				
btwn 151k-300k	37	9.54				
btwn 301k-600k	34	8.76				
btwn 601k- 800k	26	6.70				
btwn 801k-1 mill	19	4.90				
> 1 million	62	15.98				
Religion	388		What, if any, is your religious preference?	.66	1	3
Christian	236	60.82				
None	115	29.64				
Other	37	9.54				

Economy	388		Would you say that in the past year the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?	.36	0	1
Worse	256	65.98				
Same	80	20.62				
Better	52	13.40				
Manipulation Check 1	388		Based on the description you just read, how different would you say Ali's values are from your values?	1.10	1	4
Not different at all	76	19.59				
Somewhat diff	96	24.74				
Pretty different	100	25.77				
Extremely diff	116	29.90				
Manipulation Check 2	388		Based on the description you just read, how unusual would you say Ali's values are compared to typical American values?	1.19	1	4
Not unusual at all	129	33.25				
Somewhat unus	64	16.49				
Pretty unusual	96	24.74				
Extremely unus	99	25.52				

Vignette Manipulation Check Analysis

To check whether the vignettes impacted the manner in which participants perceived the described immigrant Ali, a series of one-way ANOVAs were performed using the manipulation check and feeling measures described above as dependent variables. Ali was described as having a very different set of values than typical Western liberal values, including the idea that religion and state need not be separate and women should not leave the house uncovered. The experiment vignette, therefore, should have led participants to perceive Ali's values as different from their own. Further, those in the experiment vignette should have felt more anxious and/or averse than participants in the neutral control vignette condition, which described Ali as having more typical American values.

There were significant differences between the control and experiment group vignette means across all of the dependent variables, which indicates that the experiment did have an impact (see Table 3.12 for results). Participants in the experiment vignette

group were significantly more likely to agree that their values were different than Ali's and that typical American values were different than Ali's. Additionally, participants in the experiment vignette group had significantly higher scores on both anxiety and aversion than those in the neutral vignette group. The two vignette groups also significantly differed on enthusiasm, with the experiment group having more enthusiasm after reading the vignettes than those in the control group. Enthusiasm is the trickiest of the three feeling indices to interpret because according to Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen "Enthusiasm marks the importance of executing a plan to achieve something that benefits us as well as the success of a plan to foil some foe" (2000, p. 164). This could mean that enthusiasm was higher for the experiment group because their feelings were roused more by the immigrant description. For now, it is enough to note the differential impact of the vignettes on the two groups in terms of this emotion.

Table 3.12: ANOVAs With Vignettes, Values Similarity, and Feelings

DV: Personal Value Similarity	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Control vs. Experiment	1.58	.09	18.21	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Control (Neutral)	1.61			
Experiment	3.19			
DV: Typical American Value Similarity	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Control vs. Experiment	1.90	.08	22.51	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Control (Neutral)	1.17			
Experiment	3.07			
DV: Anxiety	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Control vs. Experiment	1.63	.23	7.04	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Control (Neutral)	3.33			
Experiment	4.95			
DV: Aversion	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Control vs. Experiment	.992	.19	5.29	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Control (Neutral)	3.21			
Experiment	4.21			
DV: Enthusiasm	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Control vs. Experiment	2.18	.24	8.94	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Control (Neutral)	7.91			
Experiment	10.09			

Relationship Between Political Ideology and Value Orientation

As another preliminary investigation, the relationship between value orientation and political ideology was examined with a series of Pearson correlations and one-way ANOVAs. It is generally assumed that liberals tend to be more open toward immigrants and it follows that liberals likely tend to be more oriented toward openness to change and self-transcendence than conservatives. Likewise, it is generally assumed that conservatives tend to be more protective of tradition and established culture and to be more cautious about being open toward immigrants, which, in turn, would translate into

conservatives being more oriented toward conservation and possibly more oriented toward self-enhancement as well, though the latter assertion is more tenuous.

In this sample, however, openness to change is not correlated with political ideology and there are no significant differences in mean openness to change values scores between liberals and conservatives (see top sections of Tables 3.13 & 3.14). Self-transcendence is weakly but significantly negatively correlated with political ideology, indicating that people who are more liberal also tend to score slightly higher on self-transcendence. The one-way ANOVA for self-transcendence and political ideology shows that the mean group score for liberals is significantly higher than that of both middle of the roaders and conservatives. Conservation is strongly significantly positively correlated with political ideology, indicating that people who are more conservative also tend to score higher on the conservation values orientation. The one-way ANOVA for conservation shows that the mean group score for conservatives is significantly higher than both middle of the roaders and liberals on the conservation values quadrant. Self-enhancement is weakly but significantly positively correlated with political ideology, indicating that people who are more conservative tend to score slightly higher on self-enhancement. The one-way ANOVA for self-enhancement, however, shows no significant differences in mean group scores across the political ideology categories.

Overall, openness to change is not related to political ideology in this sample. Likewise, self-enhancement does not show any strong relationship with political ideology. Liberals in the sample do score more strongly on self-transcendence than conservatives and middle of the roaders, and conservatives score higher on conservation

than the other two groups.¹⁵ So, for this sample, it is safe to say that liberals tend to be more oriented toward self-transcendence than conservatives and conservatives tend to be more oriented toward conservation than liberals.

Table 3.13: Bivariate Relationships for Political Ideology and Value Orientation

Variable	Corr	P
Openness to Change	-.0365	.4729
Self-transcendence	-.2320	< .0001
Conservation	.5435	< .0001
Self-enhancement	.1069	.0353

Note: The political ideology variable ranged from 1 = Extremely liberal to 5 = Extremely conservative.

Table 3.14: ANOVAs With Values and Political Ideology

DV: Openness to Change	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Liberal vs. Middle	.552	1.27	.44	.901
Liberal vs. Conservative	-.537	.933	-.58	.833
Conservative vs. Middle	-1.09	1.24	-.87	.656
Group	Mean			
Liberal	55.50			
Middle	56.05			
Conservative	54.96			
DV: Self-Transcendence	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Liberal vs. Middle	-4.73	1.56	-3.03	.007
Liberal vs. Conservative	-5.47	1.15	-4.75	< .0001
Conservative vs. Middle	-.741	-.741	-.48	.880
Group	Mean			
Liberal	74.48			
Middle	69.76			
Conservative	69.02			
DV: Conservation	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Liberal vs. Middle	3.65	1.32	2.76	.017
Liberal vs. Conservative	12.09	.976	12.39	< .0001
Conservative vs. Middle	8.44	1.30	6.48	< .0001
Group	Mean			
Liberal	45.28			
Middle	48.94			

¹⁵ For those interested in how political ideology interacts with the vignettes across liking and behavioral intentions, please Figures F.3.1 and F.3.2 in *Appendix F*.

Conservative	57.38			
DV: Self-Enhancement	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Liberal vs. Middle	.543	1.58	.34	.937
Liberal vs. Conservative	2.41	1.17	2.06	.099
Conservative vs. Middle	1.86	1.56	1.20	.455
Group	Mean			
Liberal	32.42			
Middle	32.97			
Conservative	34.83			

Note: To simplify comparisons, the political ideology variable was recoded to 1 = Liberal, 2 = Middle of the road, and 3 = Conservative. Openness to change index ranged from 27 to 72, self-transcendence ranged from 28 to 90, conservation ranged from 23 to 72, and self-enhancement ranged from 10 to 60.

3.3 Results

Linear Regressions: Mediating Effect of Liking

The following series of linear regressions tests whether liking mediates the relationship between values and behavioral intentions. Anashensel (2013, p. 259) suggests four criteria be established for mediation: (1) the independent variable must significantly impact the dependent variable, (2) the independent variable must significantly impact the mediator, (3) the mediator must significantly impact the dependent variable while controlling the independent variable, and (4) the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must either become nonsignificant (full mediation) or decrease in strength (partial mediation) when the mediating variable is controlled for in the full model.

Model 1 assessed the first criterion for mediation. The overall model was statistically significant, $F(14, 373) = 11.63$, $p < .0001$. The self-transcendence by vignette interaction, $t(373) = 1.65$, $p = .099$, and the conservation by vignette interaction, $t(373) = -2.53$, $p = .012$, both significantly impact behavioral intention, while the self-enhancement by vignette, $t(373) = .59$, $p = .556$, and the openness to change by vignette

interactions $t(373) = -.03$, $p = .973$, were not significant. In order to establish whether the second criterion was met, Model 2 regressed values on liking, $F(14, 373) = 14.14$, $p < .0001$. The self-transcendence by vignette interaction, $t(373) = 2.11$, $p = .036$ and the conservation by vignette interaction, $t(373) = -3.03$, $p = .003$, both significantly impacted liking, while the self-enhancement by vignette interaction, $t(373) = 1.18$, $p = .238$, and the openness to change interaction, $t(373) = -.48$, $p = .631$, did not. Finally, Model 3 assessed the third and fourth criteria, $F(15, 372) = 45.31$, $p < .0001$. Liking does significantly impact behavioral intention while controlling for values, $t(372) = 18.98$, $p < .0001$. When liking is added to the model, none of the value by vignette interactions are significant.

As seen in Table 3.15, Models 1 and 2 establish that the first and second criteria for mediation is met for the self-transcendence and conservation by vignette interactions. Though the self-enhancement and openness to change interactions are not significant, it is recommended practice to leave them in the model since they were a part of the theory *a priori* (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017), so they will not be dropped from the remaining analyses.¹⁶ Model 3 establishes that criteria 3 and 4 are met. Because the self-transcendence and conservation by vignette interactions become insignificant with liking in the third model, it can be concluded that liking fully mediates the impact of the self-

¹⁶ Both self-enhancement and openness to change were also tested for nonlinear relationships in Model 2 using the Lowess function in STATA. They did both have nonlinear relationships. Openness to change had a monotonic relationship with liking. Model 2 was therefore rerun with the openness to change variable cubed and interacted with the vignette variable. The cubed interaction was not significant. Self-enhancement had a curvilinear relationship with liking in the shape of a concave “U.” Model 2 was therefore rerun again with the self-enhancement variable squared and interacted with the vignette variable. The squared interaction was not significant. Because neither of the nonlinear interactions were significant and including them complicated the model, they were left out in favor of parsimony.

transcendence and conservation by vignette interactions on behavioral intentions. Figure 3.3 illustrates the mediation path model.

Table 3.15: Linear Regression Models Examining Mediation of Liking Between Values and Behavior

Variable	Model 1 Values on DV: Behavior	Model 2 Values DV: Liking	Model 3 Full Model DV: Behavior
Self-Transcendence	.319** (.10)	.288* (.11)	.135 ⁺ (.07)
Conservation	.079 (.08)	.182* (.09)	-.037 (.06)
Self-Enhancement	-.180 (.09)	-.100 (.09)	-.120* (.06)
Openness to Change	-.028 (.10)	-.043 (.11)	-.0003 (.07)
Vignette Experiment	-.110 (.09)	-.210* (.09)	.024 (.06)
Liking			.639*** (.03)
ST x Vignette	.193 ⁺ (.12)	.270* (.13)	.020 (.08)
Cons x Vignette	-.224* (.09)	-.295** (.10)	-.035 (.06)
SE x Vignette	.058 (.10)	.129 (.11)	-.024 (.07)
OTC x Vign	-.004 (.12)	-.062 (.13)	.036 (.08)
Political Ideology	-.056 (.04)	-.053 (.04)	-.022 (.03)
Education	.024 (.04)	.027 (.04)	.007 (.03)
City Size	-.006 (.02)	.013 (.03)	-.014 (.02)
Age	-.047 (.04)	-.115** (.04)	.026 (.03)
Social Trust Trust	.045* (.02)	.045* (.02)	.016 (.01)
Constant	.719***	.557***	.363***
Adjusted R ²	.2778	.3222	.6320
F-statistic	11.63	14.14	45.31

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001. For all models N = 388.




Figure 3.3: Path Model With Coefficients

3.4 Discussion

The focus of this study is to examine how anxiety from values dissonance and normative violations related to this dissonance first impact people's attitudes (liking) toward immigrants and then how liking impacts behavioral intentions toward immigrants in everyday social situations. The vignettes present two different conditions: a neutral vignette condition that serves as a "normal" scenario and a normative violation condition that introduces anxiety. The first point of interest is how the vignette conditions interact with people's values in terms of liking. The second point of interest is how liking influences people's behavioral intentions. The below sections begin by discussing the section of the path model (Figure 3.3) where the value-by-vignette-group interactions connect with liking. Then, the relationship between liking and behavioral intentions is discussed.

Values, Anxiety, and Liking

The assessment so far has demonstrated that the values that matter in terms of liking the described immigrant are located in the self-transcendence and conservation quadrants. Recall that self-transcendence includes benevolence (caring, dependability), humility, and universalism (tolerance, concern, and nature). The conservation quadrant includes conformity (interpersonal, rules) tradition, and security (societal, personal; Table 3.1 above provides more in-depth description of each of the values).

Figure 3.4 shows the regression prediction lines for different levels of self-transcendence across liking for the neutral and normative violation vignette groups. The simple main effect predictions are given in Table 3.16. For both of the vignette groups, higher self-transcendence orientations equal higher liking scores; the effect of self-transcendence values are more pronounced in the normative violation vignette group as shown in the steeper slope of the predicted regression line. This indicates that self-transcendence values come into play more strongly to impact liking when values dissonance and normative violations are made salient for high self-transcendence orienters.




Figure 3.4: Graph of Self-Transcendence by Vignette Group Interaction Regressed Across Liking

Note: For both vignette groups, as orientation to self-transcendence increases, so do liking scores. The effect of the self-transcendence value orientation is stronger for the normative violation vignette group, demonstrated by the steeper slope of the regression line for that group.

Table 3.16: Predicted Simple Main Effects of Vignettes by Different levels of Self-Transcendence Across Liking

Prediction Levels	Predictions	P	Std Err
1. ST =0, Neutral	.5616	< .0001	.08
2. ST =0, Experiment	.2030	< .0001	.06
3. ST = .20, Neutral	.6191	< .0001	.05
4. ST = .20, Experiment	.3145	< .0001	.04
5. ST = .40, Neutral	.6766	< .0001	.03
6. ST = .40, Experiment	.4261	< .0001	.03
7. ST = .60, Neutral	.7341	< .0001	.02
8. ST = .60, Experiment	.5377	< .0001	.01
9. ST = .80, Neutral	.7916	< .0001	.02
10. ST = .80, Experiment	.6492	< .0001	.01
11. ST = 1, Neutral	.8492	< .0001	.03
12. ST = 1, Experiment	.7608	< .0001	.03

Schwartz's (2004) model of the value process starts with the value being activated or made salient by a stimulus. In this case, the stimulus is described values dissonance and a described public display of a normative violation. Theoretically, value differences between individuals are relative to the self-transcendence value goals of recognizing how one fits into the larger scheme of the world (humility), accepting and working to understand difference (universalism – tolerance), and believing strongly in the fight for equality and justice for everyone (universalism- concern); it makes sense that these would become actively engaged in encounters with immigrants for people strongly oriented toward this values quadrant. As the predictions illustrate, the activation of self-transcendence overpowers cognitive dissonance associated with normative violations for high orienters and impact evaluation of the target in a positive manner. For people low on the self-transcendence orientation, introducing anxiety-dissonance creates a much wider gap in liking scores between them and those in the neutral condition. Predictions for low scores on self-transcendence produce about a .36 magnitude difference on the predicted liking index, while for those highly oriented toward self-transcendence the gap between the two vignette groups decreases to about .09. People low on the self-transcendence orientation may be reacting strongly toward the anxiety introduced in the normative violation condition, which likely turns on the surveillance system and leads to more negative evaluations of the target. It could also be that values dissonance and normative violations activate a different set of values goals that negatively impact the evaluation of the immigrant for low self-transcendence orienters.

Figure 3.5 shows the regression prediction lines for different levels of conservation across liking for the neutral and normative violation vignette groups. The

simple main effect predictions are given in Table 3.17. Predictions for different levels of the conservation value orientation across liking show opposing patterns for the two vignette groups. When no anxiety is present, as conservation orientation becomes stronger, liking scores also increase. However, when values dissonance and normative violations are made salient, high conservation orienters' liking scores decrease. The slopes of the predicted regression lines are similar (in opposite directions) for both the neutral and the normative violation vignette groups, indicating that conservation values nearly equally impact individuals in both high and low anxiety situations. This latter point is interesting and theoretically speaks about the different types of values located in this quadrant.




Figure 3.5: Graph of Conservation by Vignette Group Interaction Regressed Across Liking

Note: The graph of the conservation by vignette group interaction shows that in conditions of no anxiety and no values dissonance, there is a positive relationship between conservation and liking. However, in conditions of anxiety where values dissonance and normative violations are present, there is a negative relationship between liking and conservation as conservation orientation increases in strength.

Table 3.17: Predicted Simple Main Effects of Vignettes by Different levels of Conservation Across Liking

Prediction Levels	Predictions	P	Std Err
1. Cons = 0, Neutral	.6572	< .0001	.05
2. Cons = 0, Experiment	.6573	< .0001	.04
3. Cons = .20, Neutral	.6937	< .0001	.04
4. Cons = .20, Experiment	.6348	< .0001	.03
5. Cons = .40, Neutral	.7302	< .0001	.02
6. Cons = .40, Experiment	.6123	< .0001	.02
7. Cons = .60, Neutral	.7666	< .0001	.02
8. Cons = .60, Experiment	.5898	< .0001	.01
9. Cons = .80, Neutral	.8031	< .0001	.03
10. Cons = .80, Experiment	.5673	< .0001	.02
11. Cons = 1, Neutral	.8936	< .0001	.04
12. Cons = 1, Experiment	.5449	< .0001	.03

Conservation values include value goals of preserving culture and tradition (tradition), feeling safe and unthreatened in one's environment (security – personal), maintaining the stability of society as a whole (security – societal), obeying rules (conformity – rules), and the avoidance of upsetting or harming others (conformity – interpersonal). Under normal conditions without anxiety, conformity – interpersonal is likely to be activated in social interactions for conservation orienters. This value goal works to avoid confrontation which would lead to being polite in everyday situations. As the similar regression slopes demonstrate, conformity – interpersonal likely is activated to about the same degree that other conservation values become activated at under conditions of anxiety. In contrast, the dissonance and normative violation stimulus likely activates the value goals of preserving culture and tradition (tradition), feeling safe and unthreatened in one's environment (security – personal), and obeying rules (conformity – rules), all of which have a negative impact on high conservation orienters interpretation and evaluation of the described immigrant and the described normative violation. Because the described immigrant posed as a stumbling block for the maintenance of these latter conservation value goals, cognitive dissonance occurred.

Anxiety from dissonant values and normative violations had a particularly upsetting impact for conservation orienters. The magnitude of the predicted difference between the two vignette groups in liking scores for the highest level of conservation orientation is about .35. This is a relatively sizable gap that demonstrates how strong anxiety impacts liking evaluations of immigrants with dissonant values and behaviors in the public sphere for this group. If the world rotates on maintaining cultural and religious traditions and following rules, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that different

ways of life and displays of social norms violations are perceived as disrupting what is vital for a safe and secure community. This supports the idea that conservation orienters are not necessarily acting out of blatant prejudice, but are indeed reacting out of the need to protect their most highly cherished values.

Liking and Behavioral Intention

Now that the relationship between values and liking has been examined, it is time to look at the relationship between liking and behavioral intention. Recall that the behavioral intention measure was made of the 14-items located in *Appendix E*, in Table E.3.2. The behavioral questions included items such as: “Would you invite Ali and his family to a summer BBQ in your neighborhood?”; “Would you partner with Ali on a work or community-based project?”; and “If Ali sat down next to you on a public bench at the local mall would you be able to sit by him?” Respondents answered yes or no to each of the question items and then rated how difficult their decision was. The difficulty ratings were combined to range from answering “no” and that answer being easy (intolerance) to answering “yes” and that answer being easy (friendliness) and then the recoded questions were made into the behavioral intention index. Because of the difficulty ratings, the behavioral intention index represents not only negative to positive behavior intention, but whether there is any underlying cognitive struggle.

The behavioral intention predictions for this participant sample placed people within the social tolerance and amiable underlying motivation ranges. The regressions did not predict anyone to land in the friendly motivation category (from .9 to 1 on the behavioral intention index) and only one score landed in the intolerance category (people who score 0 on the self-transcendence orientation in the experiment group). This means

that the underlying behavioral motivation changes we are primarily looking at range from social tolerance to amiability. Remember that social tolerance stems from disapproval and is symbiotically linked with intolerance. Social tolerance reflects effort to overcome negative impulses. Amiability is defined as being agreeable, pleasant, and good natured. Using predicted scores from Tables 3.17 through 3.19 and the behavioral intention range from Table 3.9, general predicted behavioral motivations can be estimated for the two vignette groups across different levels of each of the value orientations. For an example of how this is calculated please see the corresponding footnote.¹⁷

Recall that hypotheses 1 and 4 state that people who emphasize self-transcendence values will naturally be driven by motivations of amiability or friendliness toward the described immigrant, but in conditions of anxiety high self-transcendence orienters will instead be driven from motivations of social tolerance and intolerance. At about a self-transcendence score of .6 and above, we see that in the natural neutral condition, people are predicted to operate from an underlying motivation of amiability. Although none in the sample reached scores of friendliness, this supports the first hypothesis prediction that self-transcendence orienters tend to be amiable. Self-transcendence orienters in the normative violation condition at about the .6 self-

¹⁷ Table 3.18 shows the regression prediction scores of behavioral intention for different levels of liking. For example, a liking score of .5 corresponds to a behavioral intention score of about .72. Table 3.17 shows the predictions for different levels of conservation orientation across liking by vignette. From Table 3.18, then, we can see that a liking score of about .5 is predicted for participants in the normative violation group who have conservation orientation scores of about .8 and 1 (the highest levels of conservation). Returning to the .72 behavioral intention score that corresponds to the liking score of .5, if we look at where .72 falls in Table 3.9 above that provides a corresponding behavioral motivation scale for the behavioral index scores, we can see that a behavioral intention score of .72 corresponds to social tolerance. This means that high conservation scorers in the normative violation vignette group are predicted to behave toward the described immigrant from a motivational driver of social tolerance, which requires overcoming negativity through cognitive struggle in order to behave positively toward the described immigrant in the public sphere. The remaining estimations are reached from the same procedure.

transcendence score and the .8 self-transcendence score are predicted to operate from the underlying behavioral motivation of social tolerance. Only the highest self-transcendence score (a score of 1) remains in the amiable category for the normative violation group.

This suggests that for very high self-transcendence orienters, these value goals are strong enough that it remains relatively easy to intend to act with positive behaviors toward the described immigrant in the face of values dissonance and normative violations. But self-transcendence scores between .6 and .8 are calculated to encompass more cognitive struggle in the face of values dissonance and normative violations, and the motivational driver drops from amiability to social tolerance. Hypothesis 2 is therefore only partially supported at two levels of self-transcendence scores. People who score about .6 to .8 on self-transcendence are impacted by anxiety because they drop from amiability to social tolerance, while people who are at the very high end of self-transcendence scores are not impacted by values dissonance and remain relatively free of cognitive struggle.

Recall that hypotheses 2 and 5 stated that when no anxiety is present, those who emphasize conservation values will be driven by motivations of social tolerance or intolerance toward the described immigrant and in conditions of anxiety this relationship would become stronger. For the neutral condition, anyone scoring at least a .4 on the conservation index is predicted to be driven by amiability. This means that in normal conditions where there is no social anxiety from values dissonance, conservation orienters likely follow the value goal of avoiding upsetting others (conformity – interpersonal). In the normative violation condition, however, no levels of conservation scores reach the amiable behavioral motivation level. Conservation scores from 0 through

1 in the experiment group are all motivated by social tolerance when it comes to encountering descriptions of values dissonance and normative violations. This means that conservation orienters struggle to overcome negative impulses toward immigrants when those immigrants clearly have dissonant value sets. Hypothesis 2, that an emphasis on values located in the conservation quadrant will tend to correlate positively with the disliking behaviors of social tolerance and intolerance toward immigrants is only true when anxiety is present. Hypothesis 5 stated that conservation orienters would not only fall into the social tolerance behavioral motivation category but some would also be intolerant. Though the former was supported, no one reached the intolerant behavioral motivation level in this sample.




Figure 3.6: Graph of Liking Across Behavioral Intention Score Predictions

Note: The graph shows a strong positive relationship between liking and predicted behavioral intention scores.

Table 3.18: Predicted Effect of Liking on Behavioral Intention

Prediction Levels	Predictions	P	Std Err
1. Liking = 0	.4030	< .0001	.02
2. Liking = .1	.4670	< .0001	.02
3. Liking = .2	.5309	< .0001	.02
4. Liking = .3	.5948	< .0001	.01
5. Liking = .4	.6587	< .0001	.01
6. Liking = .5	.7223	< .0001	.01
7. Liking = .6	.7866	< .0001	.01
8. Liking = .7	.8505	< .0001	.01
9. Liking = .8	.9144	< .0001	.01
10. Liking = .9	.9783	< .0001	.01
11. Liking = 1	1.04	< .0001	.01

Table 3.19: Values Orientation and Vignette Group Behavioral Intention Scoring

Intolerance Liking scores: 0, .1, .2	Social Tolerance Liking scores: .3 to .6	Amiability Liking scores: .7 to .8	Friendliness Liking scores: .9 to 1
ST = 0 experiment	ST = 0 neutral	ST = .6 neutral	
	ST = .2 neutral	ST = .8 neutral	
	ST = .2 experiment	ST = 1 neutral	
	ST = .4 neutral	ST = 1 experiment	
	ST = .4 experiment	Cons = .4 neutral	
	ST = .6 experiment	Cons = .6 neutral	
	ST = .8 experiment	Cons = .8 neutral	
	Cons = 0 neutral	Cons = 1 neutral	
	Cons = 0 experiment		
	Cons = .2 neutral		
	Cons = .2 experiment		
	Cons = .4 experiment		
	Cons = .6 experiment		
	Cons = .8 experiment		
	Cons = 1 experiment		

Note: ST = self-transcendence, Cons = conservation. See footnote 12 for explanation of grouping process. Numbers indicate different levels of the values.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that the values that matter for immigrant attitudes and behavioral intentions are those located in the self-transcendence and conservation quadrants of Schwartz's values circle. It also showed that anxiety impacts people oriented toward these value quadrants in different ways in terms of estimations of liking

immigrants, and liking impacting behavioral intentions. For people highly oriented toward self-transcendence, these values become heavily activated in situations of values dissonance and normative violations. They are strong enough to overcome the experienced dissonance and enable highly oriented individuals to remain positive toward (to like) the source of difference. However, as the relationship between liking and behavioral intentions demonstrated, it is only at the highest score (a 1 on the value scale) that self-transcendence value goals were this powerful. In the normative violation condition, self-transcendence orienters who scored .6 and even .8 on the values index registered some cognitive struggle to overcome negative impulses toward the source of the value dissonance. This means that even those who are generally more open and welcoming toward difference have some difficulty remaining positive in the face of dissonant value systems. This registered as a drop from amiability to social tolerance motivations on the behavioral intention index. To put this in terms of political ideology for the sake of interest, self-transcendence values were positively correlated with being liberal (see Table 3.15) and liberals scored significantly higher than conservatives on self-transcendence (by a mean difference of 2.41, see Table 3.14). This implies that liberals also have limits for warm receptions of immigrants when immigrants clearly have different sets of values that are made salient through their behavior in everyday interactions.

People highly oriented toward conservation tend to like and to be just as amiable as self-transcendence orienters in the public arena under normal, non-anxious, circumstances. But when values dissonance and normative violations are salient, conservation orienters across the board react by lowering their estimation (liking) of the

source of the dissonance and, in turn, registering higher levels of cognitive struggle (social toleration) when reporting behavioral intentions. But the data here do not tell a story about simple racial or ethnic prejudice toward difference in this group. The data rather tell a story about how being oriented toward values such as protecting tradition, security, and social stability leads people to react with lowered estimations of the source in the face of values dissonance with immigrants. This is because the source (the described immigrant and normative violations) is interpreted as a direct threat, or block, to the value goals associated with tradition and conformity. Estimations of liking significantly decrease and individuals register cognitive struggle in behavioral intention that is indicative of working through social tolerance. In terms of political ideology, the conservation index was correlated with conservatism (see Table 3.15) and conservatives scored significantly higher than liberals on the conservation values quadrant (by a mean difference of 12.09, see Table 3.14). This implies that conservatives are oriented toward the values located in the conservation quadrant and that they can be expected to experience anxiety and substantial levels of cognitive dissonance when forming estimations of and behavioral intentions toward people associated with values difference.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

The research conducted in this dissertation sought to map and explore the malleability of the boundaries of exclusion and the limits of inclusion toward immigrants in the context of the United States. Why should political scientists care about this work? For one, immigration is, has been, and will continue to be a hot button political issue that is exploited by political actors. Given the deep cleavages between political parties and ideological orientations recently brought to the surface in American politics and the way that the issue of immigration is often used as a moral battering ram between the major political parties, more nuanced understandings of how American citizens come to their conclusions on immigration and whether these conclusions are amenable to intervention is important. Another reason this research matters is that immigrants in communities across the United States are often subjected to harassment, intimidation, and even violence. This behavior, along with anti-immigrant sentiment that exists but does not erupt into negative behavior, is taxing on communities for both newcomers and long-term residents. It lowers the quality of public life because it causes tension to lurk under the surface and community members are left feeling less secure and less at peace. The findings provide entry points from which interventions may be possible, these are discussed below.

4.1 Findings and Implications

The purpose of Chapter 2 was to test whether negative attitudes toward immigrants could be made more positive by priming trust in government institutions for people with strong national identity attachment. Results suggested that both trust and attitudes toward immigrants are anchored in political ideology and are preset in people's

minds. If the goal is to improve the attitudes of those who feel negatively toward immigrants in communities, this chapter suggests that the effort needs to be strong, impactful, and sustained over time. The effort can start at the primary school level and can be reinforced by libraries and public education campaigns, and local politicians should take responsibility as examples for the rest of the community and avoid using the immigration issue in divisive ways to gain footing for political victories.

Education about what it means to identify as an American begins in primary school (Barton 2001; Hardwick et al. 2010). Schools may be contributing to a bounded view of what it means to be “American” if they do not intentionally avoid doing so. Community leaders should, therefore, be mindful of the way the American national identity is being taught in their school textbooks. Questions that need to be addressed include: Do textbook images of Americans perpetuate the idea that Americans are white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, or do they represent the myriad of races and ethnicities that make up American communities? Are our youth so inundated with individualism and American pride that they are molded from a very young age to be ethnocentric? Is the fact that the United States has always been a country of immigrants being highlighted or suppressed? American civics textbooks should include narrations of immigrant experience as part of the wider American lived experience and should highlight accomplishments of American immigrants and show how immigrants have contributed to and participated in the American dream. Students should be encouraged to think about their own family histories in terms of when their ancestors immigrated to the country to promote the recognition that in essence, unless of Native American descent, most American citizens are, in fact, the descendants of immigrants. This can be accomplished

with essay assignments that are shared with the class in an atmosphere of respect and cooperation.

Chapter 2 found that not all strong national identifiers are alike. It was only when strong national identity was coupled with low institutional trust that attitudes toward immigrants were significantly negatively affected. Local communities have a lot of avenues that can be utilized to improve citizen-to-immigrant relations. Inviting the wider public to get involved in discussions and events centered on immigrant-to-citizen relations can help to build institutional trust and also familiarize long-term residents with different cultures of newcomers in their communities and familiarize immigrants with the established culture of the community. Local public radio and television stations can play a major role in public acceptance of the right of immigrants to live among citizens in communities. Talk shows can interview citizens and immigrants and discuss challenges felt on both sides in a refereed atmosphere. Local accomplishments of both immigrants and nonimmigrants can be highlighted together in broadcasts and community news.

When immigrants and refugees first arrive in a new community, churches and church related organizations often play a leading and pivotal role in helping to get them acclimated and resettled (Foner & Alba 2008). As has been established, strong national identifiers also tend to be more Christian than weak national identifiers (Theiss-Morse 2009). This study helps explain why those generally expected to have the most negative attitudes toward newcomers are the same people who are most involved in the churches that assist them. Church membership likely contributes to increased institutional trust for strong national identifiers. The likely connection between church membership and institutional trust helps explain why one of the most active organizations in settling

immigrants also tends to be attended by strong national identifiers, generally assumed to be more negative toward immigrants.

To further leverage the religiosity of strong national identifiers toward increased acceptance of diversity, interfaith dinner events could be put together that have speakers who represent different faiths in the community that originate from diverse backgrounds to promote understanding about the similarities and compatibilities of different religious frameworks and ways of life. For example, piety, the family structure, and moral discipline are central goals of almost all religions. Respect between different belief systems can be built based upon these practical similarities. Organizing dinner events also provides opportunities to share diverse cuisines and open hearts through convivial atmospheres created through shared meals.

Chapter 3 utilized a more complex model than Chapter 2 that went beyond political ideology and national identity to individual's core values. The conceptual model supported by the statistical analysis showed that liking fully mediates the relationship between values interacted with anxiety and behavioral intentions toward immigrants. For more exclusionary oriented individuals, the introduction of anxiety by making values dissonance and normative violations salient lowered estimations of the described immigrant and caused cognitive struggle across the board. For more open and pro-diversity oriented individuals, only the top 10% of more open individuals did not experience some cognitive difficulty in overcoming negativity toward an immigrant when a public display of a normative violation was described and values dissonance was made salient.

In everyday situations where different cultures come into contact with one another, inclusivity as pure, positive acceptance is a reaction experienced by very few. For the majority of people who are generally pro-diversity, norms violations and different sets of values create real conflicts. This means that inclusivity is often accompanied with a level of internal struggle. Knowing this can help soften the stereotypical images of the “racist conservative” or the liberal who claims complete moral superiority on issues of diversity. In the experiment vignette used in Chapter 3, traditional Muslim dress was used to represent a violation of typical American norms at a public swimming pool. Stories of clashes at American public pools because of traditional Muslim attire abound (Abdelaziz 2020; Baldeck 2018; Elmir 2016). These stories illustrate that the distinction between exclusive and inclusive tendencies depends on what types of value goals are most prominent for individuals and which ones are interpreted as being blocked in everyday social situations. Several sets of value goals are likely in play in this scenario.

Self-transcendence quadrant values include goals of recognizing how one fits into the larger scheme of the world (humility), accepting and working to understand difference (universalism – tolerance), and believing strongly in the fight for equality and justice for everyone (universalism- concern). Some self-transcendence orienters may interpret traditional Muslim women’s attire as oppressive to women¹⁸ whereas other self-transcendence orienters may interpret *not accepting* traditional Muslim dress as oppressive. Interpretation in the former sense means that left-leaners can be just as prone to anxiety caused by cultural difference in the presence of women donning a burka or

¹⁸ Traditional Muslim dress may be interpreted as oppressive by this group even though many Muslim women have publicly stated that traditional religious attire is their prerogative and personal choice (Abdelaziz 2020).

hijab as more exclusive right leaners typically are. For conservation orienters, the salient values goals of preserving culture and tradition (tradition), feeling safe and unthreatened in one's environment (security – personal), and obeying rules (conformity – rules) are prominent. Islamic attire threatens this group because it violates typical norms of American dress, which directly conflicts with conservation goals. A final set of general values may also be at play in these public instances. Typical American swimming suits are not only built for style, they follow safety regulations that warn against baggy clothing that may get weighed down when wet or catch on something and prevent the swimmer from having a free range of motion.

A way to address the social contentions surrounding this issue is to revamp state and municipal policy on proper swim attire at public pools to include the cultural customs of Muslims. Although religious freedom and freedom of expression are central tenets of United States democracy, this doesn't mean that exceptions should be made for particular groups. It means that everyone has a right to follow the customs of their chosen religion while also following general policies that apply to everyone that set safety standards and provide the assurance that others are not being harmed. The simple solution is to require Muslim women to don burkinis just as other pool attendees are required to wear swimming suits. Burkinis are widely available (at least online) and provide Muslim women the covering that Islam requires while using suitable swimwear material that meets swim safety requirements. Raising awareness is the key across state lines for reaching this simple solution. It may not erase all tensions between cultures on the matter, but it will go a long way to prevent some of the public outcry that has occurred in recent years due to the confusion that exists because of the lack of policy and because of the

potential safety hazards posed by wearing regular clothing in the pool. Further, public swim policy that specifically acknowledges Muslim attire will validate Muslim women and set the standards of acceptance for others.

In general, the best ways for communities to address cultural tensions between long-term residents and immigrants are threefold. The first is through official policy. A beginning step is to take note of current events. Community leaders should be aware of tensions through reports of it across U.S. cities. The issue of traditional Islamic dress at public pools is a prime example. A quick Google search retrieves a large collection of instances where contentions have boiled over. Once the problem is recognized, clear state and municipal policies can be developed with the triple goals of acknowledgement of rights, validation of cultures, and bringing cultural practices within the purview of general safety guidelines.

The second method community leaders can take to address cultural tensions sounds somewhat cliché but is unavoidable: raise awareness and promote understanding between cultures. As discussed above, this includes paying special attention to how the school system is shaping what it means to be American for young people with an eye for unconscious promotion of ethnocentrism and a limited perception of what the American national identity is. Cultivating inclusive ideas about what defines American tradition and what it means to be American can help conservationists reach their value goals while at the same time accepting difference.

Another area of raising awareness and promoting understanding is holding municipally sponsored events and activities that are centered on communication and sharing between different ways of life. I mentioned above that interfaith dinners with

keynote speakers are one way that strong national identifiers and traditionalists can be exposed to the practical similarities of different religious faiths. Festivals can also be held in city centers where crafts and food are exchanged. Free or low-cost concerts with diverse musicians can be included in festivals or planned as stand-alone events.

This dissertation suggests that developing inclusive communities where immigrants not only feel welcome and secure but long-term residents also feel the same in their established communities requires persistent effort on many different fronts. Community leaders must remain open and willing to validate and engage both exclusive and inclusive types of people in ways that acknowledge the myriad concerns that arise when value dissonance is salient in order to understand where interventions are viable and what precisely needs to be addressed. The clash of cultures raises real conflicts on all sides for different types of people in different ways. Policymakers who understand this are integral and this research can help them in the courageous and challenging task of promoting atmospheres in cities with diverse arrays of people that allow all to feel secure and at home in their place of residence.

4.2 Limitations and Future Research

This project points to areas for future research. One of the limitations of Chapter 2 is that the priming experiment was a one-shot event. Given that the results suggest that both institutional trust and attitudes toward immigrants are preset in people's minds, future research should use stronger manipulations to see what affects attitudes toward immigrants and present a strong prime repeatedly over a longer period of time in a longitudinal study. Additionally, empirically establishing the likely connection between church membership and institutional trust for strong national identifiers would help us

understand more fully the facets of how institutional trust, national identity, and attitudes work together to benefit immigrants in communities.

Although the findings from Chapter 3 uncovered interesting changes in behavioral motivations along the behavioral intention index, behavioral intentions and actual behavior are not necessarily synonymous. We have all had moments where our intentions were garbled in our actual behaviors in everyday social situations. Therefore, future research could study actual behavior in a laboratory setting between long-term residents and immigrants. This would further our understanding of how value goals translate in action situations and how the cognitive struggle that underlies social tolerance translates in terms of maintaining a positive and nonoffending façade when face to face with cultural difference. It would also be very interesting to measure heart rate and skin conductivity in situations of values dissonance and normative violations to understand the individual biological reactions to these events. For example, is social tolerance marked with elevated heart rate and other physical signs of alarm?

4.3 Conclusion

Understanding and explaining people's attitudes and behavior toward immigrants in American communities is a complex undertaking that requires going beyond what is often taken for granted and digging deeply into the different facets of the issue. When it comes to the immigration issue in today's political climate, we not only must contend with sometimes challenging immigrant-to-long-term-resident interactions, but we also must contend with the fact that this issue often feeds deep divisions among citizens. This research has worked to address both sets of problems. It has shown that both people who tend to be exclusive toward immigrants and people who tend to feel more inclusive

experience real internal conflicts when faced with difference in their communities. In reality there are few perfect immigration moral crusaders and many people who tend to be exclusive toward immigrants are genuinely afraid for the sanctity of their community. Understanding this can help bridge the divide between partisans and ideologues on opposite sides of the issue because it breaks down the incorrect stereotypes the two sides have of one another that are often used as ammo in contentious and heated political debates. Once unhelpful stereotypes are successfully put down between American political groups on the immigration issue, the door can then be opened for real communication and healthy debate to support practical, sustained, community-wide efforts to address the issues that arise. This, in turn, will improve the lives of both immigrants and long-term residents in American communities by addressing and reducing the tensions that can arise in everyday experience when different cultures are in close contact with one another.

CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES

APPENDIX 2.1

Appendix 2.1, Table 2.1: Vignettes

Vignette read by all participants	American cities settle both immigrants and refugees. Over 44 million non-refugee immigrants live in the U.S. The United States has the highest number of immigrants in the world. The United States has accepted 3 million refugees since 1980, which is also more than any other country.
<p>Institution Specific Vignette 1</p> <p>Institutional Trust Prime: This vignette was read only by participants in the public school treatment condition</p>	The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services screen applications for entry into the country. Refugees go through cultural orientation and health checks while their applications are processed, which can take between 18 and 24 months. Voluntary agencies with offices across the country such as the International Rescue Committee or Church World Service work with federal agencies to resettle refugees. Once resettled, local organizations help newcomers learn English and acquire job skills. Communication between agencies at the federal and state levels tends to be seamless and efficient. The ability of local institutions to successfully integrate and socialize new arrivals into American norms and way of life has been noted by many observers. In particular, the ability of the local public school system to successfully integrate and socialize immigrants into American Midwestern norms and its way of life has been noted by many observers.
<p>Institution Specific Vignette 2</p> <p>Institutional Trust Prime: This vignette was read only by participants in the law enforcement treatment condition</p>	The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services screen applications for entry into the country. Refugees go through cultural orientation and health checks while their applications are processed, which can take between 18 and 24 months. Voluntary agencies with offices across the country such as the International Rescue Committee or Church World Service work with federal agencies to resettle refugees. Once resettled, local organizations help newcomers learn English and

	<p>acquire job skills. Communication between agencies at the federal and state levels tends to be seamless and efficient. The ability of local institutions to successfully integrate and socialize new arrivals into American norms and way of life has been noted by many observers. In particular, the ability of local law enforcement agencies to successfully integrate and socialize immigrants into American Midwestern norms and its way of life has been noted by many observers.</p>
<p>Institution Specific Vignette 3</p> <p>Institutional Trust Prime: This vignette was read only by participants in the religious institution treatment condition</p>	<p>The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services screen applications for entry into the country. Refugees go through cultural orientation and health checks while their applications are processed, which can take between 18 and 24 months. Voluntary agencies with offices across the country such as the International Rescue Committee or Church World Service work with federal agencies to resettle refugees. Once resettled, local organizations help newcomers learn English and acquire job skills. Communication between agencies at the federal and state levels tends to be seamless and efficient. The ability of local institutions to successfully integrate and socialize new arrivals into American norms and way of life has been noted by many observers. In particular, the ability of local religious institutions (for example, Lutheran Family Services or Catholic Social Services) to successfully integrate and socialize immigrants into American norms and way of life has been noted by many observers.</p>

APPENDIX 2.2

Appendix 2.2, Table 2.2: Full Model With All Control Variables for Both Adult (Models 1 and 2) and Student (Models 3 and 4) Samples

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
National Identity Attachment	-.019 (.057)	-.139 (.130)	-.079 ⁺ (.045)	-.064 (.101)
Vignette	-.033 (.024)	-.154 (.120)	.017 (.022)	.029 (.078)
Political Ideology	-.296*** (.035)	-.297*** (.035)	-.277*** (.039)	-.277*** (.039)
Trust in WA Government	-.054 (.039)	-.053 (.039)	.093* (.040)	.093* (.040)
Volunteer	.066** (.024)	.065** (.024)	.013 (.018)	.013 (.018)
Social Trust	.062** (.020)	.062** (.020)	.038* (.016)	.038* (.016)
Age	.107 ⁺ (.065)	.107 ⁺ (.065)	-.021 (.144)	-.020 (.144)
Religion	.005 (.041)	.005 (.041)	.017 (.021)	.017 (.021)
City Size	-.015 (.031)	-.016 (.031)	n/a	n/a
Gender	.008 (.019)	.009 (.019)	.050** (.017)	.050** (.017)
Income	.016 (.038)	.016 (.038)	-.024 (.020)	-.024 (.020)
Economy	-.060 (.041)	-.060 (.041)	-.027 (.022)	-.027 (.022)
Race	.025 (.036)	.026 (.036)	-.016 (.022)	-.016 (.022)
Vignette x NI Attach		.143 (.139)		-.017 (.105)
Constant	.675***	.776***	.775***	.764***
Adjusted R ²	.2780	.2782	.2814	.2798
F	14.03	13.11	15.65	14.42

Note: Models 1 and 2 were performed with the adult Dynata participant sample. Models 3 and 4 were performed with the student participant sample. City size was not measured in the student sample. Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For Models 1 and 2, $N = 441$. For Models 3 and 4, $N = 450$.

APPENDIX 2.2a**Appendix 2.2a, Table 2.0:** Student Sample Demographics

Variable	N	Percent
Political ideology	450	
Extremely Liberal	32	7.11
Liberal	120	26.67
Slightly Liberal	68	15.11
Middle of Road	71	15.78
Slightly Conserv	71	15.78
Conservative	77	17.11
Extremely Conserv	11	2.44
Race	450	
White	372	82.67
Black	11	2.44
Asian	21	4.67
Hispanic	21	4.67
Other	4	0.89
Mixed	21	4.67
Age	450	
17-19	270	60.0
20-22	153	34.0
23-25	18	3.99
26-28	4	.88
29-31	2	.44
>31	3	.66
Gender	450	
Male (0)	220	48.89
Female (1)	230	51.11

Two-Way ANOVA: Strength of National Identity Attachment and Vignette Group Across Attitudes Toward immigrants in Student Sample

A two-way ANOVA was run on the student sample of 450 participants to examine the mean differences between strong and weak national identity attachment and whether there were mean differences between the control and experiment groups across attitudes toward immigrants. Strength of national identity attachment was made into a binary variable that split strong (0 = NI index score 14-16) and weak (1 = NI index score 4-13) identifiers into separate groups. Vignette is a 4-category nominal variable with 1 = control, 2 = law enforcement, 3 = public school, and 4 = religious institution. No significant differences were found across the vignette groups (Control group $M=15.61$; Law enforcement $M=15.90$; public schools $M=16.08$; religious institutions $M=15.63$), $F(3, 442) = 5.25$, $p < .0001$. There was a significant difference at the between strong and weak national identifiers on attitudes toward immigrants, $F(1, 442) = 33.04$, $p < .0001$. The interaction between strength of national identity attachment and vignette group was not significant, $F(3, 442) = 0.17$, $p = .92$, indicating that whether or not the participant saw the institutional trust prime did not impact mean attitude scores. The results reveal the same pattern that was found in the adult sample, there are no significant differences across the vignettes indicating that the experiment did not significantly shift attitudes toward immigrants in the student sample.


Appendix 2.2a, Table 2.1: Coefficients from Linear Regression of Immigrant Attitudes on Independent Variables and Trust Index Interactions in Student Sample

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
National Identity Attachment	-.103* (.045)	-.294** (.105)	-.102* (.045)	-.301** (.102)	-.097* (.045)	-.344** (.111)
Political Ideology	-.337*** (.034)	-.339*** (.034)	-.337*** (.035)	-.339*** (.034)	-.339*** (.035)	-.434*** (.035)
Trust in WA Government			.041 (.043)	.037 (.043)	.063 (.041)	.063 (.041)
Volunteer	.021 (.018)	.022 (.018)	.021 (.018)	.022 (.018)	.020 (.018)	.022 (.018)
Social Trust	.030+ (.016)	.028+ (.016)	.030+ (.016)	.028+ (.016)	.032* (.016)	.030+ (.016)
Age	-.044 (.140)	-.063 (.140)	-.044 (.141)	.063 (.140)	-.048 (.141)	-.077 (.141)
6-Item Trust Index	.151** (.051)	-.129 (.148)				
5-Item Trust Index			.113 (.050)	-.168 (.139)		
Institution only Index					.073 (.049)	-.246+ (.139)
NI Attach x 6-Item Trust Index		.384* (.192)				
NI Attach x 5-item Trust Index				.392* (.180)		
NI Attach x Institution Only Index						.448* (.184)
Constant	.791***	.938***	.790***	.942***	.797***	.986***
Adjusted R ²	.2763	.2812	.2749	.2810	.2702	.2783
F	29.58	26.10	25.31	22.93	24.75	22.64

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For all models $N = 441$.


APPENDIX 2.3

Figure A.2.1: Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the 6-Item Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 2 in Table 2.13).




Note: Figure A.2.1 shows that at low levels national identity attachment, as trust increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of national identity attachment (starting at .85), as levels of trust increase, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. Predictive marginal effects between national identity attachment strength of .5 to .8 were not significant.

Figure A.2.2: Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the 5-Item Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 4 in Table 2.13).



Note: Figure 2.2 shows that at low levels of trust, as the strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of trust, as the strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. The point at which the impact of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants as conditioned by trust changes direction of effect is at about .6.

Figure A.2.3: Significant Predictive Margins for the Moderating Effect of the Institution-Only Trust Index on the Impact of Strength of National Identity Attachment on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Model 6 in Table 2.13).



Note: Figure 2.3 shows that at low levels of institutional trust, as the strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants decrease or become more negative. Contrastingly, at high levels of institutional trust, as the strength of national identity attachment increases, attitudes toward immigrants also increase or become more positive. The point at which the impact of national identity attachment on attitudes toward immigrants as conditioned by trust changes direction of effect is at about .66.

APPENDIX 2.4

DV Measures: Attitudes Toward Migrant Generated Diversity – Question Items used for immigrant attitude index (8 items)

1. The idea of an America where most people are not white makes me feel anxious.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
2. If immigrants only tried harder to fit in, then more Americans would accept their cultural differences.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
3. Immigrants today take advantage of jobs and opportunities here without doing enough to give back to the community.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
4. Immigrants who are African seem less American to me.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
5. Immigrants who are Western European seem less American to me.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
6. Immigrants who are Middle Eastern seem less American to me.
 - A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
7. Immigrants who are Easter European seem less American to me.
 - A. Strongly agree

- B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree
8. Immigrants who are Asian seem less American to me.
- A. Strongly agree
 - B. Somewhat agree
 - C. Somewhat disagree
 - D. Strongly disagree

Other Measures Taken of Attitudes Toward Migrant Generated Diversity

1. Some people do not want immigrants and refugees to be allowed into the United States. Why do you think some people feel this way?

- A. Diversity leads to unnecessary job competition
- B. Diversity threatens American Culture, values, and way of life
- C. Diversity lowers trust in communities
- D. Diversity makes people feel less safe
- E. Other

2. Various groups of people are listed below. Please indicate any kinds of people that you would not like to have as neighbors by checking the box by that group. You may check as many as you like or you may not check any box if all of these groups would be acceptable to you as neighbors.

Drug addicts
 People of a different race
 People who have AIDS
 Immigrants
 Homosexuals
 People of a different religion
 Heavy drinkers
 Refugees
 Unmarried couples living together
 People who speak a different language

3. Several groups of people are listed below. For each group, please indicate whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all.

- A. Your family
- B. People in your neighborhood
- C. People you know personally
- D. People you meet for the first time
- E. People of another religion
- F. People of another nationality

4. Please indicate the degree to which you feel positive or negative toward these different groups:

Immigrants

Muslims

Protestants

Hindus

Christians

Atheists

Refugees

(Participants will slide an arrow indicating which degree between 1 and 100 represents the positivity or negativity they feel toward each group; lower numbers will indicate more negative feelings while higher numbers will indicate more positive feelings)

5. Should the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. be increased or decreased, or should number be the same as now?

1. Increase

2. Decrease

3. Stay the same

Follow up question: Why do you believe the number of immigrants should be increased, decreased, or stay the same? [open ended response]

6. How likely will the growing number of immigrants improve U.S. culture with new ideas and customs?

1. Extremely likely

2. Very likely

3. Somewhat likely

4. Not at all likely

8. Don't know

9. NA

7. In general, would you say that your neighborhood is...

1. Mostly white

2. Mostly black

3. Mostly Latino

4. Mostly Asian

5. Multiethnic (Please specify if you can) [open ended response]

6. Other: [open ended response]

8. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the below statements:

Immigrants who are Middle Eastern seem less American to me.

Immigrants who are Asian seem less American to me.

Immigrants who are Western European seem less American to me.

Immigrants who are Eastern European seem less American to me.

Immigrants who are African seem less American to me.

Responses:

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Somewhat agree
- C. Somewhat disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

9. Immigrants today come to think of themselves as American just as much as immigrants from earlier eras did.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Somewhat agree
- C. Somewhat disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

10. Blending in to the larger society while still maintaining cultural traditions is difficult, but a lot of immigrants today seem to do a good job of it.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Somewhat agree
- C. Somewhat disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

11. Please select the statement that come closest to your views:

I think of immigrants and refugees in the same way.

I think of immigrants and refugees differently.

12. Please select the statement that come closest to your views:

I think the United States should allow **more immigrants**, but should allow **less refugees** to come in to the country each year.

I think the United States should allow **more refugees**, but should allow **less immigrants** to come in to the country each year.

I do not make a distinction between immigrants and refugees

13. I believe that diversity generated by people from foreign countries is good for American communities in part because [may select multiple boxes]:

- a. Diversity leads to cultural and technological innovation
- b. Diversity makes life more interesting
- c. Diversity means there will be a proper division of labor for the workforce
- d. Learning about other cultures and ways of life is important to have a wise world view
- e. Other [open ended]

14. I believe that diversity generated by people from foreign countries is not good for American communities in part because [may select multiple boxes]:

- a. Diversity leads to unnecessary job competition
- b. Diversity threatens American culture
- c. Diversity lowers trust in communities
- d. Diversity makes me feel less secure
- e. Other [open ended]

15. Your thoughts are important reflections of the way the world is today. Below is an opportunity for you to share how you feel about diversity generated by people from foreign countries in your community and to tell us why you feel that way.

IV: Level of National Identity Attachment

1. Do you identify with the American people?

(response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)

2. I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people

(response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)

3. Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person

(response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)

4. "Overall, I think Americans are a great group of people" If 1 is completely disagree and 7 is completely agree, with 2 through 6 in between, where would you place the American people?

5. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

I see myself as a world citizen.

I see myself as part of my local community.

6. Below is a list of things that some people say are important in making someone a true American. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each thing.

Being born in America

Being a Christian

Having European Ancestors

Being white

Pursuing Economic success through hard work

Respecting America's institutions and laws

Having American citizenship

Being informed about local and national politics

Respecting other people's cultural differences

Blending into the larger society

Seeing people of all backgrounds as American
 Being able to speak English
 Feeling American

IV => Prime of Trust in Government Institutions Manipulation Check

1) To what extent do you think you can trust the government in Washington to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in the United States?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Only some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

2) To what extent do you think you can trust the Nebraska state government to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in Nebraska?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Only some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

3) To what extent do you think you can trust the Lincoln city government to successfully resettle people from foreign countries in Lincoln?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Only some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

Institutional Trust Questions

1) To what extent do you think you can trust the **local public school system** in your city to successfully integrate people from foreign countries into the United States?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

2) To what extent do you think you can trust the **law enforcement agencies** in your city to successfully integrate people from foreign countries into the United States?

1. Just about always

2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

3) To what extent do you think you can trust the **local religious institutions** in your city to successfully integrate people from foreign countries into the United States?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Not very much of the time
5. Never

Demographic Questions

1) Are you a citizen of the United States?

1. Yes
2. No

2) Were you born in the United States?

1. Yes
2. No

If no, in what country were you born?

3) Do you describe yourself as an American?

1. Yes
2. No

4) What is the primary language spoken in your home?

1. English
2. Spanish
3. Japanese
4. Chinese
5. Arabic
6. Other [open ended response]

5) What race do you consider yourself to be?

1. White/Caucasian
2. Black/African American
3. Asian
4. Native American
5. Some other race [open ended question]
5. Hispanic/Latino
7. Mixed (please specify multirace) [open ended response]

6) Do you identify as male or female?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Other

7) What, if any, is your religious preference?

Catholic

Jewish

Muslim

Protestant

Hindu

Other [open ended response]

8) Thinking of your total household income in 2017, was it below \$50,000 or above \$50,000?

1. Below
2. Above

9) Please select which income category best describes the total amount of income, before taxes, received by all of the members in your household during 2017. (these are ordinal categories)

1. Less than \$10,000
2. Less than \$50,000
3. \$50,000 up to \$65,000
4. \$65,000 up to \$80,000
5. \$80,000 up to \$100,000
6. Above \$100,000

10) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?

1. Republican

If answer is yes to Republican then ask: How strong of a Republican are you?

Strong

Not very strong

2. Democrat

If answer is yes to Democrat then ask: How strong of a Democrat are you?

Strong

Not very strong

3. Independent

If answer is yes to Independent then ask: Are you closer to being a Democrat or Republican or neither?

Closer to Democrat

Closer to Republican

Neither

4. Other

11) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1. Most people can be trusted
2. You can't be too careful

12) Would you say that in the past year the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?

1. Better
2. Same
3. Worse

13) What is your age?

Open box response

14) Do you currently hold a job for which you get paid?

Yes

No

15) Do you currently do any volunteer work?

Yes

If answer is yes then ask: About how many hours per week do you volunteer?

No

16) We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal – point 1 – to extremely conservative—point 7--. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

0 = extremely liberal

1 = liberal

2 = slightly liberal

3 = middle of the road

4 = slightly conservative

5 = conservative

6 = extremely conservative

17) About how many people live in your city or town?

< 50,000

Between 51,000 - 100,000

Between 101,000 - 150,000

Between 150,000 - 300,000

Between 301,000 - 600,000

Between 601,000 - 800,000

Between 801,000 - 1 million

Over 1 million

CHAPTER 3 APPENDICES

CHAPTER 3 STUDY 1 APPENDICES

STUDY 1: APPENDIX A

The pilot study consisted of two parts. First, the survey experiment was run with a sample of participants from the survey research platform Dynata (for sample composition, see *Study 1: Appendix A*, Table A.3.1). Participants completed the PVQ5X value survey, then were randomly assigned to one of four vignettes divided into two different immigrant conditions. These included a control “description-only” vignette for a described immigrant named Ali, an experiment “description-plus-normative-violation” vignette for Ali, a control, “description-only” vignette for a described immigrant named Aamira, and an experiment “description-plus-normative-violation” vignette for Aamira (see *Study 1: Appendix A*, Table A.3.2 for original vignette structure).

I hypothesized that participants in the control groups would have attitudes and behavioral intentions toward the described immigrants that were in line with their general value orientations but that the normative violation vignettes would cause even individuals normally oriented toward universalism and openness to change values quadrants, which would predispose them to be more inclusive toward immigrants, to experience an acute value reconfiguration that would lead them toward disliking immigrants and the associated behavioral outcomes of social tolerance and intolerance. In other words, there would be significant differences between the control and experiment groups on attitudes and behavioral intentions and those in the experiment group would be more negative toward immigrants across the board. However, there were no statistical differences found

in the like/dislike index ratings and the behavioral measures between those in the control vignettes and those in the experimental vignettes.

Based on these findings (see section *Study 1: Appendix A*, Tables A.3.3 through A.3.10 for crosstabs, ANOVA, and regression results for original Study 1 vignette structure), I hypothesized that the control vignette immigrant description was raising people's anxiety at the same level that the experimental addition of the normative violation was and this was why there were no significant differences between the groups. In other words, the control vignettes were not neutral enough. Therefore, an additional vignette manipulation test was conducted in study 1 with a sample of participants from the survey platform Prolific that added a more neutral control vignette for each immigrant and tested the neutral vignettes against the original control descriptive-only vignettes and against the original experiment descriptive-plus-normative-violation vignettes (see *Study 1 Appendix B: Vignette Manipulation Test*, Tables B.3.3 and B.3.4 for revised vignette structure). Results from the vignette manipulation check confirmed that again there were no differences between the original control descriptive-only and the original experiment descriptive-plus-normative-violation vignettes for both the Ali and Aamira immigrant conditions. There were, however, significant differences between the new neutral vignettes and the original vignettes for both of the Ali and Aamira conditions, supporting the hypothesis that in the original vignette structure, the control vignette was not neutral enough (see *Study 1: Appendix B*, Tables B.3.5 – B.3.14 for results of vignette manipulation check).

Several changes were made to the vignette structure based on the findings from the vignette manipulation check results. First, because the Aamira condition models

performed poorly compared to the Ali condition models, the Aamira condition was dropped (see adjusted R-squares in regression models in *Study 1: Appendix B*, Tables B.3.12 – B.3.14). Second, because there were no significant differences between the original control descriptive-only and the original experiment descriptive-plus-normative-violation vignettes, the original control descriptive-only vignette was dropped from the Ali condition. Third, the way that feelings were measured was changed.¹⁹ Using Prolific again, a second study was then completed with the new vignette structure (see *Appendix C*, Table C.3.1 for revised final vignette structure) and with a new set of feeling questions that separated each feeling into its own question with Likert response options (discussed in more detail below). The second study is the focus of the analysis below.

Table A.3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part 1, Sample from Dynata Survey Platform

Variable	N	M/%	Metric	SD	Min	Max
Like/Dislike Aamira	188	50.01	18 item index	8.63	26	71
Like/Dislike Ali	179	48.29	18 item index	11.03	18	72
Gender	367		Do you identify as male or female?	.4989	0	1
Female (1)	199	54.22				
Male (0)	168	45.78				
Citizen	367	100	Are you a citizen of the United States? (was criteria for participation)			
Yes						
Religion	367		What, if any, is your religious preference?	1.2663	1	4
Christian	230	62.67				
Jewish	31	8.45				
Other	21	5.72				
None	85	23.16				
Partisanship	367		Generally speaking, do you	1.7411	1	5

¹⁹ In the original structure of Study 1, the feelings that the vignettes aroused in participants were measured with one question that allowed participants to place a check mark in the box of all of the feelings (a nine-option list that included: discomfort, disgust, resent, anxiety, comfort, proud, enthusiastic, hopeful, and other) they felt after reading their assigned vignette. This feelings measure proved to be limited. First, people were allowed to check as many feelings as they wanted and this led to sometimes contradictory feeling selections with no way to disentangle what was meant. Second, more in depth analysis of participant feelings was limited by the structure of the question-item. For instance, factor analysis could not be performed to check for correlations and underlying relationships between the different feeling response options.

Strong Democrat	115	31.34	consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?			
Not Strong Dem	46	12.53				
Other	14	3.81				
Not Strong Rep	52	14.17				
Strong Repub	140	38.15				
Political Ideology	40	10.9	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	1.2925	1	5
Extr Liberal	68	18.53				
Liberal	85	23.16				
Middle	94	25.61				
Conservative	80	21.8				
Extr Conserv						
Income	367		What was your total household income in 2019?	2.3553	1	10
<\$25,000	61	16.62				
\$26k-\$40k	37	10.08				
\$41k-\$59k	42	11.44				
\$60k-\$79k	52	14.17				
\$80k-\$99k	52	14.17				
\$100k-\$149k	61	16.62				
\$150k-\$199k	32	8.72				
\$200k-\$249k	9	2.45				
\$250k-\$300k	14	3.81				
>\$300k	7	1.91				
Social Trust	367		Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	.4975	0	1
No Trust (0)	204	55.59				
Trust (1)	163	44.41				
Economy	367		Would you say that in the past year the national economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?	.7375	1	3
Worse	222	60.49				
Same	91	24.80				
Better	54	14.71				
Race	367		What race do you consider yourself to be?	.7019	1	4
White	311	84.74				
Black	24	6.54				
Asian	21	5.72				
Other	11	3.00				
Describe self as American	367		Do you describe yourself as an American?	.2045	0	1
Yes (1)	351	95.64				
No (0)	16	4.36				
City size			About how many people live in your city or town?	2.3863	1	8
< 50,000	113	30.79				
btwn 51k-100k	66	17.98				
btwn 101k-150k	42	11.44				
150k	40	10.9				
btwn 151k-300k	23	6.27				
300k	25	6.81				
btwn 301k-	21	5.72				

600k btwn 601k- 800k btwn 801k-1 mill > 1 million	37	10.08				
--	----	-------	--	--	--	--

Table A.3.2: Original Vignettes for Study 1, Part 1

Control: Description- Only vignettes for each immigrant condition	<p><i>Please read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.</p>	<p><i>Please read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Aamira is an immigrant in the United States. She comes from an African country where marriages are arranged. She was married to her cousin Asim and they have seven children. Two of the kids are not Aamira's biological children, they are the offspring of Asim's second wife, Amalla. As is custom in their culture, Amalla became Asim's second wife when her husband, Asim's brother, died.</p>
Experiment: Description- Plus- Normative- Violation vignettes for each immigrant	<p><i>Please read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.</p> <p><i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described,</i></p>	<p><i>Please read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Aamira is an immigrant in the United States. She comes from an African country where marriages are arranged. She was married to her cousin Asim and they have seven children. Two of the kids are not Aamira's biological children, they are the offspring of Asim's second wife, Amalla. As is custom in their culture, Amalla became Asim's second wife when her husband, Asim's brother, died. <i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>You go for a bike ride to the nearest public park where you know there are</p>

	<p><i>then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>It is a summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits with T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.</p>	<p>nice shady spots to rest after a good ride. As you near the park you hear what sounds to you like tribal music being played from someone's car radio and you see that the parking lot is unusually full of cars. Aamira is there with her extended family, they are having a community gathering with music, food, and many children playing in the park. The children are all barefoot, many of the young boys are not wearing shirts. You ride to the edge of the playground where the children quickly swarm around you. As many as can reach out to touch your bike and pull on it while asking you if they can ride it.</p>
--	---	---

Three Images Following Experimental Vignette





Crosstabulation, ANOVA, and Regression Results from Study 1

Table A.3.3: Crosstabs for Aamira Vignettes and Dichotomous Anxiety (Dynata Sample)

Aamira Vignette	Not Anxious	Anxious	Total
Control (descriptive-only)	68 90.67 48.57	7 9.33 20.59	75 100.00 43.10
Experiment (descriptive-plus- normative- violation)	72 72.73 51.43	27 27.27 79.41	99 100.00 56.90
Total	140 80.46 100.00	34 19.54 100.00	174 100.00 100.00

Key: Top row is frequency, middle row is row percentage, bottom row is column percentage.
 $X^2(1)=8.74$, $p=.003$.

Table A.3.4: Crosstabs for Ali Vignettes and Dichotomous Anxiety (Dynata Sample)

Ali Vignette	Not Anxious	Anxious	Total
Control (descriptive-only)	60 81.08 48.00	14 18.92 56.00	74 100.00 49.33
Experiment (descriptive-plus- normative- violation)	65 85.53 52.00	11 14.47 44.00	76 100.00 50.67
Total	125 83.33 100.00	25 16.67 100.00	150 100.00 100.00

Key: Top row is frequency, middle row is row percentage, bottom row is column percentage.
 $X^2(1)=0.53$, $p=.465$.

Study 1 ANOVAs

Table A.3.5: Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Dynata Sample)

Vignette DV: Liking	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Ali Control Descriptive-Only (Descr)	48.41	10.05	88
Ali Experiment Descriptive-plus- normative violation (NV)	48.18	11.95	91

Table A.3.6: ANOVA With Vignettes Across Liking (Ali – Dynata Sample)

DV: Liking	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Descr vs. NV	-.233	1.65	-.14	.888

Table A.3.7: Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Aamira – Dynata Sample)

Vignette DV: Liking	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Aamira Control Descriptive-Only (Descr)	49.45	7.39	85
Aamira Experiment Descriptive-plus- normative violation (NV)	50.48	9.55	103

Table A.3.8: ANOVA With Vignettes Across Liking (Aamira – Dynata Sample)

DV: Liking	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Descr vs. NV	1.03	1.27	.81	.418

PILOT STUDY 1 REGRESSIONS

Table A.3.9: Linear Regression Models for Aamira Condition to Test Vignette Group Impact Across Liking, Invite to Home, and Friendship Variables (Dynata Sample).

Variable	Model 1 Liking	Model 2 Full Liking	Model 3 Invite to Home	Model 4 Invite to Home (Full)	Model 5 Friendship	Model 6 Friendship (Full)
Vignette Experiment	.125 (.934)	.689 (.88)	-.068 (.58)	-.205 (.58)	.411 (.53)	.330 (.52)
Political Ideology		-1.63 (.36)		-.802*** (.24)		-.752*** (.22)
Gender Female		-.968*** (.89)		-.227 (.59)		-.382 (.53)
Race Black		-.212 (1.82)		-.287 (1.21)		-.818 (1.08)
Asian		-1.64 (1.95)		-1.17 (1.29)		.616 (1.16)
Other		-.902 (2.66)		1.28 (1.78)		1.44 (1.59)
Religion Jewish		1.114 (1.71)		.330 (1.14)		-.367 (1.02)
Other		3.24 (1.97)		-1.36 (1.31)		-1.19 (1.17)
None		1.47 (1.11)		-.268 (.74)		-.495 (.660)
Income		-.081 (.20)		-.093 (.130)		-.129 (.116)
Social Trust Trust		1.2 (.90)		1.11 ⁺ (.594)		1.51** (.53)
Economy		1.92** (.65)		-.448 (.43)		-.444 (.39)
National Identity		2.25 (2.22)		-1.30 (1.47)		-.087 (1.32)
City Size		-.390 (.21) ⁺		-.142 (.141)		-.048 (.13)
Age		-.079 (.03)*		.010 (.02)		-.005 (.02)
Constant	21.89	27.52	8.0	12.89	8.32	12.41
Adjusted R ²	-.01	.1716	-.005	.0672	-.002	.0815
F-statistic	.02	3.58	.01	1.90	.61	2.11

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses.

Significance marked as + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. For all models N =188. Models

were run with and without the anxious variable. Anxiousness was never significant and it reduced the N of the models to 174 because not all respondents selected anxious in the feeling question. For these reasons, anxiousness was dropped from the models.

Table A.3.10: Linear Regression Models for Ali Condition to Test Vignette Group Impact Across Liking, Invite to Home, and Friendship Variables (Dynata Sample).

Variable	Model 1 Liking	Model 2 Full Liking	Model 3 Invite to Home	Model 4 Invite to Home (Full)	Model 5 Friend ship	Model 6 Friendship (Full)
Vignette Experiment	.149 (1.02)	.486 (.98)	.615 (.59)	.760 (60)	.587 (.52)	.716 (.52)
Political Ideology		-1.05* (.41)		-.623* (.25)		-.632** (.21)
Gender Female		.271 (1.01)		.928 (.61)		.703 (.53)
Race Black		4.05 ⁺ (2.15)		-.439 (1.3)		.569 (1.13)
Asian		3.25 (2.33)		.956 (1.41)		-.080 (1.23)
Other		4.69 (3.13)		1.63 (1.90)		.488 (1.65)
Religion Jewish		-3.44* (1.69)		-.890 (1.02)		-.875 (.89)
Other		-4.78* (2.28)		1.32 (1.38)		-.552 (1.20)
None		-3.65 (1.27)**		-2.22** (.77)		-1.93** (.67)
Income		.132 (.23)		.022 (.14)		.022 (.12)
Social Trust Trust		3.48*** (.96)		2.49*** (.58)		2.3*** (.51)
Economy		-.246 (.68)		-.543 (.41)		-.433 (.36)
National Identity		-4.25 ⁺ (2.55)		-.237 (1.55)		.185 (1.34)
City Size		-.297 (.21)		.122 (.13)		.061 (.109)
Age		-.091** (.03)		-.003 (.02)		-.013 (.016)
Constant	21.47	33.63	7.69	9.09	8.53	10.43
Adjusted R ²	-.006	.1880	.0004	.1333	.0016	.1375
F-statistic	.02	3.75	1.07	2.83	1.29	2.89

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For all models $N = 179$. Models were run with and without the anxious variable. Anxiousness was never significant and it reduced the N of the models to 150 because not all respondents selected anxious in the feeling question. For these reasons, anxiousness was dropped from the models.

APPENDIX B STUDY 1: VIGNETTE MANIPULATION TEST

Table B.3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test (Aamira – Prolific Sample)

Variable	N	M/%	Metric	SD	Min	Max
Like	192		I think I would like Aamira.	.858	1	4
Not at all true	16	8.33				
A little true	60	31.25				
Pretty true	82	42.71				
Definitely true	34	17.71				
Neighbor	192	7.9	Given your impression of Aamira, how difficult would it be for you to decide not/to feel comfortable having her as your next door neighbor?	2.72	1	10
No – ext easy	9	4.69				
No – mod easy	10	5.21				
No – sli easy	9	4.69				
No – sli difficult	2	1.04				
No – mod diff	3	1.56				
No – ext diff	3	1.56				
Yes – ext diff	0	0				
Yes – mod diff	0	0				
Yes – sli diff	10	5.21				
Yes – sli easy	27	14.06				
Yes – mod easy	56	29.17				
Yes – ext easy	63	32.81				
Feeling Indices	192		Anxiety: 3-item index (anxiousness, discomfort, uneasiness)	2.02	4	12
Anxiety		7.44		1.22	4	11
Aversion		5.51	Aversion: 3-item index (resentment, anger, disgust)	2.36	3	12
Positive		8.40	Positive: 3-item index (hope, enthusiasm, pride)			
Gender	192		Do you identify as male or female?	.490	0	1
Female (1)	116	60.42				
Male (0)	76	39.58				
Partisanship	192		Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?	1.92	1	6
Strong Democrat	58	30.21				
Not Strong Dem	28	14.58				
Ind – Lean Dem	25	13.02				
Ind – Lean Rep	16	8.33				
Not Strong Rep	30	15.62				
Strong Repub	35	18.23				
Political Ideology	192		We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and	1.19	1	5
Extr Liberal	36	18.75				

Liberal	55	28.65	conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?			
Middle	35	18.23				
Conservative	59	30.73				
Extr Conserv	7	3.65				
Education	192		What level of education have you completed?	1.08	1	6
< High School	1	0.52				
High School	28	15.10				
Some College	49	40.62				
Bachelor's	72	37.50				
Master's	33	17.19				
PhD/Professional	9	4.69				
Income	192		What was your total household income in 2019?	2.10	1	10
<\$25,000	27	14.06				
\$26k-\$40k	19	9.90				
\$41k-\$59k	35	18.23				
\$60k-\$79k	39	20.31				
\$80k-\$99k	17	8.85				
\$100k-\$149k	31	16.15				
\$150k-\$199k	16	8.33				
\$200k-\$249k	3	1.56				
\$250k-\$300k	2	1.04				
>\$300k	3	1.56				
Race	192		What race do you consider yourself to be?	1.18	1	5
White	130	67.71				
Black	24	12.5				
Hisp/Latino	11	5.73				
Asian	20	10.42				
Other	7	3.65				
National Identity	192		I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people.	1.00	1	5
Strongly Disagree	7	3.65				
Disagree	29	15.10				
Neither	61	31.77				
Agree	72	37.50				
Strongly Agree	23	11.98				
City size	192		About how many people live in your city or town?	2.54	1	8
< 50,000	46	23.96				
btwn 51k-100k	39	20.31				
btwn 101k- 150k	21	10.94				
btwn 151k-300k	23	11.98				
btwn 301k-600k	11	5.73				
btwn 601k- 800k	10	5.21				
btwn 801k-1 mill	10	5.21				
> 1 million	32	16.67				

Table B.3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test (Ali – Prolific Sample)

Variable	N	M/%	Metric	SD	Min	Max
Like	151		I think I would like Ali.	.926	1	4
Not at all true	32	21.19				
A little true	55	36.42				
Pretty true	48	31.79				
Definitely true	16	10.60				
Neighbor	151		Given your impression of Ali, how difficult would it be for you to decide not/to feel comfortable having her as your next door neighbor?	2.87	1	10
No – ext easy	4	2.65				
No – mod easy	11	7.28				
No – sli easy	10	6.62				
No – sli difficult	9	5.96				
No – mod diff	2	1.32				
No – ext diff	3	1.99				
Yes – ext diff	0	0				
Yes – mod diff	0	0				
Yes – sli diff	6	3.97				
Yes – sli easy	16	10.60				
Yes – mod easy	41	27.15				
Yes – ext easy	49	32.45				
Feeling Indices	151		Anxiety: 3-item index (anxiousness, discomfort, uneasiness)	2.16	4	12
Anxiety		7.57				
Aversion		6.88	Aversion: 3-item index (resentment, anger, disgust)	1.76	3	12
Positive		8.08	Positive: 3-item index (hope, enthusiasm, pride)	2.32	3	12
Gender	151		Do you identify as male or female?	.486	0	1
Male (0)	57	37.75				
Female (1)	94	62.25				
Partisanship	151		Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?	1.78	1	6
Strong Democrat	32	21.19				
Not Strong Dem	16	10.6				
Ind – Lean Dem	20	13.25				
Ind – Lean Rep	20	13.25				
Not Strong Rep	41	27.15				
Strong Rep	22	14.57				
Political Ideology	151		We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	2.99	1	5
Extr Liberal	24	15.89				
Liberal	26	17.22				
Middle	35	23.18				
Conservative	59	39.07				
Extr Conserv	7	4.64				
Education	151		What level of education have you completed?	.872	1	6
< High School	1	0.66				
High School	12	7.95				
Some College	55	36.42				

Bachelor's	63	41.72				
Master's	18	11.92				
PhD/Professional	2	1.32				
Income	151		What was your total household income in 2019?	2.21	1	10
<\$25,000	25	16.56				
\$26k-\$40k	20	13.25				
\$41k-\$59k	19	12.58				
\$60k-\$79k	30	19.87				
\$80k-\$99k	19	12.58				
\$100k-\$149k	18	11.92				
\$150k-\$199k	12	7.95				
\$200k-\$249k	4	2.65				
\$250k-\$300k	0	0				
>\$300k	4	2.65				
Race	151		What race do you consider yourself to be?	.947	1	5
White	121	80.13				
Black	12	7.95				
Hisp/Lat	7	4.64				
Asian	8	5.30				
Other	3	1.99				
National Identity			I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people.	1.13	1	5
Strongly Disagree	9	5.96				
Disagree	14	9.27				
Neither	34	22.52				
Agree	57	37.75				
Strongly Agree	37	24.50				
City size	151		About how many people live in your city or town?	2.25	1	8
< 50,000	44	29.14				
btwn 51k-100k	32	21.19				
btwn 101k- 150k	15	9.93				
btwn 151k-300k	18	11.92				
btwn 301k-600k	13	8.61				
btwn 601k- 800k	11	7.28				
btwn 801k-1 mill	6	3.97				
> 1 million	12	7.95				

Table B.3.3: Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test – Revised Vignette Structure (Aamira)

Aamira – Neutral (New Vignette)
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Aamira lives in the United States in a medium sized city. She is married and has five children with her husband. She likes to go on picnics with her family and watch her children play at local public parks. She enjoys walking with her husband and reading books. She would like to travel to see more of the United States when she can.
Aamira – Descriptive-Only
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Aamira is an immigrant in the United States. She comes from an African country where marriages are arranged. She was married to her cousin Asim and they have seven children. Two of the kids are not Aamira's biological children, they are the offspring of Asim's second wife, Amalla. As is custom in their culture, Amalla became Asim's second wife when her husband, Asim's brother, died.
Aamira – Descriptive + Normative Violation
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Aamira is an immigrant in the United States. She comes from an African country where marriages are arranged. She was married to her cousin Asim and they have seven children. Two of the kids are not Aamira's biological children, they are the offspring of Asim's second wife, Amalla. As is custom in their culture, Amalla became Asim's second wife when her husband, Asim's brother, died.
<i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i>
You go for a bike ride to the nearest public park where you know there are shaded areas to rest and cool down. As you near the park you hear what sounds to you like tribal music being played from someone's car radio and you see that the parking lot is unusually full of cars. Aamira is there with her extended family, they are having a community gathering with music, food, and many children playing in the park. The children are all barefoot, many of the young boys are not wearing shirts. You ride to the edge of the playground where the children quickly swarm around you. As many as can reach out to touch your bike and pull on it while asking you if they can ride it.

Table B.3.4: Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test – Revised Vignette Structure (Ali)

Ali – Neutral (New Vignette)
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Ali lives in the United States in a medium sized city. He is married and he and his wife have a daughter and a son. He likes to take his family for picnics on the weekends and to swim at swimming pools in the summer. He enjoys American baseball and wears a baseball cap when he goes to games. He would like to travel to see more of the United States when he can.
Ali – Descriptive-Only
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.
Ali – Descriptive + Normative Violation
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.
<i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i>
It is a summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits underneath T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.
Ali – Descriptive + Normative Violation Hot
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.
<i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i>

It is an extremely hot summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits underneath T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.

APPENDIX STUDY 1: ANOVA, and Regression Results from Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test

The purpose of the Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test round of data collection was to test the revised vignette structure (see above Tables A.xx and A.xx for revised vignette structure). The hypotheses for this test were:

H1: Participants in the neutral vignette will significantly like the described immigrants more than participants in the descriptive-only vignettes and the descriptive-plus-normative violation vignettes.

H2: Participants in the neutral vignette will report significantly lower anxiety levels after reading about the described immigrant than participants in the descriptive-only vignettes and the descriptive-plus-normative violation vignettes.

H3: Participants in the neutral vignette will be significantly more likely to feel comfortable with having the described immigrant as their neighbor than participants in the descriptive-only vignettes and the descriptive-plus-normative violation vignettes.

H4: There will be no significant differences between the descriptive-only and descriptive-plus-normative violation vignettes across liking, anxiety level, and whether participants would feel comfortable having the described immigrant as a neighbor.

First, ANOVAs were performed to test mean group differences on each dependent variable. Then a series of linear regressions were performed to check whether the results would hold in more complex models with control variables included. These are discussed in turn.

ANOVAs: Vignette Manipulation Test (Aamira condition)

Table B.3.5: ANOVA Summary of Vignette data on Anxiety (Ali – Prolific Sample)

Vignette DV: Anxiety	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Ali Neutral (Neut)	2.04	.29	47
Ali Descriptive-Only (Descr)	2.41	.78	34
Ali Normative Violation (NV)	2.61	.83	28
Ali Normative Violation Hot (NV Hot)	2.83	.99	42

Table B.3.6: ANOVA for Ali Condition, Vignettes Across Anxiety (Prolific Sample)

DV: Anxiety	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Neut vs. Descr	.37	.17	2.19	.132
Neut vs. NV	.56	.18	3.15	.010
Neut vs. NV Hot	.79	.16	4.97	< .0001
NV vs. Descr	.20	.19	1.02	.737
NV Hot vs. Descr	.42	.17	2.44	.075
NV Hot vs. NV	.23	.18	1.24	.605

Table B.3.7: ANOVA Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Ali – Prolific Sample)

Vignette DV: Liking	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Ali Neutral (Neut)	2.98	.64	47
Ali Descriptive-Only (Descr)	2.24	.78	34
Ali Normative Violation (NV)	1.79	.92	28
Ali Normative Violation Hot (NV Hot)	2.0	.91	42

Table B.3.8: ANOVA for Ali Condition, Vignettes Across Liking (Prolific Sample)

DV: Liking	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Neut vs. Descr	-.743	.18	-4.09	< .0001
Neut vs. NV	-1.19	.19	-6.19	< .0001
Neut vs. NV Hot	-.979	.17	-5.71	< .0001
NV vs. Descr	-.450	.21	-2.18	.133
NV Hot vs. Descr	-.235	.19	-1.26	.588
NV Hot vs. NV	.214	.20	1.09	.697

Table B.3.9: Summary of Vignette data on Anxiety (Aamira – Prolific Sample)

Vignette DV: Anxiety	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Aamira Neutral (Neut)	6.45	1.46	65
Aamira Descriptive- Only (Descr)	7.92	2.09	66
Aamira Normative Violation (NV)	7.97	2.09	61

Table B.3.10: ANOVA for Aamira Condition, Vignettes Across Anxiety (Prolific Sample)

DV: Anxiety	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Neut vs. Descr	1.48	.332	4.45	< .0001
Neut vs. NV	1.52	.339	4.49	< .0001
NV vs. Descr	.043	.338	0.13	.991

Table B.3.11: Summary of Vignette data on Liking (Aamira – Prolific Sample)

Vignette DV: Liking	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Aamira Neutral (Neut)	3.11	.71	65
Aamira Descriptive- Only (Descr)	2.41	.89	66
Aamira Normative Violation (NV)	2.57	.81	61

Table B.3.12: ANOVA for Aamira Condition, Vignettes Across Liking (Prolific Sample)

DV: Liking	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey	P-Value
Neut vs. Descr	-.70	.141	-4.95	< .0001
Neut vs. NV	-.53	.144	-3.71	.001
NV vs. Descr	.16	.143	1.15	.485

Table B.3.13: Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Liking (Prolific Sample)

Variable	Model 1 Liking (Ali)	Model 2 Liking w/ Feelings (Ali)	Model 3 Liking (Full - Ali)	Model 4 Liking (Aamira)	Model 5 Liking w/ Feelings (Aamira)	Model 6 Liking (Full- Aamira)
Vignette Description only	-.743*** (.18)	-.387* (.18)	-.385* (.18)	-.699*** (.14)	-.494*** (.15)	-.448*** (.15)
Description + NV	-1.19*** (.19)	-.666** (.19)	-.591** (.21)	-.534*** (.14)	-.400** (.14)	-.375** (.15)
NV Hot (Ali)	-.979*** (.17)	-.428* (.18)	-.388* (.19)			
Anxiety		-.100** (.03)	-.086* (.04)		-.057+ (.03)	-.057+ (.03)
Aversion		-.092* (.04)	-.115** (.04)		-.170*** (.05)	-.172*** (.05)
Enthusiasm		.085** (.03)	.096*** (.03)		.023 (.03)	.026 (.03)
Political Ideology			-.022 (.06)			-.076 (.06)
Education			-.084 (.07)			-.044 (.06)
Gender Female			-.0008 (.13)			.086 (.12)
Race Black			.343 (.23)			.345* (.18)
Hisp/Lat			.338 (.29)			-.127 (.19)
Asian			-.271 (.29)			.071 (.31)
Other			-.646 (.44)			
Income			-.003 (.03)			-.014 (.03)
National Identity			.031 (.07)			.027 (.06)
City Size			.011 (.03)			-.023 (.02)
Constant	2.98	3.35	3.5	3.11	4.16	4.47
Adjusted R ²	.2406	.3862	.3838	.1143	.2007	.2007
F-statistic	16.84	16.73	6.84	13.33	10.59	4.20

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. For all models N = 151.

Table B.3.14: Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Anxiety (Prolific Sample)

Variable	Model 1 Anxiety (Ali)	Model 2 Anxiety w/ Feelings (Ali)	Model 3 Anxiety (Full - Ali)	Model 4 Anxiety (Aamira)	Model 5 Anxiety w/ Feelings (Aamira)	Model 6 Anxiety (Full- Aamira)
Vignette Description only	1.73*** (.44)	1.37** (.41)	1.20** (.42)	1.48*** (.33)	1.26*** (.33)	1.32*** (.33)
Description + NV	1.79*** (.47)	.911* (.47)	.870+ (.48)	1.52*** (.34)	1.40*** (.33)	1.57*** (.33)
NV Hot (Ali)	2.29*** (.42)	1.54*** (.42)	1.50** (.43)			
Aversion		.530*** (.09)	.514*** (.09)		.485*** (.06)	.462*** (.11)
Enthusiasm		-.004 (.07)	.001 (.07)		.018 (.06)	.010 (.06)
Political Ideology			.118 (.15)			-.230+ (.13)
Education			.389* (.17)			.126 (.14)
Gender Female			.127 (.31)			-.316 (.28)
Race Black			-1.00+ (.55)			.100 (.41)
Hisp/Lat			-.459 (.70)			-.316 (.58)
Asian			-.989 (.68)			.280 (.45)
Other			-.824 (1.06)			1.01 (.72)
Income			.088 (.07)			-.049 (.08)
National Identity			-.046 (.16)			.022 (.15)
City Size			.070 (.07)			.091 (.06)
Constant	6.21	3.05	1.10	6.45	3.74	3.93
Adjusted R ²	.1734	.3293	.3569	.1147	.1901	.2069
F-statistic	11.49	15.73	6.55	13.38	12.21	4.56

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. For all models N = 151.

Table B.3.15: Study 1 Vignette Manipulation Test Linear Regression Models for Ali and Aamira, Dependent Variable: Neighbor (Prolific Sample)

Variable	Model 1 Neighbor (Ali)	Model 2 Neighbor w/ Feelings (Ali)	Model 3 Neighbor (Full - Ali)	Model 4 Neighbor (Aamira)	Model 5 Neighbor w/ Feelings (Aamira)	Model 6 Neighbor (Full- Aamira)
Vignette Description only	-1.39* (.58)	-.330 (.54)	-.585 (.54)	-1.62*** (.46)	-.817 ⁺ (.46)	-.657 (.47)
Description + NV	-2.80*** (.62)	-1.09 ⁺ (.60)	-1.71** (.61)	-1.22** (.47)	-.808 ⁺ (.45)	-.606 (.47)
NV Hot (Ali)	-3.08*** (.55)	-1.36* (.55)	-1.52** (.55)			
Aversion		-.544*** (.13)	-.496*** (.13)		-.748*** (.15)	-.734*** (.16)
Enthusiasm		.123 (.09)	.094 (.09)		.154* (.08)	.135 (.08)
Political Ideology			-.259 (.18)			-.405* (.18)
Education			-.156 (.22)			-.112 (.195)
Gender Female			-.516 (.38)			.229 (.38)
Race Black			-.514 (.69)			.199 (.56)
Hisp/Lat			.155 (.87)			-.708 (.79)
Asian			-1.65 ⁺ (.85)			.172 (.61)
Other			.033 (1.31)			.306 (.98)
Income			-.082 (.09)			.072 (.102)
National Identity			-.460* (.20)			.070 (.20)
City Size			.144 ⁺ (.08)			-.028 (.08)
Constant	9.30	13.28	16.54	8.85	12.24	13.41
Adjusted R ²	.1887	.3946	.4387	.0557	.2069	.2024
F-statistic	12.63	17.29	8.33	6.64	10.97	4.23

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. For all models N = 151.

APPENDIX C: REVISED VIGNETTE STRUCTURE USED IN STUDY 2

Table C.3.1: Study 2 Revised Vignette Structure (Ali – Only)

<p>Ali – Neutral (New Vignette)</p> <p><i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Ali lives in the United States in a medium sized city. He is married and he and his wife have a daughter and a son. He likes to take his family for picnics on the weekends and to swim at swimming pools in the summer. He enjoys American baseball and wears a baseball cap when he goes to games. He would like to travel to see more of the United States when he can.</p>
<p>Ali – Descriptive + Normative Violation</p> <p><i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.</p> <p><i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>It is a summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits underneath T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.</p>
<p>Ali – Descriptive + Normative Violation Hot</p> <p><i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.</p> <p><i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>It is an extremely hot summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits underneath T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.</p>

Table C.3.2: Study 2 Final Vignette Structure (Ali – Only)

Ali – Neutral (New Vignette)
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
<p>Ali lives in the United States in a medium sized city. He is married and he and his wife have a daughter and a son. He likes to take his family for picnics on the weekends and to swim at swimming pools in the summer. He enjoys American baseball and wears a baseball cap when he goes to games. He would like to travel to see more of the United States when he can.</p>
Ali – Descriptive + Normative Violation
<i>Please carefully read the following paragraph and then answer the questions that follow.</i>
<p>Ali is an immigrant. He comes from a Middle Eastern country where a conservative and very traditional sect of Islam is widely practiced. He devoutly follows and conforms to the rules and traditions of his religion. He sees no problem with a religiously based government and system of law. He has a daughter and a son. His wife wears a burka with a niqab that covers her entire body and face when she leaves the house. His daughter will wear a burka and a niqab when she is of the proper age to do so.</p> <p><i>Please imagine that you are in this scenario and view the following images that depict what is described, then answer the questions that follow.</i></p> <p>It is a summer day and you are at the local swimming pool. Ali and his family are also there. Ali and his son and daughter are wearing bathing suits underneath T-shirts while swimming in the pool. His wife occasionally joins them in the water wearing her full burka and niqab body coverings.</p>

Appendix D: Value Items and Codes

Table D.3.1: Value Items and Codes

		Value and item	6-point α	11-point α
Self-direction–thought			.60	.69
SDT1	1 ^a	Being creative is important to him.		
SDT2	24	It is important to him to form his own opinions and have original ideas.		
SD13	39	Learning things for himself and improving his abilities is important to him.		
Self-direction–action			.69	.71
SDA1	18	It is important to him to make his own decisions about his life.		
SDA2	33	Doing everything independently is important to him.		
SDA3	49	Freedom to choose what he does is important to him.		
Stimulation			.71	.73
ST1	10	He is always looking for different kinds of things to do.		
ST2	26	Excitement in life is important to him.		
ST3	41	He thinks it is important to have all sorts of new experiences.		
Hedonism			.72	.73
HE1	3	Having a good time is important to him.		
HE2	31	Enjoying life's pleasures is important to him.		
HE3*	46	He takes advantage of every opportunity to have fun.		
Achievement			.72	.63
AC1	16	He thinks it is important to be ambitious.		
AC2	37	Being very successful is important to him.		
AC3	55	He wants people to admire his achievements.		
Power–resources			.84	.79
POR1	13	Having the feeling of power that money can bring is important to him.		
POR2	22	Being wealthy is important to him.		
POR3*	43	He pursues high status and power.		
Power–dominance			.77	.74
POD1	6	He wants people to do what he says.		
POD2*	27	It is important to him to be the most influential person in any group.		
POD3	35	It is important to him to be the one who tells others what to do.		
Face			.62	.61
FAC1	9	It is important to him that no one should ever shame him.		
FAC2	19	Protecting his public image is important to him.		
FAC3*	51	He wants people always to treat him with respect and dignity.		
Security–personal			.76	.72
SEP1*	12	He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.		
SEP2	25	His personal security is extremely important to him.		
SEP3	54	It is important to him to live in secure surroundings.		
Security–societal			.75	.76
SES1	2	It is important to him that his country protect itself against all threats.		
SES2	30	He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.		
SES3	47	Having order and stability in society is important to him.		
Tradition			.85	.84
TR1	17	It is important to him to maintain traditional values or beliefs.		
TR2	38	Following his family's customs or the customs of a religion is important to him.		
TR3	44	He strongly values the traditional practices of his culture.		
Conformity–rules			.70	.73
COR1*	15	He believes he should always do what people in authority say.		
COR2	28	It is important to him to follow rules even when no one is watching.		
COR3	40	Obedying all the laws is important to him.		

Value and item			6-point α	11-point α
Conformity–interpersonal			.71	.69
COI1	4	It is important to him to avoid upsetting other people.		
COI2	21	He thinks it is important never to be annoying to anyone.		
COI3	52	He always tries to be tactful and avoid irritating people.		
Humility			.49	.38
HU1*	7	He tries not to draw attention to himself.		
HU2	34	It is important to him to be humble.		
HU3	50	It is important to him to be satisfied with what he has and not to ask for more.		
Benevolence–dependability			.63	.78
BED1 ^b	11	It is important to him to be loyal to those who are close to him.		
BED2	42	He goes out of his way to be a dependable and trustworthy friend.		
BED3	56	He wants those he spends time with to be able to rely on him completely.		
Benevolence–caring			.76	.83
BEC1	23	It's very important to him to help the people dear to him.		
BEC2	32	Caring for the well-being of people he is close to is important to him.		
BEC3*	48	He tries always to be responsive to the needs of his family and friends.		
Universalism–concern			.72	.77
UNC1	5	Protecting society's weak and vulnerable members is important to him.		
UNC2	29	He thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life.		
UNC3	53	He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know.		
Universalism–nature			.85	.88
UNN1	8	He strongly believes that he should care for nature.		
UNN2	20	It is important to him to work against threats to the world of nature.		
UNN3	45	Protecting the natural environment from destruction or pollution is important to him.		
Universalism–tolerance			.60	.63
UNT1*	14	He works to promote harmony and peace among diverse groups.		
UNT2	36	It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him.		
UNT3	57	Even when he disagrees with people, it is important to him to understand them.		

Note. An asterisk denotes items we dropped from the comparative fit and multidimensional scaling analyses for both response scales in order to improve the fit of the theoretical model to the observed data. A revised version of the PVQ5X, the PVQ–R, is available from the first author.

^a The number preceding each item indicates its order in the survey. ^b Based on the results of the comparative fit analysis and its content, BED1 was moved to BEC and relabeled BEC4.

Note: Table taken from Schwartz et al. (2012).

APPENDIX E: LIKE MEASURES AND BEHAVIORAL INTENTION MEASURES FOR STUDY 2 (PROLIFIC SAMPLE)

Table E.3.1: Like Measure Items

Ali
1. "I think that Ali and his family could have a lot in common with me"
2. "There are aspects of Ali's personality that I dislike"
3. "I think that Ali exhibits good judgment"
4. "I think that future interactions with Ali would be undesirable"
5. "I would like to get to know Ali and his family better"
6. "I think Ali could be a friend of mine"
7. "It would be difficult to meet and talk with Ali"
8. "Ali just wouldn't fit in to my circle of friends"
9. "Ali and I could never establish a personal friendship with each other"
10. "I would like to have a friendly chat with Ali to get to know more about his lifestyle and beliefs"
11. "I have cold feelings about Ali and his family"
12. "I think that I would not like Ali as a person"
13. "Ali is probably unfair toward others"
14. "Ali seems like a loyal sort of person"
15. "I respect Ali"
16. "Ali deserves admiration"
17. "Ali should not serve as an example to others"
18. "I think I would like Ali"

Like/Dislike Index Scale


(1 = Not at all true; 2 = A little True; 3 = Most likely True; 4 = Definitely true)

Table E.3.2: Behavioral Index Questions


Ali Vignette
1. “Would you be polite to Ali if he was next to you in line at the supermarket?”
2. “Would you let Ali go in front of you in line at the supermarket if you arrived at the checkout stand slightly before he did with a full cart of groceries while he only had one item?”
3. “If Ali asked you for directions to a local store, would you give him directions?”
4. “If Ali sat down next to you on a public bench at the local mall would you be able to sit by him?”
5. “Would you smile at Ali if he was the salesperson scanning your items at the supermarket?”
6. “Would you partner with Ali on a work or community based project?”
7. “Would you consent to having Ali’s desk next to yours at your job?”
8. “Would you feel comfortable having Ali as your next-door neighbor?”
9. “Would you socialize with Ali at a social function?”
10. “Would you listen to Ali explain his beliefs about life?”
11. “Would you invite Ali as a guest to your home”
12. “Could you be friends with Ali?”
13. “Would you invite Ali and his family to a summer BBQ in your neighborhood?”
14. “Would you go for coffee (or tea, or soda) with Ali?”

APPENDIX F: MEDIATION REGRESSIONS WITH AND WITHOUT INTERACTIONS

Figure F.3.1: Political Ideology Interaction With Vignettes on Liking



Note: Political ideology interaction with vignettes regressed on liking with set of five controls. The graph shows that in the neutral vignette group, there is no difference on liking between liberals and conservatives. In the normative violation vignette group, there is a significantly large difference in simple main effects for liberals and conservatives ($.6913 - .4961 = .1952$).

Figure F.3.2: Political Ideology Interaction With Vignettes on Behavior

Note: Political ideology interaction with vignettes regressed on behavior with set of five controls. The graph shows that there are differences in base behavioral intentions (neutral group) between liberals and conservatives with conservatives scoring lower ($.8973 - .6836 = .2137$). The difference is much wider in the normative violation group with conservatives scoring point .2167 lower than liberals ($.9002 - .6835 = .2167$).

Table F.3.1: Linear Regression Models Examining Mediation of Liking Between Values and Behavior

Variable	Model 1 Values on DV: Behavior (no interact)	Model 2 Values on DV: Behavior (w/ interact)	Model 3 Values on DV: Liking	Model 4 Values (w/ interaction) DV: Liking	Model 5 Liking on DV: Behavior	Model 6 Full Model DV: Behavior
Self-Transcendence	.428*** (.05)	.308*** (.08)	.424*** (.06)	.265** (.09)		.139* (.06)
Conservation	-.068 (.05)	.081 (.08)	-.015 (.06)	.188* (.09)		-.039 (.06)
Self-Enhancement	-.139** (.04)	-.186* (.08)	-.024 (.05)	-.103 (.09)		-.120* (.06)
Vignette Experiment	-.078*** (.02)	-.111 (.08)	-.168*** (.02)	-.217* (.09)	.034* (.01)	.027 (.06)
Liking					.680*** (.03)	.637*** (.03)
ST x Vignette		.190 ⁺ (.10)		.250* (.11)		.030 (.07)
Cons x Vignette		-.227* (.09)		-.309** (.10)		-.030 (.06)
SE x Vignette		.065 (.09)		.109 (.10)		-.005 (.06)
Political Ideology	-.063 ⁺ (.03)	-.059 ⁺ (.03)	-.063 (.04)	-.057 (.04)	-.072*** (.02)	-.023 (.02)
Education	.021 (.02)	.018 (.02)	.006 (.02)	.003 (.02)	.020 ⁺ (.01)	.017 (.01)
City Size	.007 (.02)	.001 (.02)	.030 (.03)	.021 (.03)	-.030 ⁺ (.02)	-.013 (.02)
Age	-.041 (.04)	-.047 (.04)	-.104* (.04)	-.112** (.04)	.052* (.03)	.025 (.03)
Social Trust Trust	.049** (.02)	.048** (.02)	.050** (.02)	.049** (.02)	.022 ⁺ (.01)	.017 (.01)
Constant	.682***	.708*** (.07)	.515***	.552***	.360***	.356***
Adjusted R ²	.2716	.2825	.3023	.3205	.6096	.6355
F-statistic	17.03	13.69	19.63	16.21	87.34	52.89

Note: Numbers in table are regression coefficients, standard errors are included in parentheses. Significance marked as + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For all models $N = 388$.

References

- Abdelaziz, Rowaida. 2020. "When Swimming As a Muslim Woman Becomes A Political Act," *HuffPost*, accessed 5/25/21: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/muslim-women-are-fighting-to-swim-in-america_n_5d5594d1e4b056fafd08aa70?guccounter=1
- Ajzen, Icek and Martin Fishbein. 2005. Eds. D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson and M. P. Zanna. "The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior," *The handbook of Attitudes*, pp.173-22, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: NJ.
- Ajzen, Icek und Martin Fishbein. 2005. "The influence of attitudes on behavior," In: Albarracín, Dolores, Blair T. Johnson and Mark P. Zanna (Hrsg.). *The Handbook of Attitudes*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 173–221.
- Ajzen, Icek and Nicole Gilbert Cote. "Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior," *Attitudes and Attitude Change*, edited by William Crano and Radmila Prislin, Taylor & Francis Group: NY, 2008, pp. 289-312.
- Alvarez, R. Michael, Lonna Rae Atkeson, Ines Levin, and Yimeng li. 2019. "Paying Attention to Inattentive Survey Respondents," *Political Analysis*, 27 (2). pp. 145-162. ISSN 1047-1987.
- Baldeck, Brett. 2018. "YMCA employee calls police on Muslim woman over swimwear," Fox 46 Charlotte, accessed 5/25/21: <https://www.fox46.com/news/ymca-employee-calls-police-on-muslim-woman-over-swimwear/>
- Bardi, Anat; Jaspal, Rusi; Polek, Ela; Schwartz, Shalom H. 2014. R. Jaspal, and G.M. Breakwell (eds.). "Values and identity process theory (IPT) : theoretical integration and empirical interactions." in *Identity process theory: Identity, social action and social change*, Cambridge University Press.
- Barton, Keith C. 2001. "History Education and National Identity in Northern Ireland and the United States: Differing Priorities," *Theory Into Practice*, 40:1, 48-54, DOI: 10.1207/ s15430421tip4001_8
- Berg, L. and B. Hjern. 2010. "National Identity and Political Trust." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11:4, pp. 390-407.
- Brandt, Mark J., Christine Reyna, John R. Chambers, Jarret T. Crawford, and Geoffrey Wetherell. 2014. "The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. 2014, Vol. 23(1) 27–34.

- Brewer, Marilynn. 2003. *Intergroup Relations*, 2nd ed. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Cheong et al. 2007. "Immigration, social cohesion and social capital: A critical review." *Critical Social Policy* 86 Vol. 27(1): 24-49.
- Caprara, G., Vecchione, M., and Schwartz, S. H. 2009. "Mediational role of values in linking personality traits to political orientation." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 12(2), 82-94.
- Cialdini, R. B., and Trost, M. R. 1998. Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 151-192). New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill.
- Citrin, Jack, Richard Johnston and Matthew Wright. 2012. "Do Patriotism and Multiculturalism Collide? Competing Perspectives from Canada and the United States." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 45, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 531-552.
- Citrin, Jack and David Sears. 2014. *American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism*. Cambridge University Press: NY.
- Cleary, Mathew and Susan Stokes. 2006. *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism*. Russell Sage Foundation: NY.
- Crawford, Jarret and Jane Pilanski. 2012. "Political Intolerance, Right and Left," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 35, Issue 6, pp. 841-851.
- Devellis, Robert. 2017. *Scale Development: Theory and Applications*, Fourth Edition. Sage Publications: CA.
- Dwyer, Evelyn. 1993. "Attitude Scale Construction: A Review of the Literature." Moristown, TN; Walters State Community College (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 359201)
<https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED404165.pdf>
- Dovidio, John F., and Samuel L. Gaertner. 1999. "Reducing Prejudice: Combating Intergroup Biases." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Aug., 1999), pp. 101-105.
- Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzan, and Michale Woolcock. 2006. "Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth," *Economics & Politics*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, pp. 103-120.
- Edelman M. 1964. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Chicago: Univ. Ill. Press.

- Eagly AH, Chaiken S. 1993. *The Psychology of Attitudes*. Forth Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Elliot, S., and Yusuf, I. 2014. “‘Yes, we can; but together’: social capital and refugee resettlement.” *Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online*. 2014. < <https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2014.951662> >
- Elmir, Rana. 2016. “Muslim women experience thinly veiled discrimination,” Chicago Tribune, accessed 5/25/21: <https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-muslim-women-discrimination-hijab-20160916-story.html>
- Feld, Scott. 2001. “Review: On the Emergence of Social Norms.” *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (Nov., 2002), pp. 638-640.
- Gibson, James. 1992. “The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 338-356.
- Gibson, James L. and Richard D. Bingham. 1982. “On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Sep.), pp. 603-620.
- Gibson, James. 2011. Edited by Robert Goodin. “Political Intolerance in the Context of Democratic Theory.” *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford University Press.
- Grigorieff, A., Roth, C., and Ubfal, D. 2020. “Does Information Change Attitudes Toward Immigrants?” *Demography* 57, 1117–1143. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-020-00882-8>
- Halapuu, Vivika, Tiiu Paas, Tiit Tammaru & Aire Schütz. 2013. “Is institutional trust related to pro-immigrant attitudes?” A pan-European evidence, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 54:5-6, 572-593, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2014.908313
- Hamilton, DL, and Sherman, JW. 2016. *Stereotypes*. UC Davis. Retrieved from <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0c8744mq>
- Hardwick, Susan W., Rebecca Marcus & Marissa Isaak. 2010. “Education and national identity in a comparative context,” *National Identities*, 12:3, 253-268, DOI: 10.1080/14608941003727932
- Hartz, Louis. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. Harcourt Brace: NY.

- Hero, Rodney. 2003. "Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America." *Perspectives on Politics*, 1: 113–22.
- Hibbing, John R. 2020. *The Securitarian Personality: What Really Motivates Trump's Base and Why It Matters for the Post-Trump Era*. Oxford University Press: NY.
- Hitlin, Steven and Jane Allyn Piliavin. 2004. "Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 30, pp. 359-393.
- Hopkins DJ. 2010. Politicized places: explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 104(1):40–60.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Sean Westwood. 2015. "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 59, No. 3, July 2015, Pp. 690–707.
- Jenkins, Richard. 2008. *Social Identity*, Third Edition. Routledge: NY.
- Kalogeraki, Stefania. 2018. "Volunteering for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece." C. Lahusen, M. Grasso (eds.), *Solidarity in Europe*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73335-7_7
- Kaplan, Benjamin. 2007. *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA.
- Kesler, Christel and Irene Bloemraad. 2010. "Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation across 19 Countries, 1981–2000." *Canadian journal of political science*, Vol.43 (2), p.319-347).
- Kirchner, Antje, Markus Freitag and Carolin Rapp. 2011. "Crafting tolerance: the role of political institutions in a comparative perspective." *European Political Science Review*. Vol. 3:2, pp. 201-227.
- Kohn, M.L., and Schooner, C. 1983. *Work and Personality: an inquiry into the impact of social stratification*. Norwood, New Jersey, Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Marcus, George E., Sandra L. Wood, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1998. "Linking Neuroscience to Political Intolerance and Political Judgment." *Politics and the Life Sciences* 17: 165-178.

- Marcus, George, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. The University of Chicago Press: IL.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2015. "I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2015), pp. 128-145.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2018. "Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 82, Issue S1, pp. 866-887.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology*. 2001. 27:415-44.
- Miller, David and Sundas Ali. 2014. "Testing the national identity argument." *European Political Science Review*, 6:2, 237-259.
- Morgan, Scott G., Elizabeth Mullen, and Linda Skitka. 2010. "When Values and Attributions Collide: Liberals' and Conservatives' Values Motivate Attributions for Alleged Misdeeds," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36 (9), 1241-1254.
- Oliver, J. E. and Mendelberg, T. 2000 'Reconstructing the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3), 574-89.
- Olzak, S. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Pettigrew, Thomas, Ulrich Wagner, and Christ. 2007. "Who Opposes Immigration?: Comparing German With North American Findings." *DuBois Review*. Spring, pp. 19-39.
- Portes, Alejandro and Erik Vickstrom. 2011. "Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 37:461-79.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert. 2007. "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century," *The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture*.
- Sagiv, Lilach and Shalom Schwartz. 1995. "Value Priorities and Readiness for Out-Group Social Contact." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, September, 1995. Pp 437-448.

- Schildkraut, Deborah. 2011. *Americanism in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge University Press: NY.
- Schwartz, Shalom. 1992. "Universals in the Context and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 25.
- Schwartz, S. 2004. "Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In *Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*." ed. H Vinken, J Soeters, P Ester. Leiden, The Neth.: Brill.
- Schwartz, Shalom. 2006. "A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications." *Comparative Sociology*, Volume 5, issue 2-3.
- Schwartz et al. 2001. "Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement." *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 2001:32:519.
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lonnqvist, J.-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., and Konty, M. 2012. "Refining the theory of basic individual values." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 103, 663-688. doi: 10.1037/a0029393
- Schwartz, S. H. (2008). *Basic human values: An overview*. Retrieved from <http://segrdid2.fmag.unict.it/Allegati/convegno%207-8-10-05/Schwartzpaper.pdf>
- Schwartz, S. H. 2015. Basic individual values: Sources and consequences. In D. Sander and T. Brosch (Eds.), *Handbook of value*. Oxford: UK, Oxford University Press.
- Sniderman, Paul and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton University Press: UK.
- Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Tan, Shelly, Youjin Shin, and Danielle Rindler. 2021. "How one of America's ugliest days unraveled inside and outside the Capitol," The Washington Post, accessed 5/25/21: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/capitol-insurrection-visual-timeline/>
- Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. 2009. *Who Counts as an American? The Boundaries of National Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Tir, Jaroslav and Shane Singh. 2015. "Get off my lawn: Territorial civil wars and subsequent social intolerance in the public." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 52(4), pp. 478–491.
- Van der Meer, Tom and Jochem Tolsma. 2014. "Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2014. 40:459–78.
- Wals, Sergio. 2011. "Does What Happens in Los Mochis Stay in Los Mochis? Explaining Postmigration Political Behavior," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 64, Issue 3, pp. 600–611.
- Wals, Sergio. 2013. "Made in the USA? Immigrants' imported ideology and political engagement," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 32, Issue 4, pp. 756–767.
- Walsham, Alexandra. 2006. *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700*. Manchester University Press: NY.